The Bābur-nāma in English (Memoirs of Bābur)
felt neglect and made report of Bābur as arrogant, in opposition, and
unwilling to fulfil his compact,—later when he eagerly attempted success
unaided against `Ubaid Khān, and was then worsted. It illustrates the
Shāh's view of his suzerain relation to Bābur that on hearing Muḥammad
Jān's report, he ordered Najm S̤ānī to bring the offender to order.
Meantime the Shāh's conditions seem to have been carried out in
Samarkand and Bābur's subservience clearly shewn.[1337] Of this there
are the indications,—that Bābur had promised and was a man of his word;
that Sunnī irritation against him waxed and did not wane as it might
have done without food to nourish it; that Bābur knew himself impotent
against the Aūzbegs unless he had foreign aid, expected attack, knew it
was preparing; that he would hear of Muḥammad Jān's report and of Najm
S̤ānī's commission against himself. Honesty, policy and necessity
combined to enforce the fulfilment of his agreement. What were the
precise terms of that agreement beyond the two as to the _khuṯba_ and
the coins, it needs close study of the wording of the sources to decide,
lest metaphor be taken for fact. Great passions,—ambition, religious
fervour, sectarian bigotry and fear confronted him. His problem was
greater than that of Henry of Navarre and of Napoleon in Egypt; they had
but to seem what secured their acceptance; he had to put on a guise that
brought him hate.
Khān-zāda was not the only member of Bābur's family who now rejoined him
after marriage with an Aūzbeg. His half-sister Yādgār-sulṯān had fallen
to the share of Ḥamza Sulṯān's son `Abdu'l-laṯīf in 908 AH. when
Shaibānī defeated the Khāns near Akhsī. Now that her half-brother had
defeated her husband's family, she returned to her own people (f. 9).
918 AH.-MARCH 19TH 1512 TO MARCH 9TH 1513 AD.
_a. Return of the Aūzbegs._
Emboldened by the departure of the Persian troops, the Aūzbegs, in the
spring of the year, came out of Turkistān, their main attack being
directed on Tāshkīnt, then held for Bābur.[1338] `Ubaid Khān moved for
Bukhārā. He had prefaced his march by vowing that, if successful, he
would thenceforth strictly observe Musalmān Law. The vow was made in
Ḥaẓrat Turkistān at the shrine of Khwāja Aḥmad _Yasawī_, a saint revered
in Central Asia through many centuries; he had died about 1120 AD.;
Tīmūr had made pilgrimage to his tomb, in 1397 AD., and then had founded
the mosque still dominating the town, still the pilgrim's
land-mark.[1339] `Ubaid's vow, like Bābur's of 933 AH., was one of
return to obedience. Both men took oath in the Ghāzī's mood, Bābur's set
against the Hindū whom he saw as a heathen, `Ubaid's set against Bābur
whom he saw as a heretic.
_b. Bābur's defeat at Kul-i-malik._
In Ṣafar (April-May) `Ubaid moved swiftly down and attacked the Bukhārā
neighbourhood. Bābur went from Samarkand to meet him. Several details of
what followed, not given by Ḥaidar and, in one particular, contradicting
him, are given by Khwānd-amīr. The statement in which the two historians
contradict one another is Ḥaidar's that `Ubaid had 3000 men only, Bābur
40,000. Several considerations give to Khwānd-amīr's opposed statement
that Bābur's force was small, the semblance of being nearer the fact.
Ḥaidar, it may be said, did not go out on this campaign; he was ill in
Samarkand and continued ill there for some time; Khwānd-amīr's details
have the well-informed air of things learned at first-hand, perhaps from
some-one in Hindūstān after 934 AH.
Matters which make against Bābur's having a large effective force at
Kul-i-malik, and favour Khwānd-amīr's statement about the affair are
these:—`Ubaid must have formed some estimate of what he had to meet, and
he brought 3000 men. Where could Bābur have obtained 40,000 men worth
reckoning in a fight? In several times of crisis his own immediate and
ever-faithful troop is put at 500; as his cause was now unpopular, local
accretions may have been few. Some Mughūls from Merv and from Kābul were
near Samarkand (T.R. pp. 263, 265); most were with Sa`īd in Andijān; but
however many Mughūls may have been in his neighbourhood, none could be
counted on as resolute for his success. If too, he had had more than a
small effective force, would he not have tried to hold Samarkand with
the remnant of defeat until Persian help arrived? All things considered,
there is ground for accepting Khwānd-amīr's statement that Bābur met
`Ubaid with a small force.
Following his account therefore:—Bābur in his excess of daring, marched
to put the Aūzbeg down with a small force only, against the advice of
the prudent, of whom Muḥammad Mazīd Tarkhān was one, who all said it was
wrong to go out unprepared and without reinforcement. Paying them no
attention, Bābur marched for Bukhārā, was rendered still more daring by
news had when he neared it, that the enemy had retired some stages, and
followed him up almost to his camp. `Ubaid was in great force; many
Aūzbegs perished but, in the end, they were victors and Bābur was
compelled to take refuge in Bukhārā. The encounter took place near
Kul-i-malik (King's-lake) in Ṣafar 918 AH. (April-May 1512 AD.).
_c. Bābur leaves Samarkand._
It was not possible to maintain a footing in Samarkand; Bābur therefore
collected his family and train[1340] and betook himself to Ḥiṣār. There
went with him on this expedition Māhīm and her children Humāyūn,
Mihr-jahān and Bārbūl,—the motherless Ma`ṣūma,—Gul-rukh with her son
Kāmrān (Gulbadan f. 7). I have not found any account of his route;
Ḥaidar gives no details about the journey; he did not travel with Bābur,
being still invalided in Samarkand. Perhaps the absence of information
is a sign that the Aūzbegs had not yet appeared on the direct road for
Ḥiṣār. A local tradition however would make Bābur go round through
Farghāna. He certainly might have gone into Farghāna hoping to
co-operate with Sa`īd Khān; Tāshkīnt was still holding out under
Aḥmad-i-qāsim _Kohbur_ and it is clear that all activity in Bābur's
force had not been quenched because during the Tāshkīnt siege, Dost Beg
broke through the enemy's ranks and made his way into the town. Sairām
held out longer than Tāshkīnt. Of any such move by Bābur into Andijān
the only hint received is given by what may be a mere legend.[1341]
_d. Bābur in Ḥiṣār._
After experiencing such gains and such losses, Bābur was still under 30
years of age.
The Aūzbegs, after his departure, re-occupied Bukhārā and Samarkand
without harm done to the towns-people, and a few weeks later, in Jumāda
I (July-August) followed him to Ḥiṣār. Meantime he with Mīrzā Khān's
help, had so closed the streets of the town by massive earth-works that
the sulṯāns were convinced its defenders were ready to spend the last
drop of their blood in holding it, and therefore retired without
attack.[1342] Some sources give as their reason for retirement that
Bābur had been reinforced from Balkh; Bairām Beg, it is true, had sent a
force but one of 300 men only; so few cannot have alarmed except as the
harbinger of more. Greater precision as to dates would shew whether they
can have heard of Najm S̤ānī's army advancing by way of Balkh.
_e. Qarshī and Ghaj-davān._
Meantime Najm S̤ānī, having with him some 11,000 men, had started on his
corrective mission against Bābur. When he reached the Khurāsān frontier,
he heard of the defeat at Kul-i-malik and the flight to Ḥiṣār, gathered
other troops from Harāt and elsewhere, and advanced to Balkh. He stayed
there for 20 days with Bairām Beg, perhaps occupied, in part, by
communications with the Shāh and Bābur. From the latter repeated request
for help is said to have come; help was given, some sources say without
the Shāh's permission. A rendezvous was fixed, Najm S̤ānī marched to
Tīrmīẕ, there crossed the Amū and in Rajab (Sep.-Oct.) encamped near the
Darband-i-ahanīn. On Bābur's approach through the Chak-chaq pass, he
paid him the civility of going several miles out from his camp to give
him honouring reception.
Advancing thence for Bukhārā, the combined armies took Khuzār and moved
on to Qarshī. This town Bābur wished to pass by, as it had been passed
by on his previous march for Bukhārā; each time perhaps he wished to
spare its people, formerly his subjects, whom he desired to rule again,
and who are reputed to have been mostly his fellow Turks. Najm S̤ānī
refused to pass on; he said Qarshī must be taken because it was
`Ubaidu'l-lāh Khān's nest; in it was `Ubaid's uncle Shaikhīm Mīrzā; it
was captured; the Aūzbeg garrison was put to the sword and, spite of
Bābur's earnest entreaties, all the towns-people, 15,000 persons it is
said, down to the "suckling and decrepit", were massacred. Amongst the
victims was Banā'ī who happened to be within it. This action roused the
utmost anger against Najm S̤ānī; it disgusted Bābur, not only through
its merciless slaughter but because it made clear the disregard in which
he was held by his magnificent fellow-general.
From murdered Qarshī Najm S̤ānī advanced for Bukhārā. On getting within
a few miles of it, he heard that an Aūzbeg force was approaching under
Tīmūr and Abū-sa`īd, presumably from Samarkand therefore. He sent Bairām
Beg to attack them; they drew off to the north and threw themselves into
Ghaj-davān, the combined armies following them. This move placed Najm
S̤ānī across the Zar-afshān, on the border of the desert with which the
Aūzbegs were familiar, and with `Ubaid on his flank in Bukhārā.
As to what followed the sources vary; they are brief; they differ less
in statement of the same occurrence than in their choice of details to
record; as Mr. Erskine observes their varying stories are not
incompatible. Their widest difference is a statement of time but the two
periods named, one a few days, the other four months, may not be meant
to apply to the same event. Four months the siege is said to have
lasted; this could not have been said if it had been a few days only.
The siege seems to have been of some duration.
At first there were minor engagements, ending with varying success;
provisions and provender became scarce; Najm S̤ānī's officers urged
retirement, so too did Bābur. He would listen to none of them. At length
`Ubaid Khān rode out from Bukhārā at the head of excellent troops; he
joined the Ghaj-davān garrison and the united Aūzbegs posted themselves
in the suburbs where walled lanes and gardens narrowed the field and
lessened Najm S̤ānī's advantage in numbers. On Tuesday Ramẓān 3rd (Nov.
12th)[1343] a battle was fought in which his army was routed and he
himself slain.
_f. Bābur and Yār-i-aḥmad Najm Sānī._
Some writers say that Najm S̤ānī's men did not fight well; it must be
remembered that they may have been weakened by privation and that they
had wished to retire. Of Bābur it is said that he, who was the reserve,
did not fight at all; it is difficult to see good cause why, under all
the circumstances, he should risk the loss of his men. It seems likely
that Ḥaidar's strong language about this defeat would suit Bābur's
temper also. "The victorious breezes of Islām overturned the banners of
the schismatics.... Most of them perished on the field; the rents made
by the sword at Qarshī were sewn up at Ghaj-davān by the arrow-stitches
of vengeance. Najm S̤ānī and all the Turkmān amīrs were sent to hell."
The belief that Bābur had failed Najm S̤ānī persisted at the Persian
Court, for his inaction was made a reproach to his son Humāyūn in 951
AH. (1544 AD.), when Humāyūn was a refugee with Ismā`īl's son T̤ahmāsp.
Badāyūnī tells a story which, with great inaccuracy of name and place,
represents the view taken at that time. The part of the anecdote
pertinent here is that Bābur on the eve of the battle at Ghaj-davān,