Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
disordered regiments he came within range of the enemy’s fire, who,
concealed in an open wood and protected by breastworks, poured a
destructive fire for a quarter of a mile into his advancing
line, under which many brave officers and men fell. Dashing on with
unfaltering step in the face of these murderous discharges of canister
and musketry, General Hood and Colonel Law, at the heads of their
respective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down a
precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult
ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the
intrenchments, those brave and determined men pressed forward, driving
the enemy from his well-selected and fortified position. In this
charge, in which upwards of 1,000 men fell killed and wounded before
the fire of the enemy, and in which 14 pieces of artillery and nearly a
whole regiment were captured, the 4th Texas, under the lead of General
Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and seize the
guns.”[40]
How fiercely the Northern troops had battled is told in the outspoken
reports of the Confederate generals. Before Jackson’s reserves were
thrown in the first line of the Confederate attack had been exceedingly
roughly handled. A. P. Hill’s division had done good work in preparing
the way for Whiting’s assault, but a portion of his troops had become
demoralised. Ewell’s regiments met the same fate; and we read of them
“skulking from the front in a shameful manner; the woods on our left
and rear full of troops in safe cover, from which they never stirred;”
of “regiment after regiment rushing back in utter disorder;” of others
which it was impossible to rally; and of troops retiring in confusion,
who cried out to the reinforcements, “You need not go in; we are
whipped, we can’t do anything!” It is only fair to say that the
reinforcements replied, “Get out of our way, we will show you how to do
it;“[41] but it is not to be disguised that the Confederates at one
time came near defeat. With another division in reserve at the critical
moment, Porter might have maintained his line unbroken. His troops, had
they been supported, were still capable of resistance.
McClellan, however, up to the time the battle was lost, had sent but
one division (Slocum’s) and two batteries to Porter’s support. 66,000
Federals, on the south bank of the Chickahominy, had been held in their
intrenchments, throughout the day, by the demonstrations of 28,000
Confederates. Intent on saving his trains, on securing his retreat to
the river James, and utterly regardless of the chances which fortune
offered, the “Young Napoleon” had allowed his rearguard to be
overwhelmed. He was not seen on the plateau which his devoted troops so
well defended, nor even at the advanced posts on the further bank of
the Chickahominy. So convinced was he of the accuracy of the
information furnished by his detective staff that he never dreamt of
testing the enemy’s numbers by his own eyesight. Had he watched the
development of Lee’s attack, noted the small number of his batteries,
the long delay in the advance of the supports, the narrow front of his
line of battle, he would have discovered that the Confederate strength
had been greatly exaggerated. There were moments, too, during the fight
when a strong counterstroke, made by fresh troops, would have placed
Lee’s army in the greatest peril. But a general who thinks only of
holding his lines and not of annihilating the enemy is a poor
tactician, and McClellan’s lack of enterprise, which Lee had so
accurately gauged, may be inferred from his telegram to Lincoln: “I
have lost this battle because my force is too small.”[42]
Porter was perhaps a more than sufficient substitute for the
Commander-in-Chief. His tactics, as fighting a waiting battle, had been
admirable; and, when his front was broken, strongly and with cool
judgment he sought to hold back the enemy and cover the bridges. The
line of batteries he established across the plateau—80 guns in
all—proved at first an effective barrier. But the retreat of the
infantry, the waning light, and the general dissolution of all order,
had its effect upon the gunners. When the remnant of the 5th Cavalry
was borne back in flight, the greater part of the batteries had already
limbered up, and over the bare surface of the upland the Confederate
infantry, shooting down
the terrified teams, rushed forward in hot pursuit. 22 guns, with a
large number of ammunition waggons, were captured on the field,
prisoners surrendered at every step, and the fight surged onward
towards the bridges. But between the bridges and the battlefield, on
the slopes falling to the Chickahominy, the dark forest covered the
retreat of the routed army. Night had already fallen. The confusion in
the ranks of the Confederates was extreme, and it was impossible to
distinguish friend from foe. All direction had been lost. None knew the
bearings of the bridges, or whether the Federals were retreating east
or south. Regiments had already been exposed to the fire of their
comrades, and in front of the forest a perceptible hesitation seized on
both officers and men. At this moment, in front of D. H. Hill’s
division, which was advancing by the road leading directly to the
bridges, loud cheers were heard. It was clear that Federal
reinforcements had arrived; the general ordered his troops to halt, and
along the whole line the forward movement came quickly to a standstill.
Two brigades, French’s and Meagher’s, tardily sent over by McClellan,
had arrived in time to stave off a terrible disaster. Pushing through
the mass of fugitives with the bayonet, these fine troops had crossed
the bridge, passed through the woods, and formed line on the southern
crest of the plateau. Joining the regulars, who still presented a
stubborn front, they opened a heavy fire, and under cover of their
steadfast lines Porter’s troops withdrew across the river.
Notwithstanding this strong reinforcement of 5,000 or 6,000 fresh
troops, it is by no means impossible, had the Confederates pushed
resolutely forward, that the victory would have been far more complete.
“Winder,” says General D. H. Hill, “thought that we ought to pursue
into the woods, on the right of the Grapevine Bridge road; but not
knowing the position of our friends, nor what Federal reserves might be
awaiting us in the woods, I thought it advisable not to move on.
General Lawton concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the woods
in front, as mine had not got through the swamp. Winder,”
he adds, “was right; even a show of pressure must have been attended
with great result.”[43] Had Jackson been at hand the pressure would in
all probability have been applied. The contagion of defeat soon
spreads; and whatever reserves a flying enemy may possess, if they are
vigorously attacked whilst the fugitives are still passing through
their ranks, history tells us, however bold their front, that, unless
they are intrenched, their resistance is seldom long protracted. More
than all, when night has fallen on the field, and prevents all estimate
of the strength of the attack, a resolute advance has peculiar chances
of success. But when his advanced line halted Jackson was not yet up;
and before he arrived the impetus of victory had died away; the Federal
reserves were deployed in a strong position, and the opportunity had
already passed.
It is no time, when the tide of victory bears him forward, for a
general “to take counsel of his fears.” It is no time to count numbers,
or to conjure up the phantoms of possible reserves; the sea itself is
not more irresistible than an army which has stormed a strong position,
and which has attained, in so doing, the exhilarating consciousness of
superior courage. Had Stuart, with his 2,000 horsemen, followed up the
pursuit towards the bridges, the Federal reserves might have been swept
away in panic. But Stuart, in common with Lee and Jackson, expected
that the enemy would endeavour to reach the White House, and when he
saw that their lines were breaking he had dashed down a lane which led
to the river road, about three miles distant. When he reached that
point, darkness had already fallen, and finding no traces of the enemy,
he had returned to Old Cold Harbour.
On the night of the battle the Confederates remained where the issue of
the fight had found them. Across the Grapevine road the pickets of the
hostile forces were in close proximity, and men of both sides, in
search of water, or carrying messages, strayed within the enemy’s
lines. Jackson himself, it is said, came near capture. Riding forward
in the darkness, attended by only a few staff
officers, he suddenly found himself in presence of a Federal picket.
Judging rightly of the enemy’s _moral,_ he set spurs to his horse, and
charging into the midst, ordered them to lay down their arms; and
fifteen or twenty prisoners, marching to the rear, amused the troops
they met on the march by loudly proclaiming that they had the honour of
being captured by Stonewall Jackson. These men were not without
companions. 2,830 Federals were reported either captured or missing;
and while some of those were probably among the dead, a large
proportion found their way to Richmond; 4,000, moreover, had fallen on
the field of battle.[44]
The Confederate casualties were even a clearer proof of the severity of
the fighting. So far as can be ascertained, 8,000 officers and men were
killed or wounded.
Longstreet
A.P. Hill
Jackson 1,850 2,450 3,700
Jackson’s losses were distributed as follows:—
Jackson’s own Division
Ewell
Whiting
D.H. Hill 600 650 1,020 1,430
The regimental losses, in several instances, were exceptionally severe.
Of the 4th Texas, of Hood’s brigade, the first to pierce the Federal
line, there fell 20 officers and 230 men. The 20th North Carolina, of
D.H. Hill’s division, which charged the batteries on McGehee’s Hill,
lost 70 killed and 200 wounded; of the same division the 3rd Alabama
lost 200, and the 12th North Carolina 212; while two of Lawton’s
regiments, the 31st and the 38th Georgia, had each a casualty list of
170. Almost every single regiment north of the Chickahominy took part
in the action. The cavalry did nothing, but at least 48,000 infantry
were engaged, and seventeen batteries are mentioned in the reports as
having participated in the battle.
[1] “No one but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.” Johnston to
Lee, April 22, 1862. O.R., vol. xi, part3, p. 456.
[2] _Narrative of Military Operations,_ General J. B. Johnston, pp.
112, 113.
[3] The garrison consisted only of a few companies of heavy artillery,
and the principal work was still unfinished when Yorktown fell.
Reports of Dr. Comstock, and Colonel Cabell, C.S.A. O.R., vol. xi,
part i.
[4] In one sense McClellan was not far wrong in his estimate of the
Confederate numbers. In assuming control of the Union armies Lincoln
and Stanton made their enemies a present of at least 50,000 men.
[5] It must be admitted that his cavalry was very weak in proportion
to the other arms. On June 20 he had just over 5,000 sabres (O.R.,
vol. xi, part iii, p. 238), of which 3,000 were distributed among the
army corps. The Confederates appear to have had about 3,000, but of
superior quality, familiar, more or less, with the country, and united
under one command. It is instructive to notice how the necessity for a
numerous cavalry grew on the Federal commanders. In 1864 the Army of
the Potomac was accompanied by a cavalry corps over 13,000 strong,
with 32 guns. It is generally the case in war, even in a close
country, that if the cavalry is allowed to fall below the usual