Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
and he fraternised with all Evangelical denominations. During a visit
to New York, one Sabbath morning, we chanced to find ourselves at the
door of an Episcopal Church at the hour of worship. He proposed that we
should enter; and as it was a day for the celebration of the Communion,
he remained for that service, and it was with the utmost reverence and
solemnity that he walked up the chancel and knelt to receive the
elements.”
Jackson, then, was by no means imbued with the belief that the
Presbyterian was the one true Church, and that all others were in
error. Nor did he attempt, in the very slightest degree, to usurp the
functions of his chaplains. Although he invariably went to sleep during
their sermons, he was deeply interested in their endeavours, and gave
them all the assistance in his power. But he no more thought of taking
their duties on himself than of interfering with the treatment of the
men in hospital. He spoke no “words in season,” even to his intimates.
He had no “message” for them. Where religion was concerned, so long as
duly qualified instructors were available, he conceived it his business
to listen and not to teach. Morning and evening prayers were the rule
at his headquarters, but if any of his staff chose to remain absent,
the general made no remark. Yet all suspicion of indifference to vice
was effectually removed. Nothing ungenerous or unclean was said in his
presence without incurring his displeasure, always unmistakably
expressed, and although he made no parade of his piety he was far too
manly to hide it.
Yet he was never a prominent figure at the camp services. Rather than
occupy a conspicuous place he
would seat himself amongst the privates; and the only share he took in
directing the proceedings was to beckon men to the seats that respect
had left empty beside him. Those who picture him as an enthusiastic
fanatic, invading, like the Puritan dragoons, the pulpits of the
chaplains, and leading the devotions of his troops with the same
fervour that he displayed in battle, have utterly misread his
character. The humblest soldier in the Confederate army was not more
modest and unassuming than Stonewall Jackson.
NOTE
_The Federal strength at M’Dowell._
Frémont’s return of April 30 is as follows:—
Milroy’s Brigade Schenck’s Brigade 4,307 3,335
of May 10:—
Milroy Schenck 3,694 3,335
of May 31:—
Milroy Schenck 2,914 3,335
Schenck reports that the total force _engaged_ at M’Dowell was 1,768 of
Milroy’s brigade, and about 500 of his own, total 2,268; and that he
himself brought to M’Dowell 1,300 infantry, a battery, and 250
cavalry—say, 1,600 men.
Milroy’s command may fairly be estimated at 3,500; Schenck brought
1,600 men; there were therefore available for action at M’Dowell 5,100
Federals.
_Frémont’s strength at Cross Keys._
The return of May 31 gives:—13,520 officers and men.
Frémont, in his report of the battle, says that on May 29 he had over
11,000 men, which, deducting guards, garrisons, working parties and
stragglers, were reduced to 10,500 combatants at Cross Keys.
But he does not include in this last estimate Bayard’s cavalry, which
joined him at Strasburg.
On May 31 Bayard had 1,844 officers and men; he had suffered some loss
in fighting Ashby, and his strength at the battle may be put down as
1,750.
All garrisons, guards and working parties are included in the
Confederate numbers, so they should be added to the Federal estimate.
We may fairly say, then, that at Cross Keys the following troops were
available:—
Frémont Bayard 11,000 1,750 ——— Total 12,750
NOTE
_Strength of the Federals, May 17–25._
On April 30 Banks’ “effective” numbers were as follows:—
Donnelly’s Brigade
Gordon’s Brigade
Artillery (26 guns)
Cavalry (General Hatch)
Body-guard 2,747 3,005 492 2,834 70 ——— 9,148 ———
On May 23 he had:—
At Strasburg: Infantry Cavalry Artillery (18 guns) 4,476 2,600 350 At
Front Royal, Buckton, &c. At Front Royal, Body-guard 1,300 70
From the Harper’s Ferry Garrison:—
At Strasburg: Cavalry At Winchester: Infantry
Cavalry 300 856 600 ——— 10,552 ———
On May 31, after losing 2,019 men at Front Royal and Winchester, he
had, the Harper’s Ferry troops having been added to his command:—
Infantry Cavalry Artillery (16 guns) Miscellaneous 5,124 3,230 286 82
——— 8,722 Add 2,019 ——— 10,741 ———
10,500 effectives on May 23 is therefore a fair estimate.
Geary’s 2,000 at Rectortown, as they were acting under Mr. Stanton’s
orders, have not been included.
[1] “If I were mindful only of my own glory, I would choose always to
make war in my own country, for there every man is a spy, and the
enemy can make no movement of which I am not informed.”—Frederick the
Great’s _Instructions to his Generals._
[2] At the date of the action at Front Royal, May 23, the following
was the strength of the detached forces: Banks, 10,000; Frémont,
25,000; McDowell (including Shields, but excluding McCall), 35,000.
[3] The blacks, however, appear to have been as unreliable as regards
numbers as McClellan’s detectives. “If a negro were asked how many
Confederates he had seen at a certain point, his answer was very
likely to be: ‘I dunno, Massa, but I guess about a
million.’”—_McClellan’s Own Story,_ p. 254.
[4] “In consequence of the excessive growth of armies tactics have
lost in weight, and the strategical design, rather than the detail of
the movements, has become the decisive factor in the issue at a
campaign. The strategical design depends, as a rule, upon the decision
of cabinets, and upon the resources placed at the disposal of the
commander. Consequently, either the leading statesmen should have
correct views of the science of war, or should make up for their
ignorance by giving their entire confidence to the man to whom the
supreme command of the army is entrusted. Otherwise, the germs of
defeat and national ruin may be contained in the first preparations
for war.”—_The Archduke Charles of Austria._
[5] “An operation which stamps him as a military genius of the highest
order.”—Lord Wolseley, _North American Review,_ vol. 149, No. 2, p.
166.
[6] “These brilliant successes appear to me models of their kind, both
in conception and execution. They should be closely studied by all
officers who wish to learn the art and science of war.”—_Ibid._
[7] Dabney, vol. i, p. 76.
[8] Letter to the author.
[9] “In six weeks, Wellington marched with 100,000 men six hundred
miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested
two fortresses, and drove 120,000 veteran troops from Spain.”—_The War
in the Peninsula,_ Napier, vol. v, p. 132.
[10] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 297.
[11] _North American Review,_ vol. 149, p. 168.
[12] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 914.
[13] He instructed the orderly that accompanied him, and who knew the
roads, to call him “Colonel’
[14] “The manner,” says Lord Wolseley, “in which he thus mystified his
enemy regarding this most important movement is a masterpiece.”—_North
American Review,_ vol. 149, pp. 166, 167.
[15] The following table, of which the idea is borrowed from _The
Principles of Strategy,_ by Captain Bigelow, U.S.A., may be found
interesting. Under the heading “Strategic” appear the numbers
available on the theatre of operations; under the heading “Tactical”
the numbers present on the field of battle. See also note at the end
of the volume.
STRATEGIC TACTICAL _M’Dowell_ Federal Confederate 30,000
17,000 2,500 6,000 _Winchester_ Federal Confederate 60,000
16,000 7,500 16,000 _Cross Keys_ Federal Confederate 23,000
13,000 12,750 8,000 _Port Republic_ Federal
Confederate 22,000 12,700 4,500 6,000
[16] O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 402.
[17] “Campaigning in France,” says General Sheridan, who was with the
Prussian Headquarter Staff in 1870, “that is, the marching, camping,
and subsisting of an army, is an easy matter, very unlike anything we
had in the War of the Rebellion. To repeat: the country is rich,
beautiful, and densely populated, subsistence abundant, and the roads
all macadamised highways; thus the conditions are altogether different
from those existing with us. . . . I can but leave to conjecture how
the Germans would have got along on bottomless roads—often none at
all—through the swamps and quicksands of Northern
Virginia.”—_Memoirs,_ vol. ii, p. 450.
[18] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 297, 298.
[19] From April 17 to April 19, when he moved to Elk Run Valley; May 6
to May 8, when he moved against Milroy; May 18 to May 25, when he
moved against Banks; and May 29 to June 1, when he passed south
between Frémont and Shields.
[20] _The War in the Peninsula,_ Napier, vol. v, p. 244.
[21] General Sheridan is said to have declared that 25 per cent of the
Federal soldiers lacked the military spirit.
[22] O.R., vol. xi, part iii,p. 503.
[23] _Ibid,_ p. 506.
[24] Macaulay.
[25] _Memoirs of W. N. Pendleton, D.D., Brigadier-General, C.S.A.,_ p.
201.
[26] It is worth remark that Jackson’s methods of punishment showed
his deep knowledge of his soldiers. The sentence on the men who were
tempted from their duty, during Banks’ retreat, by the plunder on the
Winchester road was that they should not be allowed to serve with the
advanced guard until further orders. It was considered terribly
severe. O.R., vol. xii, part iii, p. 902.
[27] _Battles and Leaders,_ p. 297.
[28] Letter to the author.
[29] Dabney, _Southern Historical Society Papers,_ vol. xi, p. 152.
[30] His devout habits were no secret in the camp. Jim, most faithful
of servants, declared that he could always tell when there was going
to be a battle. “The general,” he said, “is a great man for prayin’.
He pray night and morning—all times. But when I see him git up several
times in the night, an’ go off an’ pray, _den I know there is goin’ to
be somethin’ to pay,”_ an’ I go right away and pack his haversack!”
[31] Dabney, vol. ii, pp. 114–5.
[32] “Sometimes,” says Major Hotchkiss, “Jackson would keep two or
three Sundays running, so as to make up arrears, and balance the
account!’
Chapter XIII
THE SEVEN DAYS. GAINES’ MILL
1862 The region whither the interest now shifts is very different from
the Valley. From the terraced banks of the Rappahannock, sixty miles
north of Richmond, to the shining reaches of the James, where the
capital of the Confederacy stands high on her seven hills, the lowlands
of Virginia are clad with luxuriant vegetation. The roads and railways
run through endless avenues of stately trees; the shadows of the giant
oaks lie far across the rivers, and ridge and ravine are mantled with
the unbroken foliage of the primeval forest. In this green wilderness
the main armies were involved. But despite the beauty of broad rivers
and sylvan solitudes, gay with gorgeous blossoms and fragrant with
aromatic shrubs, the eastern, or tidewater, counties of Virginia had
little to recommend them as a theatre of war. They were sparsely
settled. The wooden churches, standing lonely in the groves where the
congregations hitched their horses; the solitary taverns, half inns and
half stores; the court-houses of the county justices, with a few wooden
cottages clustered round them, were poor substitutes for the
market-towns of the Shenandoah. Here and there on the higher levels,
surrounded by coppice and lawn, by broad acres of corn and clover, the
manors of the planters gave life and brightness to the landscape. But
the men were fighting in Lee’s ranks, their families
had fled to Richmond, and these hospitable homes showed signs of
poverty and neglect. Neither food nor forage was to be drawn from the