The Anabasis of Alexander or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great
and a foe who had already been beaten; and that the deity was acting
the part of general on their behalf better than himself, by putting
it into the mind of Darius to move his forces from the spacious plain
and shut them up in a narrow place, where there was sufficient room
for them to deepen their phalanx by marching from front to rear, but
where their vast multitude would be useless to their enemy in battle.
He added that their foes were similar to them neither in strength nor
in courage; for the Macedonians, who had long been practised in warlike
toils accompanied with danger, were coming into close conflict with
Persians and Medes, men who had become enervated by a long course of
luxurious ease; and, to crown all, they, being freemen, were about to
engage in battle with men who were slaves. He said, moreover, that
the Greeks who were in the two armies would not be fighting for the
same objects; for those with Darius were braving danger for pay,
and that pay not high; whereas, those on their side were voluntarily
defending the interests of Greece. Again, of foreigners, the Thracians,
Paeonians, Illyrians, and Agrianians, who were the most robust and
warlike of men in Europe, were about to be arrayed against the most
sluggish and effeminate races of Asia. In addition to all this,
Alexander was commanding in the field against Darius. These things
he enumerated as evidences of their superiority in the struggle; and
then he began to point out the great rewards they would win from the
danger to be incurred. For he told them that on that occasion they
would overcome, not merely the viceroys of Darius, nor the cavalry
drawn up at the Granicus, nor the 20,000 Grecian mercenaries, but would
overcome all the available forces of the Persians and Medes, as well
as all the other races subject to them dwelling in Asia, and the Great
King present in person. After this conflict nothing would be left for
them to do, except to take possession of all Asia, and to put an end
to their many labours. In addition to this, he reminded them of their
brilliant achievements in their collective capacity in days gone by;
and if any man had individually performed any distinguished feat of
valour from love of glory, he mentioned him by name in commendation
of the deed.[240] He then recapitulated as modestly as possible his
own daring deeds in the various battles. He is also said to have
reminded them of Xenophon and the ten thousand men who accompanied him,
asserting that the latter were in no way comparable with them either
in number or in general excellence. Besides, they had had with them
neither Thessalian, Boeotian, Peloponnesian, Macedonian, or Thracian
horsemen, nor any of the other cavalry which was in the Macedonian
army; nor had they any archers or slingers except a few Cretans and
Rhodians, and even these were got ready by Xenophon on the spur of
the moment in the very crisis of danger.[241] And yet even these put
the king and all his forces to rout close to Babylon[242] itself, and
succeeded in reaching the Euxine Sea after defeating all the races
which lay in their way as they were marching down thither. He also
adduced whatever other arguments were suitable for a great commander to
use in order to encourage brave men in such a critical moment before
the perils of battle. They urged him to lead them against the foe
without delay, coming from all sides to grasp the king’s right hand,
and encouraging him by their promises.
CHAPTER VIII.
ARRANGEMENT OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES.
Alexander then ordered his soldiers to take their dinner, and having
sent a few of his horsemen and archers forward to the Gates to
reconnoitre the road in the rear, he took the whole of his army and
marched in the night to occupy the pass again. When about midnight
he had again got possession of it, he caused the army to rest the
remainder of the night there upon the rocks, having posted vigilant
sentries. At the approach of dawn he began to descend from the pass
along the road; and as long as the space was narrow everywhere, he led
his army in column, but when the mountains parted so as to leave a
plain between them, he kept on opening out the column into the phalanx,
marching one line of heavy armed infantry after another up into line
towards the mountain on the right and towards the sea on the left.
Up to this time his cavalry had been ranged behind the infantry; but
when they advanced into the open country, he began to draw up his army
in order of battle. First, upon the right wing near the mountain he
placed his infantry guard and the shield-bearers, under the command of
Nicanor, son of Parmenio; next to these the regiment of Coenus, and
close to them that of Perdiccas. These troops were posted as far as the
middle of the heavy-armed infantry to one beginning from the right.
On the left wing first stood the regiment of Amyntas, then that of
Ptolemy, and close to this that of Meleager. The infantry on the left
had been placed under the command of Craterus; but Parmenio held the
chief direction of the whole left wing. This general had been ordered
not to abandon the sea, so that they might not be surrounded by the
foreigners, who were likely to outflank them on all sides by their
superior numbers.[243]
But as soon as Darius was certified of Alexander’s approach for battle,
he conveyed about 30,000 of his cavalry and with them 20,000 of his
light-armed infantry across the river Pinarus, in order that he might
be able to draw up the rest of his forces with ease. Of the heavy
armed infantry, he placed first the 30,000 Greek mercenaries to oppose
the phalanx of the Macedonians, and on both sides of these he placed
60,000 of the men called Cardaces,[244] who were also heavy-armed
infantry.[245] For the place where they were posted was able to
contain only this number in a single phalanx.[246] He also posted
20,000 men near the mountain on their left and facing Alexander’s
right. Some of these troops were also in the rear of Alexander’s army;
for the mountain near which they were posted in one part sloped a
great way back and formed a sort of bay, like a bay in the sea, and
afterwards bending forwards caused the men who had been posted at the
foot of it to be behind Alexander’s right wing. The remaining multitude
of Darius’s light-armed and heavy-armed infantry was marshalled by
nations to an unserviceable depth and placed behind the Grecian
mercenaries and the Persian army arranged in phalanx. The whole of the
army with Darius was said to number about 600,000 fighting men.[247]
As Alexander advanced, he found that the ground spread out a little
in breadth, and he accordingly brought up his horsemen, both those
called Companions, and the Thessalians as well as the Macedonians, and
posted them with himself on the right wing. The Peloponnesians and the
rest of the allied force of Greeks he sent to Parmenio on the left.
When Darius had marshalled his phalanx, by a pre-concerted signal he
recalled the cavalry which he had posted in front of the river for
the express purpose of rendering the arranging of his army easy. Most
of these he placed on the right wing near the sea facing Parmenio;
because here the ground was more suitable for the evolutions of
cavalry. A certain part of them also he led up to the mountain towards
the left. But when they were seen to be useless there on account of
the narrowness of the ground, he ordered most of these also to ride
round to the right wing and join their comrades there. Darius himself
occupied the centre of the whole army, inasmuch as it was the custom
for the kings of Persia to take up that position, the reason of which
arrangement has been recorded by Xenophon, son of Gryllus.[248]
CHAPTER IX.
ALEXANDER CHANGES THE DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES.
Meantime when Alexander perceived that nearly all the Persian cavalry
had changed their ground and gone to his left towards the sea, and
that on his side only the Peloponnesians and the rest of the Grecian
cavalry were posted there, he sent the Thessalian cavalry thither with
speed, ordering them not to ride along before the front of the whole
array, lest they should be seen by the enemy to be shifting their
ground, but to proceed by stealth in the rear of the phalanx.[249] In
front of the cavalry on the right, he posted the lancers under the
command of Protomachus, and the Paeonians under that of Aristo; and of
the infantry, the archers under the direction of Antiochus, and the
Agrianians under that of Attalus. Some of the cavalry and archers
also he drew up so as to form an angle with the centre[250] towards
the mountain which was in the rear; so on the right his phalanx had
been drawn up separated into two wings, the one fronting Darius and
the main body of Persians beyond the river, and the other facing those
who had been posted at the mountain in their rear. On the left wing
the infantry consisting of the Cretan archers and the Thracians under
command of Sitalces were posted in front; and before these the cavalry
towards the left. The Grecian mercenaries were drawn up as a reserve
for all of them. When he perceived that the phalanx towards the right
was too thin, and it seemed likely that the Persians would outflank him
here considerably, he ordered two squadrons of the Companion cavalry,
viz. the Anthemusian,[251] of which Peroedas, son of Menestheus, was
captain, and that which was called Leugaean, under the command of
Pantordanus, son of Cleander, to proceed from the centre to the right
without being seen. Having also marched the archers, part of the
Agrianians and of the Grecian mercenaries up along his right in the
front, he extended his phalanx beyond the wing of the Persians. But
when those who had been posted upon the mountain did not descend, a
charge was made by a few of the Agrianians and archers at Alexander’s
order, by which they were easily put to the rout from the foot of the
mountain. As they fled to the summit he decided that he could make use
of the men who had been drawn up to keep these in check, to fill up
the ranks of his phalanx. He thought it quite sufficient to post 300
horsemen to watch the men on the mountain.
CHAPTER X.
BATTLE OF ISSUS.
Having thus marshalled his men, he caused them to rest for some time,
and then led them forward, as he thought the enemy’s approach was very
slow. For Darius was no longer leading the foreigners against him, as
he had arranged them at first, but he remained in his position, upon
the bank of the river, which was in many parts steep and precipitous;
and in certain places, where it seemed more easy to ascend, he extended
a stockade along it. By this it was at once evident to Alexander’s
men that Darius had become cowed in spirit.[252] But when the armies
at length met in conflict, Alexander rode about in every direction
to exhort his troops to show their valour; mentioning with befitting
epithets the names, not only of the generals, but also those of the
captains of cavalry and infantry, and of the Grecian mercenaries as
many as were more distinguished either by rank or merit. From all
sides arose a shout not to delay but to attack the enemy. At first he
still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had
the forces of Darius already in full view, lest by a more hasty march
any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line[253] and get
separated from the rest. But when they came within range of darts,
Alexander himself and those around him being posted on the right wing,
advanced first into the river with a run, in order to alarm the
Persians by the rapidity of their onset, and by coming sooner to close
conflict to receive little damage from the archers. And it turned out
just as Alexander had conjectured; for as soon as the battle became a