Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
into the water and ran up the sandy shore. In one hour General Worth’s
division, numbering 4,500 men, was disembarked; and by the same precise
arrangements the whole army was landed in six hours without accident or
confusion. To the astonishment of the Americans the enemy offered no
resistance, and the troops bivouacked in line of battle on the beach.
Little more than a mile north, across a waste of sand-hills, rose the
white walls of Vera Cruz. The city was held by 4,000 men, and its
armament was formidable. The troops, however, but partially organised,
were incapable of operations in the open field. The garrison had not
been reinforced. Santa Anna, on learning that the American army on the
Rio Grande had been reduced, had acted with
commendable promptitude. Collecting all the troops that were available
he had marched northwards, expecting, doubtless, to overwhelm Taylor
and still to be in time to prevent Scott from seizing a good harbour.
But distance was against him, and his precautions were inadequate. Even
if he defeated Taylor, he would have to march more than a thousand
miles to encounter Scott, and Vera Cruz was ill provided for a siege.
It was difficult, it is true, for the Mexican general to anticipate the
point at which the Americans would disembark. An army that moves by sea
possesses the advantage that its movements are completely veiled. But
Vera Cruz was decidedly the most probable objective of the invaders,
and, had it been made secure, the venture of the Americans would have
been rendered hazardous. As it was, with Santa Anna’s army far away,
the reduction of the fortress presented little difficulty. An immediate
assault would in all likelihood have proved successful. Scott, however,
decided on a regular siege. His army was small, and a march on the
capital was in prospect. The Government grudged both men and money, and
an assault would have cost more lives than could well be spared. On
March 18 the trenches were completed. Four days later, sufficient heavy
ordnance having been landed, the bombardment was begun.
March 27 On the 27th the town surrendered; the garrison laid down their
arms, and 400 cannon, many of large calibre, fell into the hands of the
Americans.
The fall of Vera Cruz was brought about by the heavy artillery, aided
by the sailors, and the First Regiment was continuously engaged. The
Mexican fire, notwithstanding their array of guns, was comparatively
harmless. The garrison attempted no sortie; and only 64 of the
investing force were killed or wounded. Nevertheless, Jackson’s
behaviour under fire attracted notice, and a few months later he was
promoted to first lieutenant “for gallant and meritorious conduct at
the siege of Vera Cruz.”[5]
Scott had now secured an admirable line of operations; but the
projected march upon the city of Mexico was a far more arduous
undertaking than the capture of the port. The ancient capital of
Montezuma stands high above the sea. The famous valley which surrounds
it is embosomed in the heart of a vast plateau, and the roads which
lead to this lofty region wind by steep gradients over successive
ranges of rugged and precipitous mountains. Between Vera Cruz and the
upland lies a level plain, sixty miles broad, and covered with tropical
forest. Had it been possible to follow up the initial victory by a
rapid advance, Cerro Gordo, the first, and the most difficult, of the
mountain passes, might have been occupied without a blow. Santa Anna,
defeated by Taylor at Buena Vista, but returning hot foot to block
Scott’s path, was still distant, and Cerro Gordo was undefended. But
the progress of the Americans was arrested by the difficulties inherent
in all maritime expeditions.
An army landing on a hostile coast has to endure a certain period of
inactivity. Under ordinary circumstances, as at Vera Cruz, the process
of disembarking men is rapidly accomplished. The field-guns follow with
but little delay, and a certain proportion of cavalry becomes early
available. But the disembarkation of the impedimenta—the stores,
waggons, hospitals, ammunition, and transport animals—even where ample
facilities exist, demands far more time than the disembarkation of the
fighting force. In the present case, as all the animals had to be
requisitioned in the country, it was not till the middle of April that
supplies and transport sufficient to warrant further movement had been
accumulated; and meanwhile General Santa Anna, halting in the
mountains, had occupied the pass of Cerro Gordo with 13,000 men and 42
pieces of artillery. The Mexican position was exceedingly strong. The
right rested on a deep ravine, with precipitous cliffs; the left, on
the hill of Cerro Gordo, covered with batteries, and towering to the
height of several hundred feet above the surrounding ridges; while the
front, strongly intrenched, and commanding the
road which wound zigzag fashion up the steep ascent, followed the crest
of a lofty ridge.
The Americans reached the foot of the pass without difficulty. The
enemy had made no attempt to check their passage through the forest.
Confident in the inaccessibility of his mountain crags, in his numerous
guns and massive breastworks, Santa Anna reserved his strength for
battle on ground of his own selection.
Several days were consumed in reconnaissance. The engineers, to whom
this duty was generally assigned in the American army, pushed their
explorations to either flank. At length the quick eye of a young
officer, Captain Robert Lee, already noted for his services at Vera
Cruz, discovered a line of approach, hidden from the enemy, by which
the position might be turned. In three days a rough road was
constructed by which guns could be brought to bear on the hill of Cerro
Gordo, and infantry marched round to strike the Mexicans in rear.
April 18 The attack, delivered at daylight on April 18, was brilliantly
successful. The enemy was completely surprised. Cerro Gordo was stormed
with the bayonet, and Santa Anna’s right, assaulted from a direction
whence he confessed that he had not believed a goat could approach his
lines, was rolled back in confusion on his centre. 1,200 Mexicans were
killed and wounded, and 3,000 captured, together with the whole of
their artillery.[6] The next day the pursuit was pushed with
uncompromising resolution. Amidst pathless mountains, 6,000 feet above
the sea, where every spur formed a strong position, the defeated army
was permitted neither halt nor respite. The American dragoons,
undeterred by numbers, pressed forward along the road, making hundreds
of prisoners, and spreading panic in the broken ranks.
May 15 The infantry followed, sturdily breasting the long ascent; a
second intrenched position, barring the La Hoya pass, was abandoned on
their approach; the strong castle of Perote, with an armament of 60
guns and mortars, opened its gates without firing a shot,
and on May 15 the great city of Puebla, surrounded by glens of
astonishing fertility, and only eighty miles from Mexico, was occupied
without resistance.
At Cerro Gordo the First Artillery were employed as infantry. Their
colours were amongst the first to be planted on the enemy’s
breastworks. But in none of the reports does Jackson’s name occur.[7]
The battle, however, brought him good luck. Captain Magruder, an
officer of his own regiment, who was to win distinction on wider
fields, had captured a Mexican field battery, which Scott presented to
him as a reward for his gallantry. Indian wars had done but little
towards teaching American soldiers the true use of artillery. Against a
rapidly moving enemy, who systematically forebore exposing himself in
mass, and in a country where no roads existed, only the fire-arm was
effective. But already, at Palo Alto and Resaca, against the serried
lines and thronging cavalry of the Mexicans, light field-guns had done
extraordinary execution. The heavy artillery, hitherto the more
favoured service, saw itself eclipsed. The First Regiment, however, had
already been prominent on the fighting line. It had won reputation with
the bayonet at Cerro Gordo, and before Mexico was reached there were
other battles to be fought, and other positions to be stormed. A youth
with a predilection for hard knocks might have been content with the
chances offered to the foot-soldier. But Jackson’s partiality for his
own arm was as marked as was Napoleon’s, and the decisive effect of a
well-placed battery appealed to his instincts with greater force than
the wild rush of a charge of infantry. Skilful manœuvring was more to
his taste than the mere bludgeon work of fighting at close quarters.
Two subalterns were required for the new battery. The position meant
much hard work, and possibly much discomfort. Magruder was restless and
hot-tempered, and the young officers of artillery showed no eagerness
to go through the campaign as his subordinates. Not so Jackson. He
foresaw that service with a light battery, under
a bold and energetic leader, was likely to present peculiar
opportunities; and with his thorough devotion to duty, his habits of
industry, and his strong sense of self-reliance, he had little fear of
disappointing the expectations of the most exacting superior. “I wanted
to see active service,” he said in after years, “to be near the enemy
in the fight; and when I heard that John Magruder had got his battery I
bent all my energies to be with him, for I knew if any fighting was to
be done, Magruder would be ‘on hand.’” His soldierly ambition won its
due reward. The favours of fortune fall to the men who woo more often
than to those who wait. The barrack-room proverb which declares that
ill-luck follows the volunteer must assuredly have germinated in a
commonplace brain. It is characteristic of men who have cut their way
to fame that they have never allowed the opportunity to escape them.
The successful man pushes to the front and seeks his chance; those of a
temper less ardent wait till duty calls and the call may never come.
Once before, when, despite his manifold disadvantages, he secured his
nomination to West Point, Jackson had shown how readily he recognised
an opening; now, when his comrades held back, he eagerly stepped
forward, to prove anew the truth of the vigorous adage, “Providence
helps those who help themselves.”
The American army was delayed long at Puebla. Several regiments of
volunteers, who had engaged only for a short term of service, demanded
their discharge, and reinforcements were slow in arriving.
August 7 It was not until the first week in August that Scott was able
to move upon the capital. The army now numbered 14,000 men. Several
hundred were sick in hospital, and 600 convalescents, together with 600
effectives, were left to garrison Puebla. The field force was organised
in four divisions: the first, under Major-General Worth; the second,
under Major-General Twiggs; the third, to which Magruder’s battery was
attached, under Major-General Pillow; the fourth (volunteers and
marines), under Major-General Pierce. Four field batteries, a small
brigade of dragoons, and a still
smaller siege train[8] made up a total of 11,500 officers and men.
During the three months that his enemy was idle at Puebla, Santa Anna
had reorganised his army; and 30,000 Mexicans, including a formidable
body of cavalry, fine horsemen and well trained,[9] and a large number
of heavy batteries, were now ready to oppose the advance of the
invaders.
On August 10 the American army crossed the Rio Frio Mountains, 10,000
feet above the sea, the highest point between the Atlantic and the
Pacific, and as the troops descended the western slopes the valley of
Mexico first broke upon their view. There, beneath the shadow of her
mighty mountains, capped with eternal snows, stood