The Book of the Courtier
as you say. Perhaps this would be fitting in a monk or hermit; but I am
by no means sure whether it would befit a prince (who was magnanimous,
liberal and valiant in arms) never to feel, whatever might be done to
him, either wrath or hate or good will or scorn or lust or passion of
any kind, and whether he could without this wield authority over
citizens or soldiers.”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“I did not say that temperance wholly removes and uproots the passions
from the human mind, nor would it be well to do this, for even the
passions contain some elements of good; but it reduces to the sway of
reason that which is perverse in our passions and recusant to right.
Therefore it is not well to extirpate the passions altogether, in order
to be rid of disturbance; for this would be like making an edict that no
one must drink wine, in order to be rid of drunkenness, or forbidding
everyone to run, because in running we sometimes fall. You know that
those who tame horses do not keep them from running and leaping, but
would have them do so seasonably and in obedience to the rider.
“Thus, when moderated by temperance, the passions are helpful to virtue,
like the wrath that aids strength, hatred of evil-doers aids justice,
and likewise the other virtues are aided by the passions; which, if they
were wholly removed, would leave the reason very weak and languid, so
that it could effect little, like the master of a vessel abandoned by
the winds in a great calm.
“Now do not marvel, messer Cesare, if I have said that many other
virtues are born of temperance, for when a mind is attuned to this
harmony, it then through the reason easily receives true strength, which
makes it bold, and safe from every peril, and almost superior to human
passions. Nor is this less true of justice (unspotted virgin, friend of
modesty and good, queen of all the other virtues), because she teaches
us to do that which it is right to do, and to shun that which it is
right to shun; and therefore she is most perfect, because the other
virtues perform their works through her, and because she is helpful to
whomsoever possesses her, both to himself and to others: without whom
(as it is said) Jove himself could not rule his kingdom rightly.
Magnanimity also follows these and enhances them all; but she cannot
stand alone, for whoever has no other virtue, cannot be magnanimous.
Then the guide of these virtues is foresight, which consists in a
certain judgment in choosing well. And in this happy chain are joined
liberality, magnificence, thirst for honour, gentleness, pleasantness,
affability and many others which there is not now time to name.
“But if our Courtier will do that which we have said, he will find them
all in his prince’s mind, and will daily see spring therefrom beautiful
flowers and fruits, such as all the delightful gardens in the world do
not contain; and he will feel within him very great content when he
remembers that he gave his prince, not that which fools give (which is
gold or silver, vases, raiment, and the like, whereof the giver has very
great dearth, and the recipient very great abundance), but that faculty
which of all things human is perhaps the greatest and rarest—that is,
the manner and mode of ruling and reigning rightly: which would of
itself alone suffice to make men happy and to bring back once more to
earth that age of gold which is said to have been when Saturn reigned.”
19.—My lord Ottaviano having here made a little pause as if to rest, my
lord Gaspar said:
“Which do you think, my lord Ottaviano, the happier rule, and the more
able to bring back to earth that age of gold which you have
mentioned,—the rule of so good a prince, or the government of a good
republic?”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“I should always prefer the rule of a good prince, because such dominion
is more accordant with nature, and (if it is allowed to compare small
things with infinitely great) more like that of God, who governs the
universe singly and alone.
“But leaving this aside, you see that in those things that are wrought
by human skill,—such as armies, great fleets, buildings and the
like,—the whole is referred to one man who governs to his liking. So too
in our body all the members labour and are employed at the command of
the heart. Moreover it seems fitting that the people should be ruled by
one prince, as is the case also with many animals, to whom nature
teaches this obedience as a very salutary thing. You know that stags,
cranes and many other birds, when on their flight, always set up a
leader, whom they follow and obey; and the bees obey their king as it
were by process of reason, and with as much reverence as the most
obedient people on earth; and hence all this is very strong proof that
the dominion of princes is more accordant with nature than that of
republics.”
20.—Then messer Pietro Bembo said:
“Yet it seems to me that since liberty has been given us by God as a
supreme gift, it is not reasonable that we should be deprived of it, nor
that one man should have a larger share of it than another: which
happens under the dominion of princes, who for the most part hold their
subjects in closest bondage. But in rightly ordered republics this
liberty is fully preserved: besides which, both in judgments and in
councils, it more often happens that one man’s opinion singly is wrong,
than that of many; because disturbance arising from anger or scorn or
lust more easily enters the mind of one man than that of the many, who
are almost like a great body of water, which is less liable to
corruption than a small one.
“I say, too, that the example of the animals does not seem to me
apposite; for stags, cranes and the rest do not always set up the same
one to follow and obey, but on the contrary change and vary, giving the
dominion over them now to one, now to another, and thus come to be a
kind of republic rather than a monarchy; and this may be called true and
equal liberty, when those who command to-day in turn obey to-morrow.
Neither does the example of the bees seem to me pertinent, for that king
of theirs is not of their own species; and therefore whoever would give
men a truly worthy lord, would need to find one of another species and
of more excellent nature than that of men, if men must of reason obey
him, like the herds which obey not an animal of their own kind but a
herdsman, who is a man and of higher species than theirs.
“For these reasons, my lord Ottaviano, I think the rule of a republic is
more desirable than that of a king.”
21.—Then my lord Ottaviano said:
“Against your opinion, messer Pietro, I wish to cite only one argument;
which is, that of the modes of ruling people well, three kinds only are
to be found: one is monarchy; another, the rule of the good, whom the
ancients called optimates; the other, popular government. And the excess
and opposite extreme, so to speak, wherein each one of the forms of rule
falls to ruin and decay, is when monarchy becomes tyranny; and when the
rule of the optimates changes to government by a few powerful and bad
men; and when popular government is seized by the rabble, which breaks
down distinctions and commits the government of the whole to the caprice
of the multitude. Of these three kinds of bad government, it is certain
that tyranny is the worst of all, as could be proved by many arguments;
then it follows that monarchy is the best of the three kinds of good
government, because it is the opposite of the worst; for, as you know,
the results of opposite causes are themselves opposite.
“Now as to what you said about liberty, I reply that we ought not to say
that true liberty is to live as we like, but to live according to good
laws. Nor is it less natural and useful and necessary to obey than it is
to command; and some things are born and thus appointed and ordained by
nature to command, as certain others are to obey. True it is that there
are two modes of ruling: the one imperious and violent, like that of
masters towards their slaves, and in this way the soul commands the
body; the other more mild and gentle, like that of good princes by means
of laws over their subjects, and in this way the reason commands the
appetite: and both of these modes are useful, for the body is by nature
created apt for obedience to the soul, and so is appetite for obedience
to reason. Moreover there are many men whose actions have to do only
with the use of the body; and such as these are as far from virtuous as
the soul from the body, and although they are rational creatures, they
have only such share of reason as to recognize it but not to possess or
profit by it. These, therefore, are naturally slaves, and it is better
and more profitable for them to obey than to command.”
22.—Thereupon my lord Gaspar said:
“In what mode then are the discreet and virtuous, and those who are not
by nature slaves, to be ruled?”
My lord Ottaviano replied:
“With that gentle rule, kingly and civic. And to such men it is well
sometimes to give the charge of those offices for which they are fitted,
to the end that they too may be able to command and govern those less
wise than themselves, but in such manner that the chief rule shall
wholly depend upon the supreme prince. And since you said that it is an
easier thing for the mind of one man to be corrupted than for that of
many, I say that it is also an easier thing to find one good and wise
man than many. And to be good and wise ought to be deemed possible for a
king of noble race, inclined to worthiness by his natural instinct and
by the illustrious memory of his predecessors, and practised in good
behaviour; and if he be not of another species more than human (as you
said of the bee-king), being aided by the teachings and by the education
and skill of so prudent and excellent a Courtier as these gentlemen have
described,—he will be very just, continent, temperate, strong and wise,
full of liberality, magnificence, religion and clemency. In short, he
will be very glorious, and very dear to men and to God (by whose grace
he will attain that heroic worth which will make him exceed the limits
of humanity), and may be called a demigod rather than a mortal man.
“For God delights in and protects, not those princes who wish to imitate
Him by displaying great power and making themselves adored of men, but
those who, besides the power that makes them mighty, strive to make
themselves like Him in goodness and wisdom, whereby they wish and are
able to do good and to be His ministers, distributing for men’s weal the
benefits and gifts which they receive from Him. Thus, just as in heaven
the sun and moon and other stars show the world as in a mirrour some
likeness of God, so on earth a much liker image of God is found in those
good princes who love and revere Him, and show their people the shining
light of His justice and a reflection of His divine reason and mind; and
with such as these God shares His righteousness, equity, justice and
goodness, and those other happy blessings which I know not how to name,
but which display to the world much clearer proof of divinity than the
sun’s light, or the continual revolving of the heavens and the various
coursing of the stars.
23.—“Accordingly men have been placed by God under the ward of princes,
who for this reason ought to take diligent care of them, in order to
render Him an account of them like good stewards to their lord, and
ought to love them, and regard as personal to themselves every good and
evil thing that happens to them, and provide for their happiness above
every other thing. Therefore the prince ought not only to be good, but
also to make others good, like that square used by architects, which not
only is straight and true itself, but also makes straight and true all