Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
make its way through the thick woods on the opposite crest, would have
to unlimber under fire at effective range, and the marsh below, with
its tangled undergrowth and abattis, could hardly fail to throw the
attacking infantry into disorder. Along the whole of Sykes’ line only
two weak points were apparent. On his left, as already described, a
broad tract of woodland, covering nearly the whole valley, and climbing
far up the slope on the Federal side, afforded a covered approach from
one crest to the other; on his right, a plantation of young pines
skirted the crest of McGehee’s Hill, and ran for some distance down the
slope. Under shelter of the timber it was possible that the Confederate
infantry might mass for the assault; but once in the open, unaided by
artillery, their further progress would be difficult. Under ordinary
circumstances a thorough reconnaissance, followed by a carefully
planned attack, would have been the natural course of the assailant.
The very strength of the position was in favour of the Confederates.
The creek which covered the whole front rendered a counterstroke
impracticable, and facilitated a flank attack. Holding the right bank
of the creek with a portion of his force, Jackson might have thrown the
remainder against McGehee’s Hill, and, working round the flank, have
repeated the tactics of Kernstown, Winchester, and Port Republic.
But the situation permitted no delay. A. P. Hill was hard pressed. The
sun was already sinking. McClellan’s reserves might be coming up, and
if the battle was to be won, it must be won by direct attack. There was
no time for further reconnaissance, no time for manœuvre.
Jackson’s dispositions were soon made. D. H. Hill, eastward of the Old
Cold Harbour road, was to advance against McGehee’s Hill, overlapping,
if possible, the enemy’s line. Ewell was to strike in on Hill’s right,
moving through the tract of woodland; Lawton, Whiting, and Winder, in
the order named, were to fill the gap between Ewell’s right and the
left of A. P. Hill’s division, and the artillery was ordered into
position opposite McGehee’s Hill.
4 p.m. D. H. Hill, already in advance, was the first to move. Pressing
forward from the woods, under a heavy fire of
artillery, his five brigades, the greater part in first line, descended
to the creek, already occupied by his skirmishers. In passing through
the marshy thickets, where the Federal shells were bursting on every
hand, the confusion became great. The brigades crossed each other’s
march. Regiments lost their brigades, and companies their regiments. At
one point the line was so densely crowded that whole regiments were
forced to the rear; at others there were wide intervals, and effective
supervision became impossible. Along the edge of the timber the fire
was fierce, for the Union regulars were distant no more than four
hundred yards; the smoke rolled heavily through the thickets, and on
the right and centre, where the fight was hottest, the impetuosity of
both officers and men carried them forward up the slope. An attempt to
deliver a charge with the whole line failed in combination, and such
portion of the division as advanced, scourged by both musketry and
artillery, fell back before the fire of the unshaken Federals.
In the wood to the right Ewell met with even fiercer opposition. So
hastily had the Confederate line been formed, and so difficult was it
for the brigades to maintain touch and direction in the thick covert,
that gaps soon opened along the front; and of these gaps, directly the
Southerners gained the edge of the timber, the Northern brigadiers took
quick advantage. Not content with merely holding their ground, the
regular regiments, changing front so as to strike the flanks of the
attack, came forward with the bayonet, and a vigorous counterstroke,
delivered by five battalions, drove Ewell across the swamp. Part of
Trimble’s brigade still held on in the wood, fighting fiercely; but the
Louisiana regiments were demoralised, and there were no supports on
which they might have rallied.
Jackson, when he ordered Hill to the front, had sent verbal
instructions-always dangerous-for the remainder of his troops to move
forward inline of battle.”[33]
The young staff officer to whom these instructions were entrusted,
misunderstanding the intentions of his chief, communicated the message
to the brigadiers with the addition that “they were to await further
orders before engaging the enemy.” Partly for this reason, and partly
because the rear regiments of his division had lost touch with the
leading brigades, Ewell was left without assistance. For some time the
error was undiscovered. Jackson grew anxious. From his station near Old
Cold Harbour little could be seen of the Confederate troops. On the
ridge beyond the valley the dark lines of the enemy’s infantry were
visible amongst the trees, with their well-served batteries on the
crests above. But in the valley immediately beneath, and as well as in
the forest to the right front, the dense smoke and the denser timber
hid the progress of the fight. Yet the sustained fire was a sure token
that the enemy still held his own; and for the first time and the last
his staff beheld their leader riding restlessly to and fro, and heard
his orders given in a tone which betrayed the storm within.[34]
“Unconscious,” says Dabney, “that his veteran brigades were but now
reaching the ridge of battle, he supposed that all his strength had
been put forth, and (what had never happened before) the enemy was not
crushed.”[35] Fortunately, the error of the aide-de-camp had already
been corrected by the vigilance of the chief of the staff, and the
remainder of the Valley army was coming up.
Their entry into battle was not in accordance with the
intentions of their chief. Whiting should have come in on Ewell’s
right, Lawton on the right of Whiting, and Jackson’s division on the
right of Lawton. Whiting led the way; but he had advanced only a short
distance through the woods when he was met by Lee, who directed him to
support General A. P. Hill.[36] The brigades of Law and of Hood were
therefore diverted to the right, and, deploying on either side of the
Gaines’ Mill road, were ordered to assault the commanding bluff which
marked the angle of the Federal position. Lawton’s Georgians, 3,500
strong, moved to the support of Ewell; Cunningham and Fulkerson, of
Winder’s division, losing direction in the thickets, eventually
sustained the attack of Longstreet, and the Stonewall Brigade
reinforced the shattered ranks of D. H. Hill. Yet the attack was
strong, and in front of Old Cold Harbour six batteries had forced their
way through the forest.
As this long line of guns covered McGehee’s Hill with a storm of
shells, and the louder crash of musketry told him that his lagging
brigades were coming into line, Jackson sent his last orders to his
divisional commanders: “Tell them,” he said, “this affair must hang in
suspense no longer; let them sweep the field with the bayonet.” But
there was no need for further urging. Before the messengers arrived the
Confederate infantry, in every quarter of the battlefield, swept
forward from the woods, and a vast wave of men converged upon the
plateau. Lee, almost at the same moment as Jackson, had given the word
for a general advance. As the supports came thronging up the shout was
carried down the line, “The Valley men are here!” and with the cry of
“Stonewall Jackson!” for their slogan, the Southern army dashed across
the deep ravine. Whiting, with the eight regiments of Hood and Law,
none of which had been yet engaged, charged impetuously against the
centre. The brigades of A. P. Hill, spent with fighting but clinging
stubbornly to their ground, found strength for a final effort.
Longstreet threw in his last reserve against the triple line which had
already decimated his division. Lawton’s Georgians bore back the
regulars. D. H. Hill, despite the
fire of the batteries on McGehee’s Hill, which, disregarding the shells
of Jackson’s massed artillery, turned with canister on the advancing
infantry, made good his footing on the ridge; and as the sun, low on
the horizon, loomed blood-red through the murky atmosphere, the
Confederate colours waved along the line of abandoned breastworks.
As the Federals retreated, knots of brave men, hastily collected by
officers of all ranks, still offered a fierce resistance, and,
supported by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses on the crowded
masses which swarmed up from the ravine; but the majority of the
infantry, without ammunition and with few officers, streamed in
disorder to the rear. For a time the Federal gunners stood manfully to
their work. Porter’s reserve artillery, drawn up midway across the
upland, offered a rallying point to the retreating infantry. Three
small squadrons of the 5th United States Cavalry made a gallant but
useless charge, in which out of seven officers six fell; and on the
extreme right the division of regulars, supported by a brigade of
volunteers, fell back fighting to a second line. As at Bull Run, the
disciplined soldiers alone showed a solid front amid the throng of
fugitives. Not a foot of ground had they yielded till their left was
exposed by the rout of the remainder. Of the four batteries which
supported them only two guns were lost, and on their second position
they made a determined effort to restore the fight. But their stubborn
valour availed nothing against the superior numbers which Lee’s fine
strategy had concentrated on the field of battle.
Where the first breach was made in the Federal line is a matter of
dispute. Longstreet’s men made a magnificent charge on the right, and
D. H. Hill claimed to have turned the flank of the regulars; but it is
abundantly evident that the advent of Jackson’s fresh troops, and the
vigour of their assault, broke down the resistance of the Federals.[37]
When the final attack developed, and along the whole front masses of
determined men, in overwhelming
numbers, dashed against the breastworks, Porter’s troops were well-nigh
exhausted, and not a single regiment remained in reserve. Against the
very centre of his line the attack was pushed home by Whiting’s men
with extraordinary resolution. His two brigades, marching abreast, were
formed in two lines, each about 2,000 strong. Riding along the front,
before they left the wood, the general had enjoined his men to charge
without a halt, in double time, and without firing. “Had these orders,”
says General Law, “not been strictly obeyed the assault would have been
a failure. No troops could have stood long under the withering storm of
lead and iron that beat in their faces as they became fully exposed to
view from the Federal line.”[38] The assault was met with a courage
that was equally admirable.[39] But the Confederate second line
reinforced the first at exactly the right moment, driving it
irresistibly forward; and the Federal regiments, which had been hard
pressed through a long summer afternoon, and had become scattered in
the thickets, were ill-matched with the solid and ordered ranks of
brigades which had not yet fired a shot. It was apparently at this
point that the Southerners first set foot on the plateau, and sweeping
over the intrenchments, outflanked the brigades which still held out to
right and left, and compelled them to fall back. Inspired by his
soldierly enthusiasm for a gallant deed, Jackson himself has left us a
vivid description of the successful charge. “On my extreme right,” he
says in his report, “General Whiting advanced his division through the
dense forest and swamp, emerging from the wood into the field near the
public road and at the head of the deep ravine which covered the
enemy’s left. Advancing thence through a number of retreating and