Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
reinforced by two batteries of horse-artillery, holding the
Confederates in check, and before morning a second position, east of
Powhite Creek, and covering two bridges over the Chickahominy,
Alexander’s and Grapevine, was occupied by the Fifth Army Corps.
June 27, 5 a.m. New Bridge was now uncovered, and Lee’s army was in
motion shortly after sunrise, Jackson crossing Beaver Dam Creek and
moving due south in the direction of Walnut
Grove Church.[28] The enemy, however, had already passed eastward; and
the Confederates, well concentrated and in hand, pushed forward in
pursuit; A. P. Hill, with Longstreet on his right, moving on Gaines’
Mill, while Jackson, supported by D. H. Hill, and with Stuart covering
his left, marched by a more circuitous route to Old Cold Harbour. Near
Walnut Grove Church Jackson met the Commander-in-Chief, and it is
recorded that the staff officers of the Valley army, noting the
eagerness displayed by General Lee’s suite to get a glimpse of
“Stonewall,” then for the first time realised the true character and
magnitude of the Valley campaign.
12 noon About noon, after a march of seven miles, A. P. Hill’s scouts
reported that the Federals had halted behind Powhite Creek. The leading
brigade was sent across the stream, which runs past Gaines’ Mill, and
pressing through the thick woods found the enemy in great strength on a
ridge beyond. Hill formed his division for attack, and opened fire with
his four batteries. The enemy’s guns, superior in number, at once
responded, and the skirmish lines became actively engaged. The
Confederate general, despite urgent messages from his subordinates,
requesting permission to attack, held his troops in hand, waiting till
he should be supported, and for two and a half hours the battle was no
more than an affair of “long bowls.”
The position held by the defence was emphatically one to impose caution
on the assailants. To reach it the Confederates were confined to three
roads, two from Mechanicsville, and one from Old Cold Harbour. These
roads led each of them through a broad belt of forest, and then,
passing through open fields, descended into a
winding valley, from five hundred to a thousand yards in breadth.
Rising near McGehee’s House, due south of Old Cold Harbour, a sluggish
creek, bordered by swamps and thick timber, and cutting in places a
deep channel, filtered through the valley to the Chickahominy. Beyond
this stream rose an open and undulating plateau, admirably adapted to
the movement of all arms, and with a slight command of the opposite
ridge. On the plateau, facing west and north, the Federals were formed
up. A fringe of trees and bushes along the crest gave cover and
concealment to the troops. 60 feet below, winding darkly through the
trees, the creek covered the whole front; and in the centre of the
position, east of New Cold Harbour, the valley was completely filled
with tangled wood.
Towards Old Cold Harbour the timber on the Confederate side of the
ravine was denser than elsewhere. On the Federal left flank the valley
of the Chickahominy was open ground, but it was swept by heavy guns
from the right bank of the river, and at this point the creek became an
almost impassable swamp.
Porter, who had been reinforced by 9,000 men under General Slocum, now
commanded three divisions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and
twenty-two batteries, a total of 36,000 officers and men. The _moral_
of the troops had been strengthened by their easy victory of the
previous day. Their commander had gained their confidence; their
position had been partially intrenched, and they could be readily
supported by way of Alexander’s and Grapevine Bridges from the south
bank of the Chickahominy.
The task before the Confederates, even with their superior numbers, was
formidable in the extreme. The wooded ridge which encircled the
position afforded scant room for artillery, and it was thus
impracticable to prepare the attack by a preliminary bombardment. The
ground over which the infantry must advance was completely swept by
fire, and the centre and left were defended by three tiers of riflemen,
the first sheltered by the steep banks of the creek, the second halfway
up the bluff,
covered by a breastwork, the third on the crest, occupying a line of
shelter-trenches; and the riflemen were supported by a dozen batteries
of rifled guns.[29]
But Lee had few misgivings. In one respect the Federal position seemed
radically defective. The line of retreat on White House was exposed to
attack from Old Cold Harbour. In fact, with Old Cold Harbour in
possession of the Confederates, retreat could only be effected by one
road north of the Chickahominy, that by Parker’s Mill and Dispatch
Station; and if this road were threatened, Porter, in order to cover
it, would be compelled to bring over troops from his left and centre,
or to prolong his line until it was weak everywhere. There was no great
reason to fear that McClellan would send Porter heavy reinforcements.
To do so he would have to draw troops from his intrenchments on the
south bank of the Chickahominy, and Magruder had been instructed to
maintain a brisk demonstration against this portion of the line. It was
probable that the Federal commander, with his exaggerated estimate of
the numbers opposed to him, would be induced by this means to
anticipate a general attack against his whole front, and would postpone
moving his reserves until it was too late.
While Hill was skirmishing with the Federals, Lee was anxiously
awaiting intelligence of Jackson’s arrival at Old Cold Harbour.
2.30 p.m. Longstreet was already forming up for battle, and at 2.30
Hill’s regiments were slipped to the attack. A fierce and sanguinary
conflict now ensued. Emerging in well-ordered lines from the cover of
the woods, the Confederates swept down the open slopes. Floundering in
the swamps, and struggling through the abattis which had been placed on
the banks of the stream, they drove in the advanced line of hostile
riflemen, and strove gallantly to ascend the slope which lay beyond.
“But brigade after brigade,” says General Porter, “seemed almost to
melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry;
yet others pressed on, followed by supports daring and brave as their
predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening
effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and
to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great disorder from
the deadly contest.”[30] For over an hour Hill fought on without
support. There were no signs of Jackson, and Longstreet, whom it was
not intended to employ until Jackson’s appearance should have caused
the Federals to denude their left, was then sent in to save the day.
As on the previous day, the Confederate attack had failed in
combination. Jackson’s march had been again delayed. The direct road
from Walnut Grove Church to Old Cold Harbour, leading through the
forest, was found to be obstructed by felled timber and defended by
sharpshooters, and to save time Jackson’s division struck off into the
road by Bethesda Church. This threw it in rear of D. H. Hill, and it
was near 2 p.m. when the latter’s advanced guard reached the tavern at
the Old Cold Harbour cross roads. No harm, however, had been done. A.
P. Hill did not attack till half an hour later. But when he advanced
there came no response from the left. A battery of D. H. Hill’s
division was brought into action, but was soon silenced, and beyond
this insignificant demonstration the Army of the Valley made no
endeavour to join the battle. The brigades were halted by the roadside.
Away to the right, above the intervening forest, rolled the roar of
battle, the crash of shells and the din of musketry, but no orders were
given for the advance.
Nor had Jackson’s arrival produced the slightest consternation in the
Federal ranks. Although from his position at Cold Harbour he seriously
threatened their line of retreat to the White House, they had neither
denuded their left nor brought up their reserves. Where he was now
established he was actually nearer White House than any portion of
Porter’s army corps, and yet that general apparently accepted the
situation with equanimity.
Lee had anticipated that Jackson’s approach would cause the enemy to
prolong their front in order to cover their line of retreat to the
White House, and so weaken
that part of the position which was to be attacked by Longstreet; and
Jackson had been ordered[31] to draw up his troops so as to meet such a
contingency. “Hoping,” he says in his report, “that Generals A. P. Hill
and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards me, I directed
General D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the wood, so as
to leave between him and the wood on the right an open space, across
which I hoped that the enemy would be driven.” But Lee was deceived.
The Federal line of retreat ran not to the White House, but over
Grapevine Bridge. McClellan had for some time foreseen that he might be
compelled to abandon the York River Railway, and directly he suspected
that Jackson was marching to Richmond had begun to transfer his line of
operations from the York to the James, and his base of supply from the
White House to Harrison’s Landing.
So vast is the amount of stores necessary for the subsistence, health,
and armament of a host like McClellan’s that a change of base is an
operation which can only be effected under the most favourable
circumstances.[32] It is evident, then, that the possibility of the
enemy shifting his line of operations to the James, abandoning the York
River Railroad, might easily have
escaped the penetration of either Lee or Jackson. They were not behind
the scenes of the Federal administrative system. They were not aware of
the money, labour, and ingenuity which had been lavished on the
business of supply. They had not seen with their own eyes the fleet of
four hundred transports which covered the reaches of the York. They had
not yet realised the enormous advantage which an army derives from the
command of the sea.
Nor were they enlightened by the calmness with which their immediate
adversaries on the field of battle regarded Jackson’s possession of Old
Cold Harbour. Still, one fact was manifest: the Federals showed no
disposition whatever to weaken or change their position, and it was
clear that the success was not to be attained by mere manœuvre. Lee,
seeing Hill’s division roughly handled, ordered Longstreet forward,
while Jackson, judging from the sound and direction of the firing that
the original plan had failed, struck in with vigour. Opposed to him was
Sykes’ division of regulars, supported by eighteen guns, afterwards
increased to twenty-four; and in the men of the United States Army the
Valley soldiers met a stubborn foe. The position, moreover, occupied by
Sykes possessed every advantage which a defender could desire. Manned
even by troops of inferior mettle it might well have proved
impregnable. The valley was wider than further west, and a thousand
yards intervened between the opposing ridges. From either crest the
cornfields sloped gently to the marshy sources of the creek, hidden by
tall timber and dense undergrowth. The right and rear of the position
were protected by a second stream, running south to the Chickahominy,
and winding through a swamp which Stuart, posted on Jackson’s left,
pronounced impassable for horsemen. Between the head waters of these
two streams rose the spur on which stands McGehee’s house, facing the
road from Old Cold Harbour, and completely commanding the country to
the north and north-east. The flank, therefore, was well secured; the
front was strong, with a wide field of fire; the Confederate artillery,
even if it could