Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
great painter, gifted with the sense of historic fitness, to place on
his canvas the council in the Virginia homestead, two figures only
would occupy the foreground: the one weary with travel, white with the
dust of many leagues, and bearing on his frayed habiliments the traces
of rough bivouacs and mountain roads; the other, tall, straight, and
stately; still, for all his fifty years, remarkable for his personal
beauty, and endowed with all the simple dignity of a noble character
and commanding intellect. In that humble chamber, where the only
refreshment the Commander-in-Chief could offer was a glass of milk, Lee
and Jackson met for the first time since the war had begun. Lee’s hours
of triumph had yet to come. The South was aware that he was sage in
council; he had yet to prove his mettle in the field. But there was at
least one Virginia soldier who knew his worth. With the prescient
sympathy
of a kindred spirit Jackson had divined his daring and his genius, and
although he held always to his own opinions, he had no will but that of
his great commander. With how absolute a trust his devotion was repaid
one of the brightest pages in the history of Virginia tells us; a year
crowded with victories bears witness to the strength begotten of their
mutual confidence. So long as Lee and Jackson led her armies hope shone
on the standards of the South. Great was the constancy of her people;
wonderful the fortitude of her soldiers; but on the shoulders of her
twin heroes rested the burden of the tremendous struggle.
To his four major-generals Lee explained his plan of attack, and then,
retiring to his office, left them to arrange the details. It will be
sufficient for the present to state that Jackson’s troops were to
encamp on the night of the 25th east of Ashland, fifteen miles north of
Richmond, between the village and the Virginia Central Railway. The day
following the interview, the 24th, he returned to his command,
rejoining the column at Beaver Dam Station.
June 24 His advanced guard were now within forty miles of Richmond,
and, so far from McDowell being on his heels, that general was still
north of Fredericksburg. No reinforcements could reach McClellan for
several days; the Confederates were concentrated round Richmond in full
strength; and Lee’s strategy had been entirely successful. Moreover,
with such skill had Jackson’s march been made that the Federal generals
were absolutely ignorant of his whereabouts. McClellan indeed seems to
have had some vague suspicion of his approach; but Lincoln, McDowell,
Banks, Frémont, together with the whole of the Northern people and the
Northern press, believed that he was still west of Gordonsville.
Neither scout, spy, nor patrol was able to penetrate the cordon of
Munford’s outposts. Beyond his pickets, strongly posted at New Market
and Conrad’s Store, all was dim and dark. Had Jackson halted, awaiting
reinforcements? Was he already in motion, marching swiftly and secretly
against some
isolated garrison? Was he planning another dash on Washington, this
time with a larger army at his back? Would his advance be east or west
of the Blue Ridge, across the sources of the Rappahannock, or through
the Alleghanies? Had he 15,000 men or 50,000?
Such were the questions which obtruded themselves on the Federal
generals, and not one could give a satisfactory reply. That a blow was
preparing, and that it would fall where it was least expected, all men
knew. “We have a determined and enterprising enemy to contend with,”
wrote one of Lincoln’s generals. “Jackson,” said another, “marches
thirty miles a day.” The successive surprises of the Valley campaign
had left their mark; and the correspondence preserved in the Official
Records is in itself the highest tribute to Jackson’s skill. He had
gained something more than the respect of his enemies. He had brought
them to fear his name, and from the Potomac to the Rappahannock
uncertainty and apprehension reigned supreme. Not a patrol was sent out
which did not expect to meet the Confederate columns, pressing swiftly
northward; not a general along the whole line, from Romney to
Fredericksburg, who did not tremble for his own security.
There was sore trouble on the Shenandoah. The disasters of McDowell and
Front Royal had taught the Federal officers that when the Valley army
was reported to be sixty miles distant, it was probably deploying in
the nearest forest; and with the rout of Winchester still fresh in
their memories they knew that pursuit would be as vigorous as attack
would be sudden. The air was full of rumours, each more alarming than
its predecessor, and all of them contradictory. The reports of the
cavalry, of spies, of prisoners, of deserters, of escaped negroes, told
each a different story.
Jackson, it was at first reported, had been reinforced to the number of
35,000 men.[23] A few days later his army had swelled to 60,000 with 70
guns, and he was rebuilding the bridge at Port Republic in order to
follow Frémont.
On June 13 he was believed to be moving through Charlottesville against
one or other of McDowell’s divisions. “He was either going against
Shields at Luray, or King at Catlett’s, or Doubleday at Fredericksburg,
or going to Richmond.” On the 16th it was absolutely certain that he
was within striking distance of Front Royal. On the 18th he had gone to
Richmond, but Ewell was still in the Valley with 40,000 men. On the
19th Banks had no doubt but that another immediate movement down the
Valley was intended “with 80,000 or more.” On the 20th Jackson was said
to be moving on Warrenton, east of the Blue Ridge. On the 22nd
“reliable persons” at Harper’s Ferry had learned that he was about to
attack Banks at Middletown; and on the same day Ewell, who was actually
near Frederickshall, was discovered to be moving on Moorefield! On the
25th Frémont had been informed that large reinforcements had reached
Jackson from Tennessee; and Banks was on the watch for a movement from
the west. Frémont heard that Ewell designed to attack Winchester in
rear, and the threat from so dangerous a quarter made Lincoln anxious.
“We have no definite information,” wrote Stanton to McClellan, “as to
the numbers or position of Jackson’s force. Within the last two days
the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating
rumours of Jackson’s advance in various directions, with a view to
conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell nor Banks nor
Frémont appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject.”
This was on June 25, the day the Valley army halted at Ashland; but the
climax was reached on the 28th. For forty-eight hours Jackson had been
fighting McClellan, yet Banks, although “quite confident that he was
not within thirty miles, believed that he was preparing for an attack
on Middletown.” To reach Middletown Jackson would have had to march one
hundred and fifty miles!
Under the influence of these rumours the movements of the Federal
troops were erratic in the extreme.
Frémont, who had originally been ordered to remain at Harrisonburg, had
fallen back on Banks at Middletown,
although ordered to Front Royal, was most reluctant to move so far
south. Shields was first ordered to stand fast at Luray, where he would
be reinforced by Ricketts, and was then ordered to fall back on Front
Royal. Reinforcements were ordered to Romney, to Harper’s Ferry, and to
Winchester; and McDowell, who kept his head throughout, struggled in
vain to reunite his scattered divisions. Divining the true drift of the
Confederate strategy, he realised that to protect Washington, and to
rescue McClellan, the surest method was for his own army corps to march
as rapidly as possible to the Chickahominy. But his pleadings were
disregarded. Lincoln and Stanton had not yet discovered that the best
defence is generally a vigorous attack. They had learned nothing from
the Valley campaign, and they were infected with the fears of Banks and
Frémont. Jackson was well on his way to Richmond before Shields and
Ricketts were permitted to cross the Blue Ridge; and it was not till
the 25th that McDowell’s corps was once more concentrated at
Fredericksburg. The Confederates had gained a start of five marches,
and the Northern Government was still ignorant that they had left the
Valley.
McClellan was equally in the dark. Faint rumours had preceded the march
of Jackson’s army, but he had given them scant credit. On the morning
of the 26th, however, he was rudely enlightened. It was but too clear
that Jackson, strongly reinforced from Richmond, was bearing down upon
his most vulnerable point—his right wing, which, in anticipation of
McDowell’s advance, remained exposed on the north bank of the
Chickahominy.
Nor was this the sum of his troubles. On this same day, when his
outposts were falling back before superior numbers, and the Valley
regiments were closing round their flank, he received a telegram from
Stanton, informing him that the forces commanded by McDowell, Banks,
and Frémont were to form one army under Major-General Pope; and that
this army was “to attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson
and Ewell, and threaten the
enemy in the direction of Charlottesville!” All hope of succour passed
away, and the “Young Napoleon” was left to extricate himself as best he
could, from his many difficulties; difficulties which were due in part
to his own political blindness, in part to the ignorance of Lincoln,
but, in a far larger degree, to the consummate strategy of Lee and
Jackson.
NOTE
_The Marches in the Valley Campaign, March 22 to June 25, 1862_
_Miles_ March 22 Mount Jackson–Strasburg 28 March
23 Strasburg–Kernstown–Newtown 18 Battle of
Kernstown March 24–26 Newtown–Mt. Jackson 35 April
17–19 Mt. Jackson–Elk Run Valley 50 April 30– May
8 Elk Run Valley–Mechum’s River Station 60 May
7–8 Staunton–Shenandoah Mt. 32 Battle of M’Dowell
May 9–11 Bull Pasture Mount–Franklin 30 Skirmishes
May 12–15 Franklin–Lebanon Springs 40 May 17 Lebanon
Springs–Bridgewater 18 May 19–20 Bridgewater–New
Market 24 May 1 New Market–Luray 12 May
22 Luray–Milford 12 May 23 Milford–Front
Royal–Cedarville 22 Action at Front Royal May
24 Cedarville–Abraham’s Creek 22 Action at
Middletown and Newtown May 25 Abraham’s
Creek–Stevenson’s 7 Battle of Winchester May
28 Stevenson’s–Charlestown 15 Skirmish May
29 Charlestown–Halltown 5 Skirmish May
30 Halltown–Winchester 25 May
31 Winchester–Strasburg 18 June
1 Strasburg–Woodstock 12 Skirmish June
2 Woodstock–Mount Jackson 12 June 3 Mount
Jackson–New Market 7 June 4–5 New Market–Port
Republic 30 June 8 Battle of Cross Keys June
9 Cross Keys–Brown’s Gap 16 Battle of Port Republic
June 12 Brown’s Gap–Mount Meridian 10 June
17–25 Mount Meridian–Ashland Station (one rest day) 120
—— 676 miles in 48 marching days Average 14 miles per
diem
[1] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, pp. 220, 229 (letter of S. P. Chase).
[2] Of the existence of the bridge at Port Republic, held by a party
of Confederate cavalry, the Federals do not appear to have been aware.
[3] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 352.
[4] All three of these officers escaped from their captors.
[5] According to General Shields’ account his cavalry had reported to
him that the bridge at Port Republic had been burned, and he had
therefore ordered his advanced guard to take up a defensive position
and prevent the Confederates crossing the Shenandoah River. It was the
head of the detachment which had dispersed the Confederate squadrons.
[6] Related by Colonel Poague, C.S.A.
[7] _Destruction and Reconstruction,_ p. 39.
[8] The Confederates at Kernstown lost 20 per cent.; the Federals at