Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
floating timber. Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, not the least famous member of a
famous family, accompanied by a few men, swam his horse at imminent
peril over to the
other bank; but, although he re-crossed the swollen waters in the same
manner, the daring young officer had to report that the passage was
impracticable. It was already light. The enemy would soon be up, and
the capture of the whole column seemed absolutely certain. Hitherto the
men, exhilarated by the complete success of the adventure, had borne
themselves as gaily as if they were riding through the streets of
Richmond. But the danger of their situation was now forcibly impressed
upon them, and the whole command became grave and anxious. Stuart alone
was unmoved, and at this juncture one of his scouts informed him that
the skeleton of an old bridge spanned the stream about a mile below. An
abandoned warehouse furnished the materials for a footway, over which
the troopers passed, holding the bridles of their horses as they swam
alongside. Half the column thus crossed, while the remainder
strengthened the bridge so as to permit the passage of the artillery.
By one o’clock the whole force was over the Chickahominy, unmolested by
the enemy, of whom only small parties, easily driven back by the
rear-guard, had made their appearance.
Thirty-five miles now to Richmond, in rear of the left wing of the
Northern army, and within range, for some portion of the march, of the
gunboats on the James River! Burning the bridge, with a wave of the
hand to the Federal horsemen who covered the heights above Stuart
plunged into the woods, and without further misadventure brought his
troops at sunset to the neighbourhood of Charles City Court House.
Leaving his men sleeping, after thirty-six hours in the saddle, he rode
to Richmond to report to Lee.
June 15 Before dawn on the 15th, after covering another thirty miles,
over a road which was patrolled by the enemy, he reached head-quarters.
His squadrons followed, marching at midnight, and bringing with them
165 prisoners and 260 captured horses and mules.
This extraordinary expedition, which not only effected the destruction
of a large amount of Federal property, and broke up, for the time
being, their line of supplies, but acquired information of the utmost
value, and shook the
confidence of the North in McClellan’s generalship, was accomplished
with the loss of one man. These young Virginia soldiers marched one
hundred and ten miles in less than two days. “There was something
sublime,” says Stuart, “in the implicit confidence and unquestioning
trust of the rank and file in a leader guiding them straight,
apparently, into the very jaws of the enemy, every step appearing to
them to diminish the hope of extrication.”[6] Nor was the influence of
their achievement on the _moral_ of the whole Confederate army the
least important result attained. A host of over 100,000 men, which had
allowed a few squadrons to ride completely round it, by roads which
were within hearing of its bugles, was no longer considered a
formidable foe.
On receiving Stuart’s information, Lee drew up the plan of operations
which had been imparted to Jackson on the 22nd.
It was a design which to all appearance was almost foolhardy. The
Confederate army was organised as follows:—
Longstreet
A. P. Hill
Magruder
Huger
Holmes
D. H. Hill
Jackson
Cavalry
Reserve Artillery 9,000
14,000
13,000
9,000
6,500
10,000
18,500
3,000
3,000
———
86,500[7]
June 24 On the night of June 24 the whole of these troops, with the
exception of the Valley army, were south of the Chickahominy, holding
the earthworks which protected Richmond. Less than two miles eastward,
strongly intrenched, lay four of McClellan’s army corps, in round
numbers 75,000 officers and men.[8]
To attack this force, even after Jackson’s arrival,
was to court disaster. The right was protected by the Chickahominy, the
left rested on White Oak Swamp, a network of sluggish streams and
impassable swamps, screened everywhere by tangled thickets. It needed
not the presence of the siege ordnance, placed on the most commanding
points within the lines, to make such a position absolutely
impregnable.
North of the Chickahominy, however, the Federals were less favourably
situated. The Fifth Army Corps, 25,000 strong,[9] under General
FitzJohn Porter, had been pushed forward, stretching a hand to McDowell
and protecting the railway, in the direction of Mechanicsville; and
although the tributaries of the Chickahominy, running in from the
north, afforded a series of positions, the right flank of these
positions, resting, as Stuart had ascertained, on no natural obstacle,
was open to a turning movement. Furthermore, in rear of the Fifth
Corps, and at an oblique angle to the front, ran the line of supply,
the railway to West Point. If Porter’s right were turned, the
Confederates, threatening the railway, would compel McClellan to detach
largely to the north bank of the Chickahominy in order to recover or
protect the line.
On the north bank of the Chickahominy, therefore, Lee’s attention had
been for some time fixed. Here was his adversary’s weak point, and a
sudden assault on Porter, followed up, if necessary, by an advance
against the railway, would bring McClellan out of his intrenchments,
and force him to fight at a disadvantage. To ensure success, however,
in the attack on Porter it was necessary to concentrate an overwhelming
force on the north bank; and this could hardly be done without so
weakening the force which held the Richmond lines that it would be
unable to resist the attack of the 75,000 men who faced it. If
McClellan, while Lee was fighting Porter, boldly threw forward the
great army he had on the south bank, the rebel capital might be the
reward of his resolution. The danger
was apparent to all, but Lee resolved to risk it, and his audacity has
not escaped criticism. It has been said that he deliberately
disregarded the contingency of McClellan either advancing on Richmond,
or reinforcing Porter. The truth is, however, that neither Lee, nor
those generals about him who knew McClellan, were in the least
apprehensive that their over-cautious adversary, if the attack were
sudden and well sustained, would either see or utilise his opportunity.
From Hannibal to Moltke there has been no great captain who has
neglected to study the character of his opponent, and who did not trade
on the knowledge thus acquired, and it was this knowledge which
justified Lee’s audacity.
The real daring of the enterprise lay in the inferiority of the
Confederate armament. Muskets and shot-guns, still carried by a large
part of the army, were ill-matched against rifles of the most modern
manufacture; while the smooth-bore field-pieces, with which at least
half the artillery was equipped, possessed neither the range nor the
accuracy of the rifled ordnance of the Federals.
That Lee’s study of the chances had not been patient and exhaustive it
is impossible to doubt. He was no hare-brained leader, but a profound
thinker, following the highest principles of the military art. That he
had weighed the disconcerting effect which the sudden appearance of the
victorious Jackson, with an army of unknown strength, would produce
upon McClellan, goes without saying. He had omitted no precaution to
render the surprise complete, and although the defences of Richmond
were still too weak to resist a resolute attack, Magruder, the same
officer who had so successfully imposed upon McClellan at Yorktown, was
such a master of artifice that, with 28,000 men and the reserve
artillery,[10] he might be relied upon to hold Richmond until Porter
had been
disposed of. The remainder of the army, 2,000 of Stuart’s cavalry, the
divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills, 35,000 men all told,
crossing to the north bank of the Chickahominy and combining with the
18,500 under Jackson, would be sufficient to crush the Federal right.
The initial operations, however, were of a somewhat complicated nature.
Four bridges[11] crossed the river on Lee’s left. A little more than a
mile and a half from Mechanicsville Bridge, up stream, is Meadow
Bridge, and five and a half miles further up is another passage at the
Half Sink, afterwards called Winston’s Bridge. Three and a half miles
below Mechanicsville Bridge is New Bridge. The northern approaches to
Mechanicsville, Meadow, and New Bridge, were in possession of the
Federals; and it was consequently no simple operation to transfer the
troops before Richmond from one bank of the Chickahominy to the other.
Only Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges could be used. Winston’s Bridge
was too far from Richmond, for, if Longstreet and the two Hills were to
cross at that point, not only would Magruder be left without support
during their march, but McClellan, warned by his scouts, would receive
long notice of the intended blow and have ample time for preparation.
To surprise Porter, to give McClellan no time for reflection, and at
the same time to gain a position which would bring the Confederates
operating on the north bank into close and speedy communication with
Magruder on the south, another point of passage must be chosen. The
position would be the one commanding New Bridge, for the Confederate
earthworks, held by Magruder, ran due south from that point. But Porter
was already in possession of the coveted ground, with strong outposts
at Mechanicsville. To secure, then, the two centre bridges was the
first object. This, it was expected, would be achieved by the advance
of the Valley army, aided by a brigade from the Half Sink, against the
flank and rear of the Federals at Mechanicsville. Then, as soon
as the enemy fell back, Longstreet and the two Hills would cross the
river by the Meadow and Mechanicsville Bridges, and strike Porter in
front, while Jackson attacked his right. A victory would place the
Confederates in possession of New Bridge, and the troops north of the
Chickahominy would be then in close communication with Magruder.
Lee’s orders were as follows:—’Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
June 24, 1862. General Orders, No. 75.
“I.—General Jackson’s command will proceed to-morrow (June 25) from
Ashland towards the Slash (Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at some
convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch’s brigade of A.
P. Hill’s division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the
Chickahominy, near Half Sink. At three o’clock Thursday morning, 26th
instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green
Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately
cross the Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As
soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P.
Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance
the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open
upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from
Mechanicsville and the passage of the bridge being opened, General
Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will
cross the Chickahominy at or near that point; General D. H. Hill moving
to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting
General A. P. Hill; the four divisions keeping in communication with
each other, and moving _en échelon_ on separate roads if practicable;
the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters
extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and
endeavour to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge,
General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and
taking the direction towards