Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
continue the pursuit. Not only was the infantry utterly exhausted, but
the horses of the artillery were worn out; and about five miles out of
Winchester the troops were ordered to halt and bivouac.[24] The
Federals, relieved from the pressure of the hostile fire, gradually
reformed their ranks; and Jackson, notwithstanding the extraordinary
exertions he had demanded from his troops, his own skilful manœuvres,
and the high spirit of his men, saw his opportunity pass away. His
impatience was almost uncontrollable. His staff was dispatched in all
directions to urge forward the remainder of the batteries. “We must
press them to the Potomac!” “Forward to the Potomac!” Such was the
tenor of every order; and at length, as the Federals disappeared in the
far distance, he ordered the
artillery teams to be unhitched, and the gunners, thus mounted, to
pursue the enemy. But before this strange substitute for cavalry had
moved out, the lagging squadrons arrived, and with a few fiery words
they were sent at speed down the Valley turnpike. But it was too late.
Banks, for the second time, was more fortunate than he deserved.
To the misconduct of Ashby’s troopers, and to the pedantic folly of
General Steuart, the escape of the Federal army must be attributed.
“Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry
to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Had the cavalry
played its part in this pursuit as well as the four companies under
Colonel Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a
small portion of Banks’ army would have made its escape to the
Potomac.”
So runs Jackson’s official report, and when the disorganised condition
of the Federal battalions, as they fled north from Winchester, is
recalled, it is difficult to question the opinion therein expressed.
The precipitate retreat from Strasburg, accompanied by the loss of
waggons and of stores; the concentrated attack of overwhelming numbers,
followed by the disorderly rush through the streets of Winchester, had,
for the time being, dissolved the bonds of discipline. It is true that
some of the Federal regiments held together; but many men were missing;
some fell into the hands of the Confederates, others sought safety by
devious roads, and there can be little doubt but that those who fled to
the Potomac were for the time being utterly demoralised. Had they been
resolutely charged before they had reformed their ranks, their rifles
would no more have saved them from annihilation than they had saved
Kenly’s command at Cedarville.
But where was the cavalry? Ashby’s 50 men, all that he had been able to
collect, were far away upon the right; out of reach of orders, and in
any case too few for effective use. The two regiments under Steuart,
600 or 700 strong, were the force on which Jackson had depended, and
Steuart had shown himself
incapable of command. He had received Jackson’s message with the reply
that he could obey no orders unless they came through his immediate
superior.[25] Before Ewell could be found, precious time was wasted,
and two hours elapsed before the cavalry took up the chase. But the
Federals had now established strong rear-guards. The whole of their
cavalry, supported by artillery, had been ordered to cover the retreat;
and Steuart, although he picked up numerous prisoners, and followed as
far as Martinsburg, twenty-two miles north of Winchester, found no
opportunity for attack.
Halting for two and a half hours at Martinsburg, the Federals continued
their retreat at sunset, abandoning the magazines in the town to their
pursuers. Before midnight 3,000 or 4,000 men had arrived at
Williamsport, and by the ford and ferry, supplemented by a few pontoon
boats, the remnant of Banks’ army crossed the broad Potomac.
Although not a single Confederate squadron had followed him from
Martinsburg, the Northern general, elated by his unexpected escape,
spoke of this operation as if it had been carried out under heavy fire.
“It is seldom,” he reported, “that a river-crossing of such magnitude
is achieved (_sic_) with greater success.” But he added, with more
candour, “there were never more grateful hearts, in the same number of
men, than when at mid-day on the 26th we stood on the opposite shore;”
and then, with the loss of 2,000 men, a hundred waggons, the regimental
transport of his cavalry, nearly 800 sick, and a vast quantity of
stores, to traverse his assertion, he stated that his command “had not
suffered an attack or rout, but had accomplished a premeditated march
of near sixty miles in the face of the enemy, defeating his plans, and
giving him battle wherever he was found!’[26]
But the Northern people were not to be deceived. The truth was but too
apparent; and long before Banks had found leisure to write his report,
terror had taken possession of the nation. While the soldiers of the
Valley lay round Winchester, reposing from their fatigues, and regaling
themselves on the captured stores, the Governors of thirteen States
were calling on their militia to march to the defence of Washington.
Jackson had struck a deadly blow. Lincoln and Stanton were electrified
even more effectually than Banks. They issued an urgent call for more
troops. “There is no doubt,” wrote Stanton to the Governor of
Massachusetts, “that the enemy in great force are marching on
Washington.” In the cities of the North the panic was indescribable. As
the people came out of church the newsboys were crying, “Defeat of
General Banks! Washington in danger!” The newspaper offices were
surrounded by anxious crowds. In the morning edition of the _New York
Herald_ a leader had appeared which was headed “Fall of Richmond.” The
same evening it was reported that the whole of the rebel army was
marching to the Potomac. Troops were hurried to Harper’s Ferry from
Baltimore and Washington. The railways were ordered to place their
lines at the disposal of the Government. McDowell, on the eve of
starting to join McClellan, was ordered to lay aside the movement, and
to send half his army to the Valley.[27] Frémont, who was about to join
his column from the Great Kanawha, was called upon to support Banks.
McClellan was warned, by the President himself, that the enemy was
making a general movement northward, and that he must either attack
Richmond forthwith or come to the defence of Washington. A reserve
corps of 50,000 men was ordered to be organised at once, and stationed
permanently near the capital; and in one day nearly half a million
American citizens offered their services to save the Union.
Jackson’s success was as complete as it was sudden. The second
diversion against Washington was as effective as the first, and the
victory at Winchester even more prolific of results than the defeat at
Kernstown. Within four-and-twenty hours the storm-cloud which had been
gathering about Fredericksburg was dispersed. McDowell’s army of 40,000
men and 100 guns was scattered beyond the hope of speedy concentration.
McClellan, who had pushed forward his left wing across the
Chickahominy, suddenly found himself deprived of the support on which
he counted to secure his right; and Johnston, who had determined to
attack his opponent before that support should arrive, was able to
postpone operations until the situation should become more favourable.
Immediately after his victory Jackson had sent an officer to Richmond
with dispatches explaining his views, and asking for instructions. Lee,
in reply, requested him to press the enemy, to threaten an invasion of
Maryland, and an assault upon the Federal capital.
May 28 Early on the 28th, the Stonewall Brigade advanced towards
Harper’s Ferry. At that point, crowded with stores of every
description, 7,000 men and 18 guns, under General Saxton, had already
been assembled. At Charlestown, Winder’s advanced guard struck a
reconnoitring detachment, composed of two regiments, a section of
artillery, and a cavalry regiment. Within twenty minutes the Federals,
already demoralised by the defeat of Banks, were retiring in disorder,
abandoning arms, blankets, and haversacks, along the road, and the
pursuit was continued until their reserves were descried in strong
force on the Bolivar Heights, a low ridge covering Harper’s Ferry from
the south. The same evening Ewell advanced in support of Winder; and,
on the 29th, the Valley army was concentrated near Halltown, with the
exception of the Louisiana brigade, posted near Berryville, the 12th
Georgia, with 2 guns, in occupation of Front Royal, and Ashby, on the
road to Wardensville, watching Frémont.
During the afternoon the 2nd Virginia Infantry was sent across the
Shenandoah, and occupying the Loudoun
Heights, threatened the enemy’s position on the ridge below. Saxton, in
consequence, withdrew a part of his troops the same night to the left
bank of the Potomac; but Jackson, although Harper’s Ferry and its
magazines might easily have been taken, made no attempt to follow. His
scouts, riding far to east and west, had already informed him that
McDowell and Frémont were in motion to cut off his retreat. Shields’
division, leading McDowell’s advance from Fredericksburg, was
approaching Manassas Gap; while Frémont, hurrying from Franklin through
the passes of the North Mountain, was ten miles east of Moorefield.
Lee’s instructions had already been carried to the extreme point
consistent with safety, and Jackson determined to retreat by the Valley
turnpike. Not only was it the one road which was not yet closely
threatened, but it was the one road over which the enormous train of
captured stores could be rapidly withdrawn.[28]
May 29 The next morning, therefore, the main body of the army marched
back to Winchester; Winder, with the Stonewall Brigade and two
batteries, remaining before Harper’s Ferry to hold Saxton in check.
Jackson himself returned to Winchester by the railway, and on the way
he was met by untoward news. As the train neared Winchester a staff
officer, riding at a gallop across the fields, signalled it to stop,
and the general was informed that the 12th Georgia had been driven from
Front Royal, burning the stores, but not the bridges, at Front Royal,
and that Shields’ division was in possession of the village.
The situation had suddenly become more than critical. Front Royal is
but twelve miles from Strasburg. Not a single Confederate battalion was
within five-and-twenty miles of that town, and Winder was just twice as
far away. The next morning might see the Valley turnpike blocked by
10,000 Federals under Shields. Another 10,000, McDowell’s Second
Division, under General Ord, were already near Front Royal; Frémont,
with 15,000, was
pressing forward from the west; and Banks and Saxton, with the same
number, were moving south from the Potomac. With resolute management it
would seem that 35,000 Federals might have been assembled round
Strasburg by midday of the 31st, and that this force might have been
increased to 50,000 by the evening of June 1.[29] Desperate indeed
appeared the Confederate chances. The waggons which conveyed the spoils
of Martinsburg and Charlestown were still at Winchester, and with them
were more than 2,000 prisoners. With the utmost expedition it seemed
impossible that the Valley army, even if the waggons were abandoned,
could reach Strasburg before the evening of the 31st; and the Stonewall
Brigade, with fifty miles to march, would be four-and-twenty hours
later. Escape, at least by the Valley turnpike, seemed absolutely
impossible. Over Pharaoh and his chariots the waters were already
closing.
But there is a power in war more potent than mere numbers. The moral
difficulties of a situation may render the proudest display of physical
force of no avail. Uncertainty and apprehension engender timidity and