Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
Chickahominy, Lee, rightly concluding that McClellan was retreating to
the James, issued orders for the pursuit to be taken up the next
morning.
But to intercept the enemy before he could fortify a position, covered
by the fire of his gunboats, on the banks of the James, was a difficult
operation. The situation demanded rapid marching, close concert, and
delicate manœuvres. The Confederate army was in rear of the Federals,
and separated from them by the Chickahominy, and, to reach the James,
McClellan had only fourteen miles to cover. But the country over which
he had to pass was still more intricate, and traversed by even fewer
roads, than the district which had hitherto been the theatre of
operations. Across his line of march ran the White Oak Swamp, bordered
by thick woods and a wide morass, and crossed by only one bridge. If he
could transfer his whole army south of this stream, without
molestation, he would find himself within six miles of his gunboats;
and as his left flank was already resting on the Swamp, it was not easy
for Lee’s army to prevent his passage.
But 28,000 Confederates were already south of the Chickahominy, on the
flank of McClellan’s line of march, and it was certainly possible that
this force might detain the Federals until A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and
Jackson should come up. Magruder and Huger were therefore ordered to
advance early on the 29th, and moving, the one by the Williamsburg, the
other by the Charles City road, to strike the enemy in flank.
A. P. Hill and Longstreet, recrossing the Chickahominy at New Bridge,
were to march by the Darbytown road in the
direction of Charles City cross roads, thus turning the head waters of
the White Oak Swamp, and threatening the Federal rear.
Jackson, crossing Grapevine Bridge, was to move down the south bank of
the Chickahominy, cross the Swamp by the bridge, and force his way to
the Long Bridge road.
The Confederate army was thus divided into four columns, moving by four
different roads; each column at starting was several miles distant from
the others, and a junction was to be made upon the field of battle. The
cavalry, moreover, with the exception of a few squadrons, was far away
upon the left, pursuing a large detachment which had been observed on
the road to the White House.[3]
McClellan had undoubtedly resolved on a most hazardous manœuvre. His
supply and ammunition train consisted of over five thousand waggons. He
was encumbered with the heavy guns of the siege artillery. He had with
him more than fifty field batteries; his army was still 95,000 strong;
and this unwieldy multitude of men, horses, and vehicles, had to be
passed over White Oak Swamp, and then to continue its march across the
front of a powerful and determined enemy.
But Lee also was embarrassed by the nature of the country.[4] If
McClellan’s movements were retarded by the woods, swamps, and
indifferent roads, the same obstacles would interfere with the
combination of the Confederate columns; and the pursuit depended for
success on their close co-operation.
June 29 The first day’s work was hardly promising. The risks of
unconnected manœuvres received abundant illustration. Magruder, late in
the afternoon, struck the enemy’s rearguard near Savage’s Station, but
was heavily repulsed by two Federal army corps. Huger, called by
Magruder to his assistance, turned aside from the road which had been
assigned to him, and when he was recalled by an urgent message from
Lee, advanced with the timidity which almost invariably besets the
commander of an isolated force in the neighbourhood of a large army.
Jackson, whose line of march led him directly on Savage’s Station, was
delayed until after nightfall by the necessity of rebuilding the
Grapevine Bridge.[5] Stuart had gone off to the White House, bent on
the destruction of the enemy’s supply depot. Longstreet and Hill
encamped south-west of Charles City cross roads, but saw nothing of the
enemy. Holmes, with 6,500 men, crossed the James during the afternoon
and encamped on the north bank, near Laurel Hill Church. During the
night the Federal rearguard fell back, destroying the bridge over White
Oak Swamp; and although a large quantity of stores were either
destroyed or abandoned, together with a hospital containing 2,500
wounded, the whole of McClellan’s army, men, guns, and trains, effected
the passage of this dangerous obstacle.
June 30 The next morning Longstreet, with Hill in support, moved
forward, and found a Federal division in position near Glendale.
Bringing his artillery into action, he held his infantry in hand until
Huger should come up on his left, and Jackson’s guns be heard at White
Oak Bridge. Holmes, followed by Magruder, was marching up the Newmarket
road to Malvern House; and when the sound of Jackson’s artillery became
audible to the northwards, Lee sent Longstreet forward to the attack. A
sanguinary conflict, on ground covered with heavy timber, and cut up by
deep ravines, resulted in the Federals holding
their ground till nightfall; and although many prisoners and several
batteries were captured by the Confederates, McClellan, under cover of
the darkness, made good his escape.
The battle of Glendale or Frayser’s Farm was the crisis of the “Seven
Days.” Had Lee been able to concentrate his whole strength against the
Federals it is probable that McClellan would never have reached the
James. But Longstreet and Hill fought unsupported. As the former very
justly complained, 50,000 men were within hearing of the guns but none
came to co-operate, and against the two Confederate divisions fought
the Third Federal Army Corps, reinforced by three divisions from the
Second, Fifth, and Sixth. Huger’s march on the Charles City road was
obstructed by felled trees. When he at last arrived in front of the
enemy, he was held in check by two batteries, and he does not appear to
have opened communication with either Lee or Longstreet. Magruder had
been ordered to march down from Savage Station to the Darbytown road,
and there to await orders. At 4.30 p.m. he was ordered to move to
Newmarket in support of Holmes. This order was soon countermanded, but
he was unable to join Longstreet until the fight was over. Holmes was
held in check by Porter’s Army Corps, minus McCall’s division, on
Malvern Hill; and the cavalry, which might have been employed
effectively against the enemy’s left flank and rear, was still north of
the Chickahominy, returning from a destructive but useless raid on the
depôt at the White House. Nor had the conduct of the battle been
unaffected by the complicated nature of the general plan. Longstreet
attacked alone, Hill being held back, in order to be fresh for the
pursuit when Jackson and Huger should strike in. The attack was
successful, and McCall’s division, which had shared the defeat at
Gaines’ Mill, was driven from its position. But McCall was reinforced
by other divisions; Longstreet was thrown on to the defensive by
superior numbers, and when Hill was at length put in, it was with
difficulty that the fierce counterblows of the Federals were beaten
off.
Jackson had been unable to participate in the conflict. When night fell
he was still north of the White Oak Swamp, seven miles distant from his
morning bivouac, and hardly a single infantry man in his command had
pulled a trigger. According to his own report his troops reached White
Oak Bridge about noon. “Here the enemy made a determined effort to
retard our advance and thereby to prevent an immediate junction between
General Longstreet and myself. We found the bridge destroyed, the
ordinary place of crossing commanded by their batteries on the other
side, and all approach to it barred by detachments of sharp-shooters
concealed in a dense wood close by. . . . A heavy cannonading in front
announced the engagement of General Longstreet at Frayser’s Farm
(Glendale) and made me eager to press forward; but the marshy character
of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek,
and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage,
prevented my advancing until the following morning.”[6]
Such are Jackson’s reasons for his failure to co-operate with
Longstreet. It is clear that he was perfectly aware of the importance
of the part he was expected to play; and he used every means which
suggested itself as practicable to force a crossing. The 2nd Virginia
Cavalry, under Colonel Munford, had now joined him from the Valley, and
their commanding officer bears witness that Jackson showed no lack of
energy.
“When I left the general on the preceding evening, he ordered me to be
at the cross-roads (five miles from White Oak Bridge) at sunrise the
next morning, ready to move in advance of his troops. The worst
thunderstorm came up about night I ever was in, and in that thickly
wooded country one could not see his horse’s ears. My command scattered
in the storm, and I do not suppose that any officer had a rougher time
in any one night than I had to endure. When the first grey dawn
appeared I started off my adjutant and officers to bring up the
scattered regiment; but at sunrise I had not more than fifty men,
and I was half a mile from the cross-roads. When I arrived, to my
horror there sat Jackson waiting for me. He was in a bad humour, and
said, ‘Colonel, my orders to you were to be here at sunrise.’ I
explained my situation, telling him that we had no provisions, and that
the storm and the dark night had conspired against me. When I got
through he replied, ‘Yes, sir. But, Colonel, I ordered you to be here
at sunrise. Move on with your regiment. If you meet the enemy drive in
his pickets, and if you want artillery, Colonel Crutchfield will
furnish you.’
“I started on with my little handful of men. As others came straggling
on to join me, Jackson noticed it, and sent two couriers to inform me
that ‘my men were straggling badly.’ I rode back and went over the same
story, hoping that he would be impressed with my difficulties. He
listened to me, but replied as before, ‘Yes, sir. But I ordered you to
be here at sunrise, and I have been waiting for you for a quarter of an
hour.’
“Seeing that he was in a peculiar mood, I determined to make the best
of my trouble, sent my adjutant back, and made him halt the stragglers
and form my men as they came up; and with what I had, determined to
give him no cause for complaint. When we came upon the enemy’s picket
we charged, and pushed the picket every step of the way into their
camp, where there were a large number of wounded and many stores. It
was done so rapidly that the enemy’s battery on the other side of White
Oak Swamp could not fire on us without endangering their own friends.
“When Jackson came up he was smiling, and he at once (shortly after
noon) ordered Colonel Crutchfield to bring up the artillery, and very
soon the batteries were at work. After the lapse of about an hour my
regiment had assembled, and while our batteries were shelling those of
the enemy, Jackson sent for me and said, ‘Colonel, move your regiment
over the creek, and secure those guns. I will ride with you to the
Swamp.’ When we reached the crossing we found that the enemy had torn
up the bridge, and had thrown the timbers into the stream, forming a
tangled mass which seemed to prohibit a crossing. I said to General
Jackson that I did not think that we could cross. He looked at me,
waved his hand, and replied, ‘Yes, Colonel, try it.’ In we went and
floundered over, and before I formed the men, Jackson cried out to me
to move on at the guns. Colonel Breckenridge started out with what we
had over, and I soon got over the second squadron, and moved up the