Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
was not for Jackson to initiate such a movement. He had been ordered by
General Lee to move along the road to White Oak Swamp, to endeavour to
force his way to the Long Bridge road, to guard Lee’s left flank from
any attack across the fords or bridges of the lower Chickahominy, and
to keep on that road until he received further orders. These further
orders he never received; and it was certainly not his place to march
to the Charles City road until Lee, who was with Longstreet, sent him
instructions to do so. “General Jackson,” says Dr. McGuire, “demanded
of his subordinates implicit, blind obedience. He gave orders in his
own peculiar, terse, rapid way, and he did not permit them to be
questioned. He obeyed his own superiors in the same fashion. At White
Oak Swamp he was looking for some message from General Lee, but he
received none, and therefore, as a soldier, he had no right to leave
the road which had been assigned to him. About July 18, 1862, the night
before we started to Gordonsville, Crutchfield, Pendleton (assistant
adjutant-general), and myself were discussing the campaign just
finished. We were talking about the affair at Frayser’s Farm, and
wondering if it would have been better for Jackson with part of his
force to have moved to Longstreet’s aid. The general came in while the
discussion was going on, and curtly said: ‘If General Lee had wanted me
he could have sent for me.’ It looked the day after the battle, and it
looks to me now, that if General Lee had sent a staff officer, who
could have ridden the distance in forty minutes, to order Jackson with
three divisions to the cross roads, while D. H. Hill and the artillery
watched Franklin, we should certainly have crushed McClellan’s army. If
Lee had wanted Jackson to give direct support to Longstreet, he could
have had him there in under three hours. The staff officer was not
sent, and the evidence is that General Lee believed Longstreet strong
enough to defeat the Federals without
direct aid from Jackson.”[14] Such reasoning appears incontrovertible.
Jackson, be it remembered, had been directed to guard the left flank of
the army “until further orders.” Had these words been omitted, and he
had been left free to follow his own judgment, it is possible that he
would have joined Huger on the Charles City road with three divisions.
But in all probability he felt himself tied down by the phrase which
Moltke so strongly reprobates. Despite Dr. McGuire’s statement Jackson
knew well that disobedience to orders may sometimes be condoned. It may
be questioned whether he invariably demanded “blind” obedience.
“General,” said an officer, “you blame me for disobedience of orders,
but in Mexico you did the same yourself.” “But I was successful,” was
Jackson’s reply; as much as to say that an officer, when he takes upon
himself the responsibility of ignoring the explicit instructions of his
superior, must be morally certain that he is doing what that superior,
were he present, would approve. Apply this rule to the situation at
White Oak Swamp. For anything Jackson knew it was possible that
Longstreet and Hill might defeat the Federals opposed to them without
his aid. In such case, Lee, believing Jackson to be still on the left
flank, would have ordered him to prevent the enemy’s escape by the Long
Bridge. What would Lee have said had his “further orders” found Jackson
marching to the Charles City road, with the Long Bridge some miles in
rear? The truth is that the principle of marching to the sound of the
cannon, though always to be borne in mind, cannot be invariably
followed. The only fair criticism on Jackson’s conduct is that he
should have informed Lee of his inability to force the passage across
the Swamp, and have held three divisions in readiness to march to
Glendale. This, so far as can be ascertained, was left undone, but the
evidence is merely negative.
Except for this apparent omission, it cannot be fairly said that
Jackson was in the slightest degree responsible for the failure of the
Confederate operations. If the truth be told, Lee’s design was by no
means
perfect. It had two serious defects. In the first place, it depended
for success on the co-operation of several converging columns, moving
over an intricate country, of which the Confederates had neither
accurate maps nor reliable information. The march of the columns was
through thick woods, which not only impeded intercommunication, but
provided the enemy with ample material for obstructing the roads, and
Jackson’s line of march was barred by a formidable obstacle in White
Oak Swamp, an admirable position for a rear-guard. In the second place,
concentration at the decisive point was not provided for. The staff
proved incapable of keeping the divisions in hand. Magruder was
permitted to wander to and fro after the fashion of D’Erlon between
Quatre Bras and Ligny. Holmes was as useless as Grouchy at Waterloo.
Huger did nothing, although some of his brigades, when the roads to the
front were found to be obstructed, might easily have been drawn off to
reinforce Longstreet. The cavalry had gone off on a raid to the White
House, instead of crossing the Chickahominy and harassing the enemy’s
eastward flank; and at the decisive point only two divisions were
assembled, 20,000 men all told, and these two divisions attacked in
succession instead of simultaneously. Had Magruder and Holmes, neither
of whom would have been called upon to march more than thirteen miles,
moved on Frayser’s Farm, and had part of Huger’s division been brought
over to the same point, the Federals would in all probability have been
irretrievably defeated. It is easy to be wise after the event. The
circumstances were extraordinary. An army of 75,000 men was pursuing an
army of 95,000, of which 65,000, when the pursuit began, were perfectly
fresh troops. The problem was, indeed, one of exceeding difficulty;
but, in justice to the reputation of his lieutenants, it is only fair
to say that Lee’s solution was not a masterpiece.
During the night which followed the battle of Frayser’s Farm the whole
Federal army fell back on Malvern Hill—a strong position, commanding
the country for many miles, and very difficult of access, on which the
reserve artillery,
supported by the Fourth and Fifth Corps, was already posted.
July 1 The Confederates, marching at daybreak, passed over roads which
were strewn with arms, blankets, and equipments. Stragglers from the
retreating army were picked up at every step. Scores of wounded men lay
untended by the roadside. Waggons and ambulances had been abandoned;
and with such evidence before their eyes it was difficult to resist the
conviction that the enemy was utterly demoralised. That McClellan had
seized Malvern Hill, and that it was strongly occupied by heavy guns,
Lee was well aware. But, still holding to his purpose of annihilating
his enemy before McDowell could intervene from Fredericksburg, he
pushed forward, determined to attack; and with his whole force now well
in hand the result seemed assured. Three or four miles south of White
Oak Swamp Jackson’s column, which was leading the Confederate advance,
came under the fire of the Federal batteries. The advanced guard
deployed in the woods on either side of the road, and Lee, accompanied
by Jackson, rode forward to reconnoitre.
Malvern Hill, a plateau rising to the height of 150 feet above the
surrounding forests, possessed nearly every requirement of a strong
defensive position. The open ground on the top, undulating and
unobstructed, was a mile and a half in length by half a mile in
breadth. To the north, north-west, and north-east it fell gradually,
the slopes covered with wheat, standing or in shock, to the edge of the
woods, which are from eight to sixteen hundred yards distant from the
commanding crest. The base of the hill, except to the east and
south-east, was covered with dense forest; and within the forest, at
the foot of the declivity, ran a tortuous and marshy stream. The right
flank was partially protected by a long mill-dam. The left, more open,
afforded an excellent artillery position overlooking a broad stretch of
meadows, drained by a narrow stream and deep ditches, and flanked by
the fire of several gunboats. Only three approaches, the Quaker and the
river roads, and a track from the north-west, gave access to the
heights.
The reconnaissance showed that General Porter, commanding the defence,
had utilised the ground to the best advantage. A powerful artillery,
posted just in rear of the crest, swept the entire length of the
slopes, and under cover in rear were dense masses of infantry, with a
strong line of skirmishers pushed down the hill in front.
Nevertheless, despite the formidable nature of the Federal
preparations, orders were immediately issued for attack. General Lee,
who was indisposed, had instructed Longstreet to reconnoitre the
enemy’s left, and to report whether attack was feasible. Jackson was
opposed to a frontal attack, preferring to turn the enemy’s right.
Longstreet, however, was of a different opinion. “The spacious open,”
he says, “along Jackson’s front appeared to offer a field for play of a
hundred or more guns. . . . I thought it probable that Porter’s
batteries, under the cross-fire of the Confederates’ guns posted on his
left and front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way for
the combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, and General Lee
ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps to cut a
road for the right batteries.”[15]
4 p.m. It was not till four o’clock that the line of battle was formed.
Jackson was on the left, with Whiting to the left of the Quaker road,
and D. H. Hill to the right; Ewell’s and Jackson’s own divisions were
in reserve. Nearly half a mile beyond Jackson’s right came two of
Huger’s brigades, Armistead and Wright, and to Huger’s left rear was
Magruder. Holmes, still on the river road, was to assail the enemy’s
left. Longstreet and A. P. Hill were in reserve behind Magruder, on the
Long Bridge road.
The deployment of the leading divisions was not effected without loss,
for the Federal artillery swept all the roads and poured a heavy fire
into the woods; but at length D. H. Hill’s infantry came into line
along the edge of the timber.
The intervening time had been employed in bringing the artillery to the
front; and now were seen the tremendous difficulties which confronted
the attack. The swamps
and thickets through which the batteries had to force their way were
grievous impediments to rapid or orderly movement, and when they at
last emerged from the cover, and unlimbered for action, the
concentrated fire of the Federal guns overpowered them from the outset.
In front of Huger four batteries were disabled in quick succession, the
enemy concentrating fifty or sixty guns on each of them in turn; four
or five others which Jackson had ordered to take post on the left of
his line, although, with two exceptions, they managed to hold their
ground, were powerless to subdue the hostile fire. “The obstacles,”
says Lee in his report, “presented by the woods and swamp made it
impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose
successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy,
while the field itself afforded us few positions favourable for its use
and none for its proper concentration.”
According to Longstreet, when the inability of the batteries to prepare
the way for the infantry was demonstrated by their defeat, Lee
abandoned the original plan of attack. “He proposed to me to move
“round to the left with my own and A. P. Hill’s division, and turn the
Federal right.” I issued my orders accordingly for the two divisions to