Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Cross Keys, and at Port Republic. And greater generals than either
Shields or Fremont have met with little better success in attempting
the same manœuvre. At both Eylau and Bautzen Napoleon was deprived of
decisive victory by his failure to ensure the co-operation of his
widely separated columns.
Jackson and A. P. Hill, on the morning of the 26th, were nearly fifteen
miles apart. Intercommunication at the outset was ensured by the
brigade under Branch; but as the advance progressed, and the enemy was
met with, it became more difficult. The messengers riding from one
force to the other were either stopped by the Federals, or were
compelled to make long _détours_; and as they approached the enemy’s
position, neither Hill nor Jackson was informed of the whereabouts of
the other.
The truth is, that the arrangements made by the Confederate headquarter
staff were most inadequate. In the first place, the order of the 24th,
instructing Jackson to start from Slash Church at 3 a.m. on the 26th,
and thus leading the other generals to believe that he would certainly
be there at that hour, should never have been issued. When it was
written Jackson’s advanced guard was at Beaver Dam Station, the rear
brigades fifteen miles behind; and to reach Slash Church his force had
to march forty miles through an intricate country, in possession of the
enemy, and so little known that it was impossible to designate the
route to be followed. To fix an hour of arrival so long in advance was
worse than useless, and Jackson cannot be blamed if he failed to comply
with the exact letter of a foolish order. As it was, so many of the
bridges were broken, and so difficult was it to pass the fords, that if
Dr. Dabney had not found in his brother, a planter of the
neighbourhood, an efficient substitute for the guide headquarters
should have provided, the Valley army would have been not hours but
days too late. In the second place, the duty of keeping up
communications should not have been left to Jackson, but have been seen
to at headquarters. Jackson had with him only a few cavalry, and these
few had not only to supply the necessary orderlies for the subordinate
generals, and the escorts for the artillery and trains, but to form his
advanced guard, for Stuart’s squadrons were on his left flank, and not
in his front. Moreover, his cavalry were complete strangers to the
country, and there were no
maps. In such circumstances the only means of ensuring constant
communication was to have detached two of Stuart’s squadrons, who knew
the ground, to establish a series of posts between Jackson’s line of
march and the Chickahominy; and to have detailed a staff officer, whose
sole duty would have been to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with hourly
reports of the progress made, to join the Valley army.[20] It may be
remarked, too, that Generals Branch and Ewell, following converging
roads, met near Shady Grove Church about 3 p.m. No report appears to
have been sent by the latter to General A. P. Hill; and although Branch
a little later received a message to the effect that Hill had crossed
the Chickahominy and was moving on Mechanicsville,[21] the information
was not passed on to Jackson.
Neglect of these precautions made it impracticable to arrange a
simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment
of Hill and Jackson. In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek
there was no co-operation whatever. Hill attacked and was repulsed.
Jackson had halted at Hundley’s Corner, three miles distant from the
battle-field. Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill
moved against their front an easy success would in all probability have
been the result.
Nevertheless, the responsibility for Hill’s defeat cannot be held to
rest on Jackson’s shoulders. On August 18, 1870, the Prussian Guards
and the Saxon Army Corps
were ordered to make a combined attack on the village of St. Privat,
the Guards moving against the front, the Saxons against the flank. When
the order was issued the two corps were not more than two miles apart.
The tract of country which lay between them was perfectly open, the
roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in the extreme.
Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities of communication, the
Guards advanced to the attack an hour and a half too soon; and from six
o’clock to nearly seven their shattered lines lay in front of the
position, at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single
Saxon regiment coming to their aid. But the Saxons were not to blame.
Their march had been unchecked; they had moved at speed. On their part
there had been no hesitation; but on the part of the commander of the
Guards there had been the same precipitation which led to the premature
attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam Creek. It was the
impatience of General Hill, not the tardiness of Jackson, which was the
cause of the Confederate repulse.
We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was justified in not
marching to the sound of the cannon. Referring to General Lee’s orders,
it will be seen that as soon as Longstreet and D. H. Hill had crossed
the Chickahominy the four divisions of the army were to move forward
_in communication with each other_ and drive the enemy from his
position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, “turning Beaver Dam Creek,
and taking the direction of Cold Harbour.”
When Jackson reached Hundley’s Corner, and drove the Federal infantry
behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as his orders indicated, was
to get touch with the rest of the army. It was already near sunset;
between Hundley’s Corner and Mechanicsville lay a dense forest, with no
roads in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impossible, under
ordinary conditions, to do more that evening than to establish
connection; the combined movement against the enemy’s position must be
deferred till the morning. But the sound of battle to the south-west
introduced a complication. “We distinctly heard,” says Jackson,
“the rapid and continued discharges of cannon.”[22] What did this fire
portend? It might proceed, as was to be inferred from Lee’s orders,
from the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy covering Hill’s passage.
It might mean a Federal counterstroke on Hill’s advanced guard; or,
possibly, a premature attack on the part of the Confederates. General
Whiting, according to his report, thought it “indicated a severe
battle.”[23] General Trimble, marching with Ewell, heard both musketry
and artillery; and in his opinion the command should have moved
forward;[24] and whatever may have been Jackson’s orders, it was
undoubtedly his duty, if he believed a hot engagement was in progress,
to have marched to the assistance of his colleagues. He could not help
them by standing still. He might have rendered them invaluable aid by
pressing the enemy in flank. But the question is, What inference did
the cannonade convey to Jackson’s mind? Was it of such a character as
to leave no doubt that Hill was in close action, or might it be
interpreted as the natural accompaniment of the passage of the
Chickahominy? The evidence is conflicting. On the one hand we have the
evidence of Whiting and Trimble, both experienced soldiers; on the
other, in addition to the indirect evidence of Jackson’s inaction, we
have the statement of Major Dabney. “We heard no signs,” says the chief
of the staff, “of combat on Beaver Dam Creek until a little while
before sunset. The whole catastrophe took place in a few minutes about
that time; and in any case our regiments, who had gone into bivouac,
could not have been reassembled, formed up, and moved forward in time
to be of any service. A night attack through the dense, pathless, and
unknown forest was quite impracticable.”[25] It seems probable,
then—and the Federal reports are to the same effect[26]—that the firing
was only really heavy for a very short period, and that Jackson
believed it
to be occasioned by Hill’s passage of the Chickahominy, and the rout of
the Federals from Mechanicsville. Neither Trimble nor Whiting were
aware that Lee’s orders directed that the operation was to be covered
by a heavy cannonade.
Obeying orders very literally himself, Jackson found it difficult to
believe that others did not do the same. He knew that the position he
had taken up rendered the line of Beaver Dam Creek untenable by the
Federals. They would never stand to fight on that line with a strong
force established in their rear and menacing their communications, nor
would they dare to deliver a counterstroke through the trackless woods.
It might confidently be assumed, therefore, that they would fall back
during the night, and that the Confederate advance would then be
carried out in that concentrated formation which Lee’s orders had
dictated. Such, in all probability, was Jackson’s view of the
situation; and that Hill, in direct contravention of those orders,
would venture on an isolated attack before that formation had been
assumed never for a moment crossed his mind.[27]
Illustration: Map of The Environs of Richmond For larger view click on
image.
Hill, on the other hand, seems to have believed that if the Federals
were not defeated on the evening of the 26th they would make use of the
respite, either to bring up reinforcements, or to advance on Richmond
by the opposite bank of the Chickahominy. It is not impossible that he
thought the sound of his cannon would bring Jackson to his aid. That it
would have been wiser to establish communication, and to make certain
of that aid before attacking, there can be no question. It was too late
to defeat Porter the same evening. Nothing was to be gained by
immediate attack, and much would be risked. The last assault, in which
the heaviest losses were incurred, was made just as night fell. It was
a sacrifice of life as unnecessary as that of the Prussian Guard before
St. Privat. At the same time, that General Hill did wrong in crossing
the Chickahominy before he heard of his colleague’s approach is not a
fair
accusation. To have lingered on the south bank would have been to leave
Jackson to the tender mercies of the Federals should they turn against
him in the forest. Moreover, it was Hill’s task to open a passage for
the remaining divisions, and if that passage had been deferred to a
later hour, it is improbable that the Confederate army would have been
concentrated on the north bank of the Chickahominy until the next
morning. It must be admitted, too, that the situation in which Hill
found himself, after crossing the river, was an exceedingly severe test
of his self-control. His troops had driven in the Federal outposts;
infantry, cavalry, and artillery were retiring before his skirmishers.
The noise of battle filled the air. From across the Chickahominy
thundered the heavy guns, and his regiments were pressing forward with
the impetuous ardour of young soldiers. If he yielded to the excitement
of the moment, if eagerness for battle overpowered his judgment, if his
brain refused to work calmly in the wild tumult of the conflict, he is
hardly to be blamed. The patience which is capable of resisting the
eagerness of the troops, the imperturbable judgment which, in the heat
of action, weighs with deliberation the necessities of the moment, the
clear vision which forecasts the result of every movement—these are
rare qualities indeed.
During the night Porter fell back on Gaines’ Mill. While the engagement
at Beaver Dam Creek was still in progress vast clouds of dust, rising
above the forests to the north-west and north, had betrayed the
approach of Jackson, and the reports of the cavalry left no doubt that
he was threatening the Federal rear.
The retreat was conducted in good order, a strong rear-guard,