Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
bloodless. The loss of 618 officers and men was a small price to pay
for such results.[35]
That Jackson’s lucky star was in the ascendant there can be little
doubt. But fortune had far less to do with his success than skill and
insight; and in two instances—the misconduct of his cavalry, and the
surprise of the 12th Georgia—the blind goddess played him false. Not
that he trusted to her favours. “Every movement throughout the whole
period,” says one of his staff officers, “was the result of profound
calculation. He knew what his men could do, and to whom he could
entrust the execution of important orders.”[36] Nor was his danger of
capture, on his retreat from Harper’s Ferry, so great as it appeared.
May 31 was the crisis of his operations. On that morning, when the
prisoners and the convoy marched out of Winchester, Shields was at
Front Royal. But Shields
was unsupported; Ord’s division was fifteen miles in rear, and Bayard’s
cavalry still further east. Even had he moved boldly on Strasburg he
could hardly have seized the town. The ground was in Jackson’s favour.
The only road available for the Federals was that which runs south of
the North Fork and the bridges had been destroyed. At that point, three
miles east of Strasburg, a small flank-guard might have blocked the way
until the main body of the Confederates had got up. And had Frémont,
instead of halting that evening at Cedar Creek, swept Ashby aside and
pushed forward to join his colleague, the Valley army might easily have
effected its retreat. Winder alone would have been cut off, and Jackson
had provided for that emergency.
When the embarrassments under which the Federals laboured are laid
bare, the passage of the Confederates between the converging armies
loses something of its extraordinary character. Nevertheless, the
defeat of the Front Royal garrison and the loss of the bridges was
enough to have shaken the strongest nerves. Had Jackson then burnt his
convoy, and released his prisoners, few would have blamed him; and the
tenacity with which he held to his original purpose, the skill with
which he imposed on both Shields and Frémont, are no less admirable
than his perception of his opponents’ difficulties. Well has it been
said: “What gross ignorance of human nature do those declaimers display
who assert that the employing of brute force is the highest
qualification of a general!”
NOTE
POSITION OF THE TROOPS, MAY 29 TO JUNE 1
_Night of May 29_
FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell
Shields, 10,200, Rectorstown.
Ord, 9,000, Thoroughfare Gap.
Bayard, 2,000. Catlett’s Station.
Frémont, 15,000, Fabius.
Saxton, 7,000, Harper’s Ferry.
Banks, 7,000, Williamsport.
Geary, 2,000, Middleburg. Jackson’s Division, 7,200, Halltown.
Ewell’s Division, 5,000, Halltown.
Ashby. 800, Wardensville road.
Taylor’s Brigade, 8,000, Berryville.
12th Georgia Regiment, 460, Front Royal.
2nd Virginia Regiment, 860, Loudoun Heights.
_Night of May 30_
FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell
Shields, 10,200, Front Royal.
Ord, 9,000, Piedmont.
Bayard, 2,000,
Thoroughfare Gap.
King, 10,000,
near Catlett’s Station.
Saxton, 7,000, Harper’s Ferry.
Banks, 8,600, Williamsport.
Freémont, 15,000, Wardensville.
Geary, 2,000, Upperville. Army of Valley, 13,850, Winchester.
Stonewall Brigade, 1,600, Halltown.
2nd Virginia Regiment, 380,
Loudoun Heights.
Ashby, 300, Wardensville Road.
_Night of May 31_
FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell
Shields, Front Royal.
Ord, Manassas Gap.
King, Catlett’s Station.
Bayard, Manassas Gap.
Saxton, Harper’s Ferry.
Banks, Williamsport.
Frémont, Cedar Creek.
Geary, Snicker’s and Ashby’s Gaps. Army of Valley, Strasburg.
Stonewall Brigade, Newtown.
Ashby, Cedar Creek.
_Night of June 1_
FEDERALS CONFEDERATES McDowell
Shields, ten miles south of
Front Royal.
Ord, Front Royal.
King, Haymarket.
Bayard, Buckton.
Saxton, Harper’s Ferry.
Banks, Williamsport.
Frémont, Cedar Creek.
Geary, Snicker’s and Ashby’s Gaps. Army of Valley, Woodstock. Ashby,
Tom’s Brook.
TOTAL STRENGTH
Federal 62,000
Confederate 16,000
[1] General A. S. Johnston.
[2] Directly McClellan closed in on Richmond, McDowell was ordered, as
soon as Shields should join him, to march from Manassas to his
assistance. Lincoln and Stanton had recovered confidence when Jackson
returned to the Valley from Mechum’s Station.
[3] This estimate is Colonel Allan’s. Cf _The Valley Campaign,_ pp.
92, 93. Dabney gives 16,000 men.
[4] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ General R. Taylor pp. 38, 39.
[5] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 890.
[6] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 52, 53.
[7] _Ibid,_ p. 37.
[8] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 54–6.
[9] Compare instructions to Ewell, _ante,_ p. 281.
[10] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 201.
[11] O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 523, 560.
[12] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 95.
[13] The ingenuous report of a Federal officer engaged at Front Royal
is significant of the effect of the sudden attack of the Confederates.
He was sick at the time, but managed to escape. “By considerable
coaxing,” he wrote, “I obtained an entrance to a house near by. I was
now completely broken down—so much so that the gentleman prepared a
liniment for me, and actually bound up some of my bruises, while the
female portion of the household actually screamed for joy at our
defeat! I was helped to bed, and next morning was taken by Mr. Bitzer
to Winchester in his carriage. He is a gentleman in all particulars,
but his family is the reverse (_sic_). On reaching Winchester I found
things decidedly squally, and concluded to get out. I was carried to
Martinsburg, and being offered by the agent of a luggage train to take
me to Baltimore, I concluded to accept the offer, and took a sleeping
bunk, arriving in Baltimore the next afternoon.” He then proceeded to
Philadelphia, and sent for his physician. Several of his officers whom
he found in the town he immediately sent back to the colours; but as
he believed that “the _moral_ of his regiment was not as it should be”
he remained himself in Philadelphia.
[14] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 93, 94. It may be recalled that Wellington
found it necessary to form a corps of the same kind in the Peninsular
War; it is curious that no such organisation exists in regular armies.
[15] _From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,_ pp. 191, 192.
[16] Article in _Harper’s Weekly_ by Colonel Strother, aide-de-camp to
General Banks.
[17] Jackson’s Report. O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 703.
[18] The supply waggons were still eight miles south of Front Royal,
in the Luray Valley.
[19] Jackson’s Report. O.R., vol. xii, part i, p. 704.
[20] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 101–2. “The difficulty,” says General
Taylor, speaking of the Confederate cavalry, “of converting raw men
into soldiers is enhanced manifold when they are mounted. Both man and
horse require training, and facilities for rambling, with temptation
to do so, are increased. There was little time, and it may be said
less disposition, to establish camps of instruction. Living on
horseback, fearless and dashing, the men of the South afforded the
best possible material for cavalry. They had every quality but
discipline, and resembled Prince Charming, whose manifold gifts were
rendered useless by the malignant fairy. Assuredly our cavalry
rendered much excellent service, especially when dismounted; and such
able officers as Stuart, Hampton, and the younger Lees in the east,
Forrest, Green, and Wheeler in the West, developed much talent for
war; but their achievements, however distinguished, fell far below the
standard that would have been reached had not the want of discipline
impaired their efforts.”—_Destruction and Reconstruction,_ pp. 70–71.
It is only fair to add, however, that the Confederate troopers had to
supply their own horses, receiving no compensation for their loss by
disease or capture. This in some measure excuses their anxiety to loot
as many chargers as they could lay hands on.
[21] Twenty regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. O.R.,
vol. xii, part iii, p. 313.
[22] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 65.
[23] Banks’ aide-de-camp, Colonel Strother, says, “For several minutes
it looked like the commencement of a Bull Run panic. The stragglers,”
he adds, “rapidly increased in numbers, and many threw down their
arms.” _Harper’s Weekly._ See also Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xii,
part i, p. 706.
[24] The greater part of the troops had marched over thirty miles in
thirty hours, during which time they had been almost continuously
engaged.
[25] Jackson’s Report.
[26] Some of Banks’ officers shared his opinion. The captain of the
Zouaves d’Afrique, the general’s body-guard, who had been cut off at
Strasburg, but rejoined on the Potomac, reported that, “incredible as
it may appear, my men marched 141 miles in 47 hours, as measured by
Captain Abert,” and concluded by congratulating Banks upon the success
of his “unparalleled retreat.” The Zouaves, at all events, could not
complain that they had been excluded from “active operations.” Another
officer declared that “we have great reason to be grateful to kind
Providence, and applaud the skill and energy of our commanding
officers for the miraculous escape of our men from utter
annihilation.” O.R., vol. xii, part i, pp. 573, 611.
[27] Shields’ and Ord’s divisions of infantry, and Bayard’s brigade of
cavalry, numbering all told 21,200 officers and men.
[28] Jackson, although the harvest was in full swing, had given orders
that all waggons in the valley were to be impressed and sent to
Winchester and Martinsburg.
[29] For the distribution of the different forces during this period
see Note at end of chapter.
[30] O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 81. King’s division, when it was found
that Jackson had halted near Winchester, was ordered to Front Royal.
The fourth division, McCall’s, was left to defend Fredericksburg.
[31] Up to the time that they arrived within striking distance of
Jackson they had acted vigorously, Shields marching eighty miles in
five days, and Frémont seventy over a mountain road.
[32] According to the Official Records, 156 men were taken by General
Shields. It is said that when Colonel Connor, in command of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, reported to Jackson at Winchester, and gave rather a
sensational account of his defeat, the General looked up, and asked in
his abrupt manner: “Colonel, how many men had you killed?” “None, I am
glad to say, General.” “How many wounded?” “Few or none, sir.” “Do you
call that fighting, sir?” said Jackson, and immediately placed him
under arrest, from which he was not released for several months.
[33] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 78.
[34] Quartermaster’s stores, to the value of £25,000, were captured at
Winchester alone, and 9,354 small arms, besides two guns, were carried
back to Staunton.
[35] 68 killed; 386 wounded; 3 missing; 156 captured.
[36] Letter from Major Hotchkiss.
Chapter XI
CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC
By the ignorant and the envious success in war is easily explained
away. The dead military lion, and, for that matter, even the living, is
a fair mark for the heels of a baser animal. The greatest captains have
not escaped the critics. The genius of Napoleon has been belittled on
the ground that each one of his opponents, except Wellington, was only
second-rate. French historians have attributed Wellington’s victories
to the mutual jealousy of the French marshals; and it has been asserted
that Moltke triumphed only because his adversaries blundered. Judged by