Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
hesitation, and if the commander is ill at ease the movements of his
troops become slow and halting. And when several armies, converging on
a single point, are separated by distance or by the enemy, when
communication is tedious, and each general is ignorant of his
colleagues’ movements, uncertainty and apprehension are inevitable.
More than ever is this the case when the enemy has a character for
swiftness and audacity, and some unfortunate detachment is still
reeling under the effects of a crushing and unexpected blow.
Regarding, then, like Napoleon, the difficulties rather than the
numbers of his enemies, Jackson held fast to his purpose, and the
capture of Front Royal disturbed him little. “What news?” he asked
briefly as the staff officer rode up to the carriage door. “Colonel
Connor has been driven back from Front Royal.” Jackson smiled
grimly, but made no reply. His eyes fixed themselves apparently upon
some distant object. Then his preoccupation suddenly disappeared. He
read the dispatch which he held in his hand, tore it in pieces, after
his accustomed fashion, and, leaning forward, rested his head upon his
hands and apparently fell asleep. He soon roused himself, however, and
turning to Mr. Boteler, who tells the story, said: “I am going to send
you to Richmond for reinforcements. Banks has halted at Williamsport,
and is being reinforced from Pennsylvania. Dix (Saxton) is in my front,
and is being reinforced by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway. I have just
received a dispatch informing me of the advance of the enemy upon Front
Royal, which is captured, and Frémont is now advancing towards
Wardensville. Thus, you see, I am nearly surrounded by a very large
force.”
“What is your own, General?” asked his friend.
“I will tell you, but you must not repeat what I say, except at
Richmond. To meet this attack I have only 15,000 effective men.”
“What will you do if they cut you off, General?”
A moment’s hesitation, and then the cool reply: “I will fall back upon
Maryland for reinforcements.”
“Jackson,” says Cooke, “was in earnest. If his retreat was cut off he
intended to advance into Maryland, and doubtless make his way straight
to Baltimore and Washington, depending on the Southern sentiment in
that portion of the State to bring him reinforcements.” That the
Federal Government was apprehensive of some such movement is certain.
The wildest rumours were everywhere prevalent. Men throughout the North
wore anxious faces, and it is said that one question, “Where is
Jackson? Has he taken Washington?” was on every lip. The best proof,
however, that a movement on Washington was actually anticipated by the
Federals is the dispatch of the Secretary of War to the Governors of
the different States: “Send forward all the troops that you can,
immediately. Banks completely routed. Intelligence from various
quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy, in great force, are advancing
on Washington.
You will please organise and forward immediately all the volunteer and
militia force in your State.” Further, on receiving the news of Banks’
defeat, the President had called King’s division of McDowell’s army
corps to defend the capital; and his telegram of May 25 to McClellan,
already alluded to, in which that general was warned that he might have
to return to Washington, is significant of what would have happened had
the Confederates entered Maryland.[30] McClellan’s vast army, in all
human probability, would have been hurriedly re-embarked, and Johnston
have been free to follow Jackson.
May 31 On the night of the 30th the whole Army of the Valley was
ordered back to Strasburg; and early next morning the prisoners,
escorted by the 21st Virginia, and followed by the convoy of waggons in
double column, covering seven miles of road, led the way. Captain
Hotchkiss was sent with orders to Winder to hasten back to Winchester,
and not to halt till he had made some distance between that place and
Strasburg. “I want you to go to Charlestown,” were Jackson’s
instructions to his staff officer, “and bring up the First Brigade. I
will stay in Winchester until you get here, if I can, but if I cannot,
and the enemy gets here first, you must conduct it around through the
mountains.”
The march, however, as the general had expected, was made without
molestation, and during the afternoon the main body reached Strasburg,
and camped there for the night. The Stonewall Brigade, meanwhile, had
passed through Winchester, halting near Newtown; the 2nd Virginia
Regiment having marched thirty-five miles, and all the remainder
twenty-eight. Little had been seen of the enemy. Frémont had passed
Wardensville, and, marching through heavy rain, had halted after
nightfall at Cedar Creek, six miles west of Strasburg. On the road to
Front Royal, only a few scouts had been encountered by the Confederate
patrols, for Shields, deceived by a demonstration
which the Louisiana Brigade had made from Winchester, had let the day
pass by without a decisive movement. The difficulties on which Jackson
had counted had weighted the feet of his adversaries with lead.[31]
Frémont, with two-and-twenty miles to march, had suffered Ashby to
delay his progress; and although he had promised Lincoln that he would
be in Strasburg at five o’clock that evening, he had halted on the
mountains six miles distant. Shields, far ahead of the next division,
had done nothing more than push a brigade towards Winchester, and place
strong pickets on every road by which the enemy might approach. Neither
Federal general could communicate with the other, for the country
between them was held by the enemy. Both had been informed of the
other’s whereabouts, but both were uncertain as to the other’s
movements; and the dread of encountering, unsupported, the terrible
weight of Jackson’s onset had sapped their resolution. Both believed
the enemy far stronger than he really was. The fugitives from
Winchester had spread exaggerated reports of the Confederate numbers,
and the prisoners captured at Front Royal had by no means minimised
them.[32] Banks, impressed by the long array of bayonets that had
crowned the ridge at Winchester, rated them at 20,000 infantry, with
cavalry and artillery in addition. Geary, who had retired in hot haste
from Rectortown, burning his tents and stores, had learned, he
reported, from numerous sources that 10,000 cavalry were passing
through Manassas Gap. There were constant rumours that strong
reinforcements were coming up from Richmond, and even McDowell believed
that the army of invasion consisted of 25,000 to 30,000 men.
Frémont’s scouts, as he approached Strasburg, represented the
Confederate force at 30,000 to 60,000.” Shields, before he crossed the
Blue Ridge and found himself in the vicinity of his old opponent, had
condemned the panic that had seized his brother generals, and had told
McDowell that he would clear the Valley with his own division. But when
he reached Front Royal the force that he had scornfully described as
insignificant had swelled to 20,000 men. Troops from Richmond, he
telegraphed, were marching down the Luray Valley; and he urged that he
should be at once supported by two divisions. It cannot be said that
Lincoln and Stanton were to blame for the indecision of the generals.
They had urged Frémont forward to Strasburg, and Shields to Front
Royal. They had informed them, by the telegraph, of each other’s
situation, and had passed on such intelligence of the enemy’s movements
as had been acquired at Harper’s Ferry; and yet, although the
information was sufficiently exact, both Shields and Frémont, just as
Jackson anticipated, held back at the decisive moment. The waters had
been held back, and the Confederates had passed through them dry-shod.
Such is the effect of uncertainty in war; a mighty power in the hands
of a general who understands its scope.
June 1 On the morning of June 1, Jackson’s only remaining anxiety was
to bring Winder back, and to expedite the retreat of the convoy. Ewell
was therefore ordered to support Ashby, and to hold Frémont in check
until the Stonewall Brigade had passed through Strasburg. The task was
easily accomplished. At seven in the morning the Confederate pickets
were driven in. As they fell back on their supports, the batteries on
both sides came rapidly into action, and the Federal infantry pressed
forward. But musketry replied to musketry, and finding the road blocked
by a line of riflemen, Frémont ordered his troops to occupy a defensive
position on Cedar Creek. “I was entirely ignorant,” he says, “of what
had taken place in the Valley beyond, and it was now evident that
Jackson, in superior force, was at or near Strasburg.” His men, also,
appear to have caught the spirit of irresolution, for a forward
movement on the part of the Confederates drove in Blenker’s Germans
with the greatest ease. “Sheep,” says General Taylor, “would have made
as much resistance as we met. Men decamped without firing, or threw
down their arms and surrendered. Our whole skirmish line was, advancing
briskly. I sought Ewell and reported. We had a fine game before us, and
the temptation to play it was great; but Jackson’s orders were
imperative and wise. He had his stores to save, Shields to guard
against, Lee’s grand strategy to promote. He could not waste time
chasing Frémont.”[33]
Winder reached Strasburg about noon. The troops that had been facing
Frémont were then withdrawn; and the whole force, now reunited, fell
back on Woodstock; Ashby, with the cavalry, holding his old position on
Tom’s Brook. The retreat was made in full view of the Federal scouts.
On the Confederates retiring from before him, Frémont had pushed
forward a reconnaissance, and Bayard’s cavalry brigade, of McDowell’s
army, came up in the evening on the other flank. But attack was
useless. The Confederate trains were disappearing in the distance, and
heavy masses of all arms were moving slowly south. The Federal horsemen
were unsupported save by a single battery. McDowell, who had reached
Front Royal with part of his Second Division in the morning, had
endeavoured to push Shields forward upon Strasburg. But Shields,
fearing attack, had dispersed his troops to guard the various roads;
and when at last they were assembled, misled by erroneous information,
he had directed them on Winchester. Before the mistake was discovered
the day had passed away. It was not until the next morning that the
Federal columns came into communication, and then Jackson was already
south of Woodstock.
On Friday morning, May 29, says Allan, “Jackson was in front of
Harper’s Ferry, fifty miles from Strasburg. Frémont was at Fabius,
twenty miles from Strasburg; and Shields was not more than twenty miles
from Strasburg, for his advance entered Front Royal, which is but
twelve miles distant, before mid-day, while McDowell was
following with two divisions. Yet by Sunday night Jackson had marched
between fifty and sixty miles, though encumbered with prisoners and
captured stores, had reached Strasburg before either of his
adversaries, and had passed safely between their armies, while he held
Frémont at bay by a show of force, and blinded and bewildered Shields
by the rapidity of his movements.”
From the morning of May 19 to the night of June 1, a period of fourteen
days, the Army of the Valley had marched one hundred and seventy miles,
had routed a force of 12,500 men, had threatened the North with
invasion, had drawn off McDowell from Fredericksburg, had seized the
hospitals and supply depots at Front Royal, Winchester,[34] and
Martinsburg, and finally, although surrounded on three sides by 60,000
men, had brought off a huge convoy without losing a single waggon.
This remarkable achievement, moreover, had been comparatively