Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War

proportion of one trooper to every six men of the other arms the army suffers. [6] Stuart’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i. [7] This estimate is rather larger than that of the Confederate historians (Allan, W. H. Taylor, &c., &c.), but it has been arrived at after a careful examination of the strength at different dates and the losses in the various engagements. [8] Return of June 20, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 238. [9] The Fifth Army Corps included McCall’s division, which had but recently arrived by water from Fredericksburg. Report of June 20, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 238. [10] Magruder’s division, 13,000; Huger’s division, 9,000; reserve artillery, 3,000; 5 regiments of cavalry, 2,000. Holmes’ division, 6,500, was still retained on the south bank of the James. [11] Lee’s bridge, shown on the map, had either been destroyed or was not yet built. [12] The meaning of this term is clearly defined in Lee’s report. “It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to operate on the north bank.” O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 490. [13] O.R., vol. xi, part iii, p. 252. [14] Letter from Captain T. W. Sydnor, 4th Virginia Cavalry, who carried the message. [15] So General Porter. _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 331. [16] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 38, 39. [17] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 389, 390. [18] Dr. White, in his excellent _Life of Lee,_ states that the tardiness of the arrival of the provisions sent him from Richmond had much to do with the delay of Jackson’s march. [19] “Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy.” By General D. H. Hill. _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 347. General Longstreet, however, _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ says Jackson appointed the morning of the 25th, but, on Longstreet’s suggestion, changed the date to the 26th. [20] Of the events of June 26 Dr. Dabney, in a letter to the author, writes as follows:—“Here we had a disastrous illustration of the lack of an organised and intelligent general staff. Let my predicament serve as a specimen. As chief of Jackson’s staff, I had two assistant adjutant-generals, two men of the engineer department, and two clerks. What did I have for orderlies and couriers? A detail from some cavalry company which happened to bivouac near. The men were sent to me without any reference to their local knowledge, their intelligence, or their courage; most probably they were selected for me by their captain on account of their lack of these qualities. Next to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff should be the best man in the country. The brains of an army should be in the General Staff. The lowest orderlies attached to it should be the very best soldiers in the service, for education, intelligence, and courage. Jackson had to find his own guide for his march from Beaver Dam Station. He had not been furnished with a map, and not a single orderly or message reached him during the whole day.” [21] Branch’s Report, O.R., vol. ii, part ii, p. 882. [22] Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 553. [23] Whiting’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 562. [24] Trimble’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 614. [25] Letter to the author. [26] Porter’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 222. _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 330. [27] Longstreet, on page 124 of his _From Manassas to Appomattox,_ declares that “Jackson marched by the fight without giving attention, and went into camp at Hundley’s Corner, _half a mile in rear_ of the enemy’s position. A reference to the map is sufficient to expose the inaccuracy of this statement. [28] Jackson’s division—so-called in Lee’s order—really consisted of three divisions:— Whiting’s Division Hood’s Brigade Law’s Brigade Jackson’s [Winder] Division Stonewall Brigade Cunningham’s Brigade Fulkerson’s Brigade Lawton’s Brigade Ewell’s Division B. T. Johnson’s Elzey’s Brigade Trimble’s Brigade Taylor’s Brigade [29] The remainder of the guns were in reserve. [30] _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,_ vol. ii, p. 337. [31] This order was verbal; no record of it is to be found, and Jackson never mentioned, either at the time or afterwards, what its purport was. His surviving staff officers, however, are unanimous in declaring that he must have received direct instructions from General Lee. “Is it possible,” writes Dr. McGuire, “that Jackson, who knew nothing of the country, and little of the exact situation of affairs, would have taken the responsibility of stopping at Old Cold Harbour for an hour or more, unless he had had the authority of General Lee to do so? I saw him that morning talking to General Lee. General Lee was sitting on a log, and Jackson standing up. General Lee was evidently giving him instructions for the day.” In his report (O.R., vol. ii, part i, p. 492) Lee says: “The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected; it was supposed that his approach would cause the enemy’s extension in that direction.” [32] The Army of the Potomac numbered 105,000 men, and 25,000 animals. 600 tons of ammunition, food, forage, medical and other supplies had to be forwarded each day from White House to the front; and at one time during the operations from fifty to sixty days’ rations for the entire army, amounting probably to 25,000 tons, were accumulated at the depot. 5 tons daily per 1,000 men is a fair estimate for an army operating in a barren country. [33] The instructions, according to Dr. Dabney, ran as follows:— “The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back rapidly along the line and tell the commanders to advance instantly _en échelon_ from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide the right regiment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. Tell the commanders that if this formation fails at any point, to form line of battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing and attack the enemy vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each commander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit tell them to take in their field batteries and use them. If not, post them in the rear.” Letter to the author. [34] It may be noted that Jackson’s command had now been increased by two divisions, Whiting’s and D. H. Hill’s, but there had been no increase in the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley army. The mistakes which occurred at Gaines’ Mill, and Jackson’s ignorance of the movements and progress of his troops, were in great part due to his lack of staff officers. A most important message, writes Dr. Dabney, involving tactical knowledge, was carried by a non-combatant. [35] Dabney, vol. ii, p. 194. [36] Whiting’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part i, p. 563. [37] Porter himself thought that the first break in his line was made by Hood, at a point where he least expected it.” _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, pp. 335, 340. [38] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 363. [39] “The Confederates were within ten paces when the Federals broke cover, and leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in rear, carrying the second line with them in their rout.”—General Law, _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 363. [40] Jackson’s Report, O.R., vol. xi, part 1, pp. 555, 556. [41] Reports of Whiting, Trimble, Bodes, Bradley T. Johnson, O.R., vol. xi, part i. [42] Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War. [43] _Battles and Leaders,_ vol. ii, p. 357. [44] O.R., vol. xi, part i, pp. 40–42. Chapter XIV THE SEVEN DAYS. FRAYSER’S FARM AND MALVERN HILL June 28, 1862 The battle of Gaines’ Mill, although the assailants suffered heavier losses than they inflicted, was a long step towards accomplishing the deliverance of Richmond. One of McClellan’s five army corps had been disposed of, a heavy blow had been struck at the _moral_ of his whole army, and his communications with the White House and the Pamunkey were at the mercy of his enemies. Still the Confederate outlook was not altogether clear. It is one thing to win a victory, but another to make such use of it as to annihilate the enemy. Porter’s defeat was but a beginning of operations; and although Lee was convinced that McClellan would retreat, he was by no means so certain that his escape could be prevented. Yet this was essential. If the Federal army were suffered to fall back without incurring further loss, it would be rapidly reinforced from Washington, and resuming the advance, this time with still larger numbers, might render Gaines’ Mill a barren victory. How to compass the destruction of McClellan’s host was the problem that now confronted the Confederate leader; and before a plan could be devised it was necessary to ascertain the direction of the retreat. On the morning of June 28 it was found that no formed body of Federal troops remained north of the Chickahominy. French, Meagher, and Sykes, the regulars forming the rear-guard, had fallen back during the night and destroyed the bridges. Hundreds of stragglers were picked up, and one of the most gallant of the Northern brigadiers[1] was found asleep in the woods, unaware that his troops had crossed the stream. No further fighting was to be expected on the plateau. But it was possible that the enemy might still endeavour to preserve his communications, marching by the south bank of the river and recrossing by the railway and Bottom’s Bridges. Stuart, supported by Ewell, was at once ordered to seize the former; but when the cavalry reached Dispatch Station, a small Federal detachment retreated to the south bank of the Chickahominy and fired the timbers. Meanwhile, from the field of Gaines’ Mill, long columns of dust, rising above the forests to the south, had been descried, showing that the enemy was in motion; and when the news came in that the railway bridge had been destroyed, and that the line itself was unprotected, it was at once evident that McClellan had abandoned his communications with White House. This was valuable information, but still the line of retreat had not yet been ascertained. The Federals might retreat to some point on the James River, due south, there meeting their transports, or they might march down the Peninsula to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe. “In the latter event,” says Lee, “it was necessary that our troops should continue on the north bank of the river, and until the intention of General McClellan was discovered it was deemed injudicious to change their disposition. Ewell was therefore ordered to proceed to Bottom’s Bridge, and the cavalry to watch the bridges below. No certain indications of a retreat to the James River were discovered by our forces (Magruder) on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late in the afternoon the enemy’s works were reported to be fully manned. Below (south of) the enemy’s works the country was densely wooded and intersected by impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements and precluding reconnaissances except by the regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded. The bridges over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to wait until his purpose should be developed.”[2] During the day, therefore, the Confederate army remained on the battle-field, waiting for the game to bolt. In the evening, however, signs of a general movement were reported in rear of the intrenchments at Seven Pines; and as nothing had been observed by the cavalry on the