Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
by water; and two days later McDowell himself, with the remainder of
his force, was directed to join McClellan as speedily as possible
overland. Frémont, on the same date, was instructed to halt at
Harrisonburg, and Shields to march to Fredericksburg. But before
Stanton’s dispatches reached their destination both Frémont and Shields
had been defeated, and the plans of the Northern Cabinet were once more
upset.
Instead of moving at once on Fredericksburg, and in spite of McDowell’s
remonstrances, Shields was detained at Luray, and Ricketts, who had
succeeded Ord, at Front Royal; while Frémont, deeming himself too much
exposed at Harrisonburg, fell back to Mount Jackson. It was not till
June 20 that Ricketts and Shields were permitted to leave the Valley,
ten days after the order had been issued for McDowell to move on
Richmond. For that space of time, then, his departure was delayed; and
there was worse to come. The great strategist at Richmond had not yet
done with Lincoln. There was still more profit to be derived from the
situation; and from the subsidiary operations in the Valley we may now
turn to the main armies.
By Jackson’s brilliant manœuvres McDowell had been lured westward at
the very moment he was about to join McClellan. The gap between the two
Federal armies had been widened from five to fifteen marches, while
Jackson at Brown’s Gap was no more than nine marches distant from
Richmond. McClellan, moreover, had been paralysed by the vigour of
Jackson’s blows.
On May 16, as already related, he had reached White House on the
Pamunkey, twenty miles from the Confederate capital. Ten miles south,
and directly across his path, flowed the Chickahominy, a formidable
obstacle to the march of a large army.
On the 24th, having already been informed that he was to be reinforced
by McDowell, he was told that the movement of the latter for
Fredericksburg was postponed until the Valley had been cleared. This
change of plan placed him in a most awkward predicament. A portion of
his army, in order to lend a hand to McDowell, had already crossed the
Chickahominy, a river with but few points of passage, and over which,
by reason of the swamps, the construction of military bridges was a
difficult and tedious operation. On May 30, two army corps were south
of the Chickahominy, covering, in a partially intrenched position, the
building of the bridges, while three army corps were still on the
further bank.
McClellan’s difficulties had not escaped the observation of his
watchful adversaries, and on the morning of May 31 the Federal lines
were heavily attacked by Johnston. The left of the position on the
south side of the Chickahominy was protected by the White Oak Swamp, a
broad and almost impassable morass; but the right, thrown back to the
river, was unprotected by intrenchments, and thinly manned. The defence
of the first line had been assigned to one corps only; the second was
five miles in rear. The assailants should have won an easy triumph. But
if McClellan had shown but little skill in the distribution of his
troops on the defensive, the Confederate arrangements for attack were
even more at fault. The country between Richmond and the Chickahominy
is level and well wooded. It was intersected by several roads, three of
which led directly to the enemy’s position. But the roads were bad, and
a tremendous rain-storm, which broke on the night of the 30th,
transformed the fields into tracts of greasy mud, and rendered the
passage of artillery difficult. The natural obstacles, however, were
not the chief.
The force detailed for the attack amounted to 40,000 men, or
twenty-three brigades. The Federal works were but five miles from
Richmond, and the Confederates were ordered to advance at dawn. But it
was the first time that an offensive movement on so large a scale had
been
attempted; the woods and swamps made supervision difficult, and the
staff proved unequal to the task of ensuring co-operation. The orders
for attack were badly framed. The subordinate generals did not clearly
comprehend what was expected from them. There were misunderstandings as
to the roads to be followed, and as to who was to command the wings.
The columns crossed, and half the day was wasted in getting into
position. It was not till 1 p.m. that the first gun was fired, and not
till 4 p.m. that the commanding general, stationed with the left wing,
was made acquainted with the progress of his right and centre. When it
was at last delivered, the attack was piecemeal; and although
successful in driving the enemy from his intrenchments, it failed to
drive him from the field. The Federals fell back to a second line of
earthworks, and were strongly reinforced from beyond the river. During
the battle Johnston himself was severely wounded, and the command
devolved on General G. W. Smith. Orders were issued that the attack
should be renewed next morning; but for reasons which have never been
satisfactorily explained, only five of the twenty-three brigades were
actively engaged, and the battle of Seven Pines ended with the
unmolested retreat of the Confederates. Smith fell sick, and General
Lee was ordered by the President to take command of the army in the
field.
McClellan, thanks to the bad work of the Confederate staff at the
battle of Seven Pines, had now succeeded in securing the passages
across the Chickahominy. But for the present he had given up all idea
of an immediate advance. Two of his army corps had suffered severely,
both in men and in _moral_; the roads were practically impassable for
artillery; the bridges over the Chickahominy had been much injured by
the floods; and it was imperative to re-establish the communications.
Such is his own explanation of his inactivity; but his official
correspondence with the Secretary of War leaves no doubt that his hope
of being reinforced by McDowell was a still more potent reason. During
the first three weeks in June he received repeated assurances from Mr.
Stanton that large bodies of troops were on their way to join him,
and it was for these that he was waiting. This expectant attitude, due
to McDowell’s non-arrival, entailed on him a serious disadvantage. If
he transferred his whole army to the right bank of the Chickahominy,
his line of supply, the railway to West Point, would be exposed; and,
secondly, when McDowell approached from Fredericksburg, it would be
possible for Leo to drive that general back before the Army of the
Potomac could give him direct support, or in any case to cut off all
communication with him. McClellan was consequently compelled to retain
his right wing north of the river; and indeed in so doing he was only
obeying his instructions. On May 18 Stanton had telegraphed: “You are
instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication [with
McDowell], by extending your right wing north of Richmond.”
The Federal army, then, whilst awaiting the promised reinforcements,
was divided into two parts by a stream which another storm might render
impassable. It will thus be seen that Jackson’s operations not only
deprived McClellan of the immediate aid of 40,000 men and 100 guns, but
placed him in a most embarrassing situation. “The faulty location of
the Union army,” says General Porter, commanding the Fifth Federal Army
Corps, “was from the first realised by General McClellan, and became
daily an increasing cause of care and anxiety; not the least disturbing
element of which was the impossibility of quickly reinforcing his right
wing or promptly withdrawing it to the south bank.”[16]
Seeing that the Confederates were no more than 60,000 strong, while the
invading army mustered 100,000, it would seem that the knot should have
been cut by an immediate attack on the Richmond lines. But McClellan,
who had been United States Commissioner in the Crimea, knew something
of the strength of earthworks; and moreover, although the comparatively
feeble numbers developed by the Confederates at Seven Pines should have
enlightened him, he still believed that his enemy’s army was far larger
than his own. So, notwithstanding his danger, he
preferred to postpone his advance till Jackson’s defeat should set
McDowell free.
Fatal was the mistake which retained McDowell’s divisions in the
Valley, and sent Shields in pursuit of Jackson. While the Federal army,
waiting for reinforcements, lay astride the noisome swamps of the
Chickahominy, Lee was preparing a counterstroke on the largest scale.
The first thing to do was to reduce the disparity of numbers; and to
effect this troops were to be brought up from the south, Jackson was to
come to Richmond, and McDowell was to be kept away. This last was of
more importance than the rest, and, at the same time, more difficult of
attainment. Jackson was certainly nearer to Richmond than was McDowell;
but to defeat McClellan would take some time, and it was essential that
Jackson should have a long start, and not arrive upon the battlefield
with McDowell on his heels. It was necessary, therefore, that the
greater part of the latter’s force should be detained on the
Shenandoah; and on June 8, while Cross Keys was being fought, Lee wrote
to Jackson: “Should there be nothing requiring your attention in the
Valley, so as to prevent you leaving it in a few days, and you can make
arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your
presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment
with the army near Richmond. Make your arrangements accordingly; but
should an opportunity occur of striking the enemy a successful blow, do
not let it escape you.”
June 11 At the same time a detachment of 7,000 infantry was ordered to
the Valley. “Your recent successes,” wrote Lee on the 11th, when the
news of Cross Keys and Port Republic had been received, “have been the
cause of the liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. The
admiration excited by your skill and boldness has been constantly
mingled with solicitude for your situation. The practicability of
reinforcing you has been the subject of gravest consideration. It has
been
determined to do so at the expense of weakening this army.
Brigadier-General Lawton with six regiments from Georgia is on his way
to you, and Brigadier-General Whiting with eight veteran regiments
leaves here to-day. The object is to enable you to crush the forces
opposed to you. Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and
guard the passes covered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your
main body, including Ewell’s division and Lawton’s and Whiting’s
commands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you may find
most advantageous, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and the
Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy’s communications, etc., while this army
attacks McClellan in front. He will then, I think, be forced to come
out of his intrenchments, where he is strongly posted on the
Chickahominy, and apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on
Richmond.”[17]
Before the reinforcements reached the Valley both Frémont and Shields
were out of reach. To have followed them down the Valley would have
been injudicious. Another victory would have doubtless held McDowell
fast, but it would have drawn Jackson too far from Richmond. The
Confederate generals, therefore, in order to impose upon their enemies,
and to maintain the belief that Washington was threatened, had recourse
to stratagem. The departure of Whiting and Lawton for the Valley was
ostentatiously announced. Federal prisoners, about to be dismissed upon
parole, were allowed to see the trains full of soldiers proceeding
westward, to count the regiments. And learn their destination. Thus Lee
played his part in the game of deception, and meanwhile Jackson had
taken active measures to the same end.