The Anabasis of Alexander or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great
four hundred cavalry, he went with all speed to their aid. The rest of
the army he left behind near the city, to prevent the citizens from
hastening forth to form a junction with Glaucias (as they would have
done), if all the Macedonian army had withdrawn. Directly Glaucias
perceived that Alexander was advancing, he evacuated the mountains,
and Philotas and his forces returned to the camp in safety. But Clitus
and Glaucias still imagined that they had caught Alexander in a
disadvantageous position; for they were occupying the mountains, which
commanded the plain by their height, with a large body of cavalry,
javelin-throwers, and slingers, besides a considerable number of
heavy-armed infantry. Moreover, the men who had been beleaguered in
the city were expected to pursue the Macedonians closely if they made
a retreat. The ground also through which Alexander had to march was
evidently narrow and covered with wood; on one side it was hemmed in by
a river, and on the other there was a very lofty and craggy mountain,
so that there would not be room for the army to pass, even if only four
shield-bearers marched abreast.
CHAPTER VI.
DEFEAT OF CLITUS AND GLAUCIAS.
Then Alexander drew up his army in such a way that the depth of the
phalanx was 120 men; and stationing 200 cavalry on each wing, he
ordered them to preserve silence, in order to receive the word of
command quickly. Accordingly he gave the signal to the heavy-armed
infantry in the first place to hold their spears erect, and then to
couch them at the concerted sign; at one time to incline their spears
to the right, closely locked together, and at another time towards
the left. He then set the phalanx itself into quick motion forward,
and marched it towards the wings, now to the right, and then to the
left. After thus arranging and re-arranging his army many times very
rapidly, he at last formed his phalanx into a sort of wedge, and led
it towards the left against the enemy, who had long been in a state of
amazement at seeing both the order and the rapidity of his evolutions.
Consequently they did not sustain Alexander’s attack, but quitted
the first ridges of the mountain. Upon this, Alexander ordered the
Macedonians to raise the battle cry and make a clatter with their
spears upon their shields; and the Taulantians, being still more
alarmed at the noise, led their army back to the city with all speed.
As Alexander saw only a few of the enemy still occupying a ridge,
along which lay his route, he ordered his body-guards and personal
companions to take their shields, mount their horses, and ride to
the hill; and when they reached it, if those who had occupied the
position awaited them, he said that half of them were to leap from
their horses, and to fight as foot-soldiers, being mingled with the
cavalry. But when the enemy saw Alexander’s advance, they quitted the
hill and retreated to the mountains in both directions. Then Alexander,
with his companions,[62] seized the hill, and sent for the Agrianians
and archers, who numbered 2,000. He also ordered the shield-bearing
guards to cross the river, and after them the regiments of Macedonian
infantry, with instructions that, as soon as they had succeeded in
crossing, they should draw out in rank towards the left, so that the
phalanx of men crossing might appear compact at once. He himself, in
the vanguard, was all the time observing from the ridge the enemy’s
advance. They, seeing the force crossing the river, marched down the
mountains to meet them, with the purpose of attacking Alexander’s rear
in its retreat. But, as they were just drawing near, Alexander rushed
forth with his own division, and the phalanx raised the battle-cry,
as if about to advance through the river. When the enemy saw all the
Macedonians marching against them, they turned and fled. Upon this,
Alexander led the Agrianians and archers at full speed towards the
river, and succeeded in being himself the first man to cross it. But
when he saw the enemy pressing upon the men in the rear, he stationed
his engines of war upon the bank, and ordered the engineers to shoot
from them as far forward as possible all sorts of projectiles which are
usually shot from military engines.[63] He directed the archers, who
had also entered the water, to shoot their arrows from the middle of
the river. But Glaucias durst not advance within range of the missiles;
so that the Macedonians passed over in such safety, that not one of
them lost his life in the retreat.
Three days after this, Alexander discovered that Clitus and Glaucias
lay carelessly encamped; that neither were their sentinels on guard
in military order, nor had they protected themselves with a rampart
or ditch, as if they imagined he had withdrawn through fear; and that
they had extended their line to a disadvantageous length. He therefore
crossed the river again secretly, at the approach of night, leading
with him the shield-bearing guards, the Agrianians, the archers, and
the brigades of Perdiccas[64] and Coenus,[65] after having given orders
for the rest of the army to follow. As soon as he saw a favourable
opportunity for the attack, without waiting for all to be present, he
despatched the archers and Agrianians against the foe. These, being
arranged in phalanx, fell unawares with the most furious charge upon
their flank, where they were likely to come into conflict with their
weakest point, and slew some of them still in their beds, others being
easily caught in their flight. Accordingly, many were there captured
and killed, as were many also in the disorderly and panic-stricken
retreat which ensued. Not a few, moreover, were taken prisoners.
Alexander kept up the pursuit as far as the Taulantian mountains;
and as many of them as escaped, preserved their lives by throwing
away their arms. Clitus first fled for refuge into the city, which,
however, he set on fire, and withdrew to Glaucias, in the land of the
Taulantians.
CHAPTER VII.
REVOLT OF THEBES (_September_, B.C. 335).
While these events were occurring, some of the exiles who had been
banished from Thebes, coming to the city by night, and being brought in
by some of the citizens, in order to effect a change in the government,
apprehended and slew outside the Cadmea,[66] Amyntas and Timolaüs,[67]
two of the men who held that fortress, having no suspicion that
any hostile attempt was about to be made. Then entering the public
assembly, they incited the Thebans to revolt from Alexander, holding
out to them as pretexts the ancient and glorious words, liberty and
freedom of speech, and urging them now at last to rid themselves of the
heavy yoke of the Macedonians. By stoutly maintaining that Alexander
had been killed in Illyria they gained more power in persuading the
multitude;[68] for this report was prevalent, and for many reasons it
gained credit, both because he had been absent a long time, and because
no news had arrived from him. Accordingly, as is usual in such cases,
not knowing the facts, each man conjectured what was most pleasing to
himself.
When Alexander heard what was being done at Thebes, he thought it was
a movement not at all to be slighted, inasmuch as he had for a long
time suspected the city of Athens and deemed the audacious action of
the Thebans no trivial matter, if the Lacedaemonians, who had long been
disaffected in their feelings to him, and the Aetolians and certain
other States in the Peloponnese, who were not firm in their allegiance
to him, should take part with the Thebans in their revolutionary
effort. He therefore led his army through Eordaea and Elimiotis[69] and
along the peaks of Stymphaea and Paravaea,[70] and on the seventh day
arrived at Pelina[71] in Thessaly. Starting thence, he entered Boeotia
on the sixth day; so that the Thebans did not learn that he had passed
south of Thermopylae, until he was at Onchestus[72] with the whole of
his army. Even then the authors of the revolt asserted that Antipater’s
army had arrived out of Macedonia, stoutly affirming that Alexander
himself was dead, and being very angry with those who announced that
it was Alexander himself who was advancing.[73] For they said it must
be another Alexander, the son of Aëropus, who was coming.[74] On the
following day Alexander set out from Onchestus, and advanced towards
the city along the territory consecrated to Iolaüs;[75] where indeed
he encamped, in order to give the Thebans further time to repent of
their evil resolutions and to send an embassy to him. But so far were
they from showing any sign of wishing to come to an accommodation,
that their cavalry and a large body of light-armed infantry sallied
forth from the city as far as the camp, and, skirmishing with the
Macedonian outposts, slew a few of their men. Alexander hereupon sent
forth a party of his light-armed infantry and archers to repel their
sortie; and these men repelled them with ease, just as they were
approaching the very camp. The next day he took the whole of his army
and marched round towards the gate which led to Eleutherae and Attica.
But not even then did he assault the wall itself, but encamped not
far away from the Cadmea, in order that succour might be at hand to
the Macedonians who were occupying that citadel. For the Thebans had
blockaded the Cadmea with a double stockade and were guarding it, so
that no one from without might be able to give succour to those who
were beleaguered, and that the garrison might not be able, by making
a sally, to do them any injury, when they were attacking the enemy
outside. But Alexander remained encamped near the Cadmea, for he still
wished rather to come to friendly terms with the Thebans than to come
to a contest with them.[76] Then those of the Thebans who knew what
was for the best interest of the commonwealth were eager to go out to
Alexander and obtain pardon for the commonalty of Thebes for their
revolt; but the exiles and those who had summoned them home kept on
inciting the populace to war by every means in their power, since they
despaired of obtaining for themselves any indulgence from Alexander,
especially as some of them were also Boeotarchs.[77] However not even
for this did Alexander assault the city.
CHAPTER VIII.
FALL OF THEBES.
But Ptolemy, son of Lagus, tells us that Perdiccas, who had been posted
in the advanced guard of the camp with his own brigade, and was not far
from the enemy’s stockade, did not wait for the signal from Alexander
to commence the battle; but of his own accord was the first to assault
the stockade, and, having made a breach in it, fell upon the advanced
guard of the Thebans.[78] Amyntas,[79] son of Andromenes, followed
Perdiccas, because he had been stationed with him. This general also
of his own accord led on his brigade when he saw that Perdiccas had
advanced within the stockade. When Alexander saw this, he led on the
rest of his army, fearing that unsupported they might be intercepted by
the Thebans and be in danger of destruction. He gave instructions to
the archers and Agrianians to rush within the stockade, but he still
retained the guards and shield-bearing troops outside. Then indeed
Perdiccas, after forcing his way within the second stockade, fell there
wounded with a dart, and was carried back grievously injured to the
camp, where he was with difficulty cured of his wound. However the men
of Perdiccas, in company with the archers sent by Alexander, fell upon
the Thebans and shut them up in the hollow way leading to the temple
of Heracles, and followed them in their retreat as far as the temple
itself. The Thebans, having wheeled round, again advanced from that
position with a shout, and put the Macedonians to flight. Eurybotas the
Cretan, the captain of the archers, fell with about seventy of his men;