Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War
losses of the Seven Days had reduced the Confederate strength to
60,000. Under such circumstances it was not considered safe to remove
the army from the capital. Jackson, however, was entrusted with a more
congenial duty than watching an enemy who, he was absolutely convinced,
had no intention of leaving his intrenchments.
July 13 His longing for active work was gratified by an order to march
westward. Lee, finding McClellan immovable, had recourse to his former
strategy. He determined to play once more on Lincoln’s fears. The Army
of Virginia, under the command of Pope, defended Washington. Would the
Northern Government, when the news came that Stonewall Jackson was
returning to the Shenandoah, deem this force sufficient to protect the
capital? Would they not rather think it necessary to recall McClellan?
The experiment was worth trying. After some delay in recovering from
the disorganisation caused by the disasters in the Valley, Pope had
assembled his army east of the Blue Ridge, near the sources of the
Rappahannock. Sperryvile, his advanced post, was no more than forty
miles north of the Virginia Central Railway, and his cavalry was
already advancing. It was essential that
the railway, the chief line of supply of the Confederate army, should
be protected; and Jackson was instructed to halt near Gordonsville.
July 16 On the 16th his leading brigades reached their destination.
Their arrival was opportune. The Federal cavalry, with a strong
infantry support, was already threatening Gordonsville. On learning,
however, that the town was occupied they at once fell back.
Jackson, as soon as his command was up, and he had had time to
ascertain the Federal strength, applied for reinforcements. His own
numbers were very small. The divisions of D. H. Hill and Whiting had
remained at Richmond. The Army of the Valley, reduced to its original
elements, was no more than 11,000 strong. Pope’s army consisted of
47,000 men.[4] But the Federals were scattered over a wide front.
Sigel, a German who had succeeded Frémont, was near Sperryville, and
Banks lay close to Sigel. Each of these officers commanded an army
corps of two divisions. Of McDowell’s army corps, Ricketts’ division
held Warrenton, twenty-five miles east of Banks; while King’s division
was retained at Fredericksburg, forty miles south-east of Ricketts’.
Such dispersion seemed to invite attack. Lee, however, found it
impossible to comply with his lieutenant’s request for such aid as
would enable him to assume the offensive. The army covering Richmond
was much smaller than McClellan’s, and the Confederates were aware that
a large reinforcement for the latter, under General Burnside, had
landed in the Peninsula. But assistance was promised in case Pope
advanced so far south that troops could be detached without risk to
Richmond. Pope, in fact, was too far off, and Jackson was to entice him
forward.
A week, however, passed away without any movement on the part of
McClellan. He knew that Lee’s army was diminished; and it was believed
at his headquarters that “Jackson had started towards the Valley with
60,000 to 80,000 troops.”[5] He knew that there was no large force
within ten miles of his outposts, and if the President would send him
20,000 or 30,000 more men he said that he was ready to march on
Richmond. But, as yet, he had not observed the opportunity for which,
according to his own account, he was so carefully watching. Pope was
far more enterprising. His cavalry had burned the railway depôt at
Beaver Dam, destroyed some Confederate stores, cut the line at several
points, and threatened Hanover Junction. Stuart, with his cavalry
division, was immediately sent northwards, and Lee ordered A. P. Hill
to Gordonsville.
Jackson’s letters to headquarters at this period are missing. But Lee’s
answers indicate the tenor of the views therein expressed. On July 27
the Commander-in-Chief wrote:—
“I have received your dispatch of the 26th instant. I will send A. P.
Hill’s division and the Second Brigade of Louisiana volunteers to you.
. . . I want Pope to be suppressed. . . . A. P. Hill you will, I think,
find a good officer, with whom you can consult, and by advising with
your division commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be
saved you in arranging details, and they can act more intelligently. I
wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command. Cache your
troops as much as possible till you can strike your blow, and be
prepared to return to me when done, if necessary. I will endeavour to
keep General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed.”
Illustration: Map of the Environs of Warrenton, Virginia. For larger
view click on image.
This letter, besides containing a delicate hint that extreme reticence
is undesirable, evidently refers to some plan proposed by Jackson.
Whatever this may have been, it is certain that both he and Lee were in
close accord. They believed that the best method of protecting the
railway was, in Lee’s words, “to find the main body of the enemy and
drive it,” and they were agreed that there should be no more Malvern
Hills. “You are right,” says Lee on August 4, “in not attacking them in
their strong and chosen positions. They ought always to be turned as
you propose, and thus force them on to more favourable ground.”
At the end of July, about the same time that Hill
joined Jackson, Pope, under instructions from Washington, moved
forward. His cavalry occupied the line of Robertson River, within
twenty miles of the Confederate lines, and it became clear that he
intended advancing on Gordonsville. His infantry, however, had not yet
crossed Hazel Run, and Jackson, carefully concealing his troops,
remained on the watch for a few days longer. His anxiety, however, to
bring his enemy to battle was even greater than usual. Pope had already
gained an unenviable notoriety. On taking over command he had issued an
extraordinary address. His bombast was only equalled by his want of
tact. Not content with extolling the prowess of the Western troops,
with whom he had hitherto served, he was bitterly satirical at the
expense of McClellan and of McClellan’s army. “I have come to you,” he
said to his soldiers, “from the West, where we have always seen the
backs of our enemies—from an army whose business it has been to seek
the adversary, and beat him when found, whose policy has been attack
and not defence. . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue
the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to
do so, and that speedily. . . . Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from
your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find much in vogue
amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding
them—of lines of retreat and of bases of supplies. Let us discard such
ideas. . . . Let us study the probable line of retreat of our
opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look
before and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster
and shame lurk in the rear.”[6]
Even the Northern press made sport of Pope’s “’Ercles vein,” and the
Confederates contrasted his noisy declamation with the modesty of Lee
and Jackson. To the South the new commander was peculiarly obnoxious.
He was the first of the Federal generals to order that the troops
should subsist upon the country, and that the people should be held
responsible for all damage done to roads, railways, and
telegraphs by guerillas. His orders, it is true, were warranted by the
practice of war. But “forced requisitions,” unless conducted on a
well-understood system, must inevitably degenerate into plunder and
oppression; and Pope, in punishing civilians, was not careful to
distinguish between the acts of guerillas and those of the regular
Confederate cavalry. “These orders,” says a Northern historian, “were
followed by the pillaging of private property, and by insults to
females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war.” But in
comparison with a third edict they were mild and humane. On July 23
Pope’s generals were instructed to arrest every Virginian within the
limits of their commands, to administer the oath of allegiance to the
Union, and to expel from their homes all those who refused to take it.
This order was preceded by one from General von Steinwehr, a German
brigadier, directing the arrest of five prominent citizens, to be held
as hostages, and to suffer death in the event of any soldiers being
shot by bushwhackers. The Confederate Government retaliated by
declaring that Pope and his officers were not entitled to be considered
as soldiers. If captured they were to be imprisoned so long as their
orders remained unrepealed; and in the event of any unarmed Confederate
citizens being tried and shot, an equal number of Federal prisoners
were to be hanged. It need hardly be added that the operations north of
Gordonsville were watched with peculiar interest by the South. “This
new general,” it was said to Jackson, “claims your attention.” “And,
please God, he shall have it,” was the reply.
Nevertheless, with all his peculiar characteristics, Pope was no
despicable foe. The Federal cavalry were employed with a boldness which
had not hitherto been seen. Their outposts were maintained twenty miles
in advance of the army. Frequent reconnaissances were made. A regiment
of Jackson’s cavalry was defeated at Orange Court House, with a loss of
60 or 70 men, and scouting parties penetrated to within a few miles of
Gordonsville. Even Banks was spurred to activity, and learned at last
that information is generally to be obtained
if it is resolutely sought.[7] Very little that occurred within the
Confederate lines escaped the vigilance of the enemy; and although
Jackson’s numbers were somewhat overestimated, Pope’s cavalry,
energetically led by two able young officers, Generals Buford and
Bayard, did far better service than McClellan’s detectives. Jackson had
need of all his prudence. Including the Light Division, his force
amounted to no more than 24,000 men; and if Pope handled his whole army
with as much skill as he used his cavalry, it would go hard with
Gordonsville. 24,000 men could hardly be expected to arrest the march
of 47,000 unless the larger force should blunder.
During the first week in August events began to thicken. Stuart made a
strong reconnaissance towards Fredericksburg, and administered a check
to the Federal scouting parties in that quarter. But McClellan threw
forward a division and occupied Malvern Hill, and it became evident
that Pope also was meditating a further advance.
Jackson, for the purpose of luring him forward, and also of concealing
Hill’s arrival, had drawn back his cavalry, and moved his infantry
south of Gordonsville. Pope was warned from Washington that this was
probably a ruse. His confidence, however, was not to be shaken. “Within
ten days,” he reported, “unless the enemy is heavily reinforced from
Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordonsville and
Charlottesville.”
Although such an operation would carry Pope far from Washington there
was no remonstrance from headquarters. Lincoln and Stanton, mistrustful
at last of their ability as strategists, had called to their councils
General Halleck, who had shown some evidence of capacity while in
command of the Western armies. The new Commander-in-Chief had a
difficult problem to work out. It is impossible to determine how far
Jackson’s movement to Gordonsville influenced the Federal authorities,
but immediately on Halleck’s arrival
at Washington, about the same date that the movement was reported, he
was urged, according to his own account, to withdraw McClellan from the
Peninsula. “I delayed my decision,” he says, “as long as I dared delay