The Anabasis of Alexander or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great
eclipse of the moon nearly total occurred.[384] Alexander thereupon
offered sacrifice to the moon, the sun and the earth, whose deed this
was, according to common report. Aristander thought that this eclipse
of the moon was a portent favourable to Alexander and the Macedonians;
that there would be a battle that very month, and that victory for
Alexander was signified by the sacrificial victims. Having therefore
decamped from the Tigris, he went through the land of Aturia,[385]
having the mountains of the Gordyaeans[386] on the left and the Tigris
itself on the right; and on the fourth day after the passage of the
river, his scouts brought word to him that the enemy’s cavalry were
visible there along the plain, but how many of them there were they
could not guess. Accordingly he drew his army up in order and advanced
prepared for battle. Other scouts again riding forward and taking more
accurate observations, told him that the cavalry did not seem to them
to be more than 1,000 in number.
CHAPTER VIII.
DESCRIPTION OF DARIUS’S ARMY AT ARBELA.
Alexander therefore took the royal squadron of cavalry, and one
squadron of the Companions, together with the Paeonian scouts, and
marched with all speed; having ordered the rest of his army to follow
at leisure. The Persian cavalry, seeing Alexander advancing quickly,
began to flee with all their might. Though he pressed close upon
them in pursuit, most of them escaped; but a few, whose horses were
fatigued by the flight, were slain, others were taken prisoners,
horses and all. From these they ascertained that Darius with a large
force was not far off. For the Indians who were conterminous with
the Bactrians, as also the Bactrians themselves and the Sogdianians
had come to the aid of Darius, all being under the command of Bessus,
the viceroy of the land of Bactria. They were accompanied by the
Sacians, a Scythian tribe belonging to the Scythians who dwell in
Asia.[387] These were not subject to Bessus, but were in alliance
with Darius. They were commanded by Mavaces, and were horse-bowmen.
Barsaëntes, the viceroy of Arachotia, led the Arachotians[388] and the
men who were called mountaineer Indians. Satibarzanes, the viceroy
of Areia, led the Areians,[389] as did Phrataphernes the Parthians,
Hyrcanians, and Tapurians,[390] all of whom were horsemen. Atropates
commanded the Medes, with whom were arrayed the Cadusians, Albanians,
and Sacesinians.[391] The men who dwelt near the Red Sea[392] were
marshalled by Ocondobates, Ariobarzanes, and Otanes. The Uxians and
Susianians[393] acknowledged Oxathres son of Aboulites as their
leader, and the Babylonians were commanded by Boupares. The Carians
who had been deported into central Asia, and the Sitacenians[394]
had been placed in the same ranks as the Babylonians. The Armenians
were commanded by Orontes and Mithraustes, and the Cappadocians by
Ariaces. The Syrians from the vale between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon
(_i.e._ Coele-Syria) and the men of Syria which lies between the
rivers[395] were led by Mazaeus. The whole army of Darius was said to
contain 40,000 cavalry, 1,000,000 infantry, and 200 scythe-bearing
chariots.[396] There were only a few elephants, about fifteen in
number, belonging to the Indians who live this side of the Indus.[397]
With these forces Darius had encamped at Gaugamela, near the river
Bumodus, about 600 stades distant from the city of Arbela, in a
district everywhere level;[398] for whatever ground thereabouts was
unlevel and unfit for the evolutions of cavalry, had long before been
levelled by the Persians, and made fit for the easy rolling of chariots
and for the galloping of horses. For there were some who persuaded
Darius that he had forsooth got the worst of it in the battle fought
at Issus, from the narrowness of the battle-field; and this he was
easily induced to believe.
CHAPTER IX.
ALEXANDER’S TACTICS.—HIS SPEECH TO THE OFFICERS.
When Alexander had received all this information from the Persian
scouts who had been captured, he remained four days in the place where
he had received the news; and gave his army rest after the march. He
meanwhile fortified his camp with a ditch and stockade, as he intended
to leave behind the baggage and all the soldiers who were unfit for
fighting, and to go into the contest accompanied by his warriors
carrying with them nothing except their weapons. Accordingly he took
his forces by night, and began the march about the second watch, in
order to come into collision with the foreigners at break of day. As
soon as Darius was informed of Alexander’s approach, he at once drew
out his army for battle; and Alexander led on his men drawn up in like
manner. Though the armies were only sixty stades[399] from each other,
yet they were not in sight of each other, for between the hostile
forces some hills intervened. But when Alexander was only thirty stades
distant from the enemy, and his army was already marching down from the
hills just mentioned, catching sight of the foreigners, he caused his
phalanx to halt there. Calling a council of the Companions, generals,
cavalry officers, and leaders of the Grecian allies and mercenaries,
he deliberated with them, whether he should at once lead on the
phalanx without delay, as most of them urged him to do; or, whether,
as Parmenio thought preferable, to pitch their tents there for the
present, to reconnoitre all the ground, in order to see if there was
anything there to excite suspicion or to impede their progress, or if
there were ditches or stakes firmly fixed in the earth out of sight,
as well as to make a more accurate survey of the enemy’s tactical
arrangements. Parmenio’s opinion prevailed, so they encamped there,
drawn up in the order in which they intended to enter the battle. But
Alexander took the light infantry and the cavalry Companions and went
all round, reconnoitring the whole country where he was about to fight
the battle. Having returned, he again called together the same leaders,
and said that they did not require to be encouraged by him to enter the
contest; for they had been long before encouraged by their own valour,
and by the gallant deeds which they had already so often achieved. He
thought it expedient that each of them individually should stir up
his own men separately; the infantry captain the men of his company,
the cavalry captain his own squadron, the brigadiers their various
brigades, and each of the leaders of the infantry the phalanx entrusted
to him. He assured them that in this battle they were going to fight,
not as before, either for Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, or Egypt, but for
the whole of Asia. For he said this battle would decide who were to
be the rulers of that continent. It was not necessary for him to stir
them up to gallant deeds by many words, since they had this valour by
nature; but they should see that each man took care, so far as in him
lay, to preserve discipline in the critical moment of action, and to
keep perfect silence when it was expedient to advance in silence. On
the other hand, they should see that each man uttered a sonorous shout,
where it would be advantageous to shout, and to raise as terrible a
battle-cry as possible, when a suitable opportunity occurred of raising
the battle-cry. He told them to take care to obey his orders as quickly
as possible, and to transmit the orders they had received to the ranks
with all rapidity; each man remembering that both as an individual
and in the aggregate he was increasing the general danger if he was
remiss in the discharge of his duty, and that he was assisting to gain
a victory if he zealously put forth his utmost exertions.
CHAPTER X.
REJECTION OF PARMENIO’S ADVICE.
With these words and others like them he briefly exhorted his officers,
and in return was exhorted by them to feel confidence in their valour.
He then ordered the soldiers to take dinner and to rest themselves.
It is said that Parmenio came to him in his tent, and urged him to
make a night attack on the Persians; saying that thus he would fall
upon them unprepared and in a state of confusion, and at the same time
more liable to a panic in the dark.[400] But the reply which he made,
as others were listening to their conversation, was, that it would be
mean to steal a victory, and that Alexander ought to conquer in open
daylight, and without any artifice. This vaunting did not appear any
arrogance on his part, but rather to indicate self-confidence amid
dangers. To me at any rate, he seems to have used correct reasoning
in such a matter. For in the night many accidents have occurred
unexpectedly to those who were sufficiently prepared for battle as
well as to those who were deficiently prepared, which have caused the
superior party to fail in their plans, and have handed the victory
over to the inferior party, contrary to the expectations of both
sides. Though Alexander was generally fond of encountering danger in
battle, the night appeared to him perilous; and, besides, if Darius
were again defeated, a furtive and nocturnal attack on the part of
the Macedonians would relieve him of the necessity of confessing that
he was an inferior general and commanded inferior troops. Moreover, if
any unexpected defeat befell his army, the circumjacent country was
friendly to the enemy, and they were acquainted with the locality,
whereas the Macedonians[401] were unacquainted with it, and surrounded
by nothing but foes, of whom there were a great number prisoners.
These would be a great source of anxiety, as they would be likely to
assist in attacking them in the night, not only if they should meet
with defeat, but even if they did not appear to be gaining a decisive
victory. For this way of reasoning I commend Alexander; and I think him
no less worthy of admiration for his excessive desire to fight in open
daylight.
CHAPTER XI.
TACTICS OF THE OPPOSING GENERALS.
Darius and his army remained drawn up during the night in the same
order as that in which they had first arrayed themselves; because
they had not surrounded themselves with a completely entrenched camp,
and, moreover, they were afraid that the enemy would attack them
in the night. The success of the Persians, on this occasion, was
impeded especially by this long standing on watch with their arms,
and by the fear which usually springs up before great dangers; which,
however, was not then suddenly aroused by a momentary panic, but had
been experienced for a long time, and had thoroughly cowed their
spirits.[402] The army of Darius was drawn up in the following manner:
for, according to the statement of Aristobulus, the written scheme of
arrangement drawn up by Darius was afterwards captured. His left wing
was held by the Bactrian cavalry, in conjunction with the Daans[403]
and Arachotians; near these had been posted the Persians, horse and
foot mixed together; next to these the Susians, and then the Cadusians.
This was the arrangement of the left wing as far as the middle of the
whole phalanx. On the right had been posted the men from Coele-Syria
and Mesopotamia. On the right again were the Medes; next to them the
Parthians and Sacians; then the Tapurians and Hyrcanians, and last
the Albanians and Sacesinians, extending as far as the middle of the
whole phalanx. In the centre where King Darius was, had been posted
the king’s kinsmen,[404] the Persian guards carrying spears with
golden apples at the butt end,[405] the Indians, the Carians who had
been forcibly removed to Central Asia, and the Mardian archers.[406]
The Uxians, the Babylonians, the men who dwell near the Red Sea, and
the Sitacenians had also been drawn up in deep column. On the left,
opposite Alexander’s right, had been posted the Scythian cavalry, about