The Confessions of St. Augustine
so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more
familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak
of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What
then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one
that asketh, I know not: yet I say boldly that I know, that if nothing
passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were coming, a time to
come were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two
times then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past now is
not, and that to come is not yet? But the present, should it always be
present, and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time,
but eternity. If time present (if it is to be time) only cometh into
existence, because it passeth into time past, how can we say that either
this is, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be; so, namely, that
we cannot truly say that time is, but because it is tending not to be?
And yet we say, "a long time" and "a short time"; still, only of time
past or to come. A long time past (for example) we call an hundred years
since; and a long time to come, an hundred years hence. But a short
time past, we call (suppose) often days since; and a short time to come,
often days hence. But in what sense is that long or short, which is not?
For the past, is not now; and the future, is not yet. Let us not then
say, "it is long"; but of the past, "it hath been long"; and of the
future, "it will be long." O my Lord, my Light, shall not here also Thy
Truth mock at man? For that past time which was long, was it long when
it was now past, or when it was yet present? For then might it be long,
when there was, what could be long; but when past, it was no longer;
wherefore neither could that be long, which was not at all. Let us not
then say, "time past hath been long": for we shall not find, what hath
been long, seeing that since it was past, it is no more, but let us say,
"that present time was long"; because, when it was present, it was long.
For it had not yet passed away, so as not to be; and therefore there
was, what could be long; but after it was past, that ceased also to be
long, which ceased to be.
Let us see then, thou soul of man, whether present time can be long:
for to thee it is given to feel and to measure length of time. What wilt
thou answer me? Are an hundred years, when present, a long time? See
first, whether an hundred years can be present. For if the first of
these years be now current, it is present, but the other ninety and
nine are to come, and therefore are not yet, but if the second year be
current, one is now past, another present, the rest to come. And so if
we assume any middle year of this hundred to be present, all before it,
are past; all after it, to come; wherefore an hundred years cannot be
present. But see at least whether that one which is now current, itself
is present; for if the current month be its first, the rest are to come;
if the second, the first is already past, and the rest are not yet.
Therefore, neither is the year now current present; and if not present
as a whole, then is not the year present. For twelve months are a year;
of which whatever by the current month is present; the rest past, or to
come. Although neither is that current month present; but one day only;
the rest being to come, if it be the first; past, if the last; if any of
the middle, then amid past and to come.
See how the present time, which alone we found could be called long, is
abridged to the length scarce of one day. But let us examine that also;
because neither is one day present as a whole. For it is made up of four
and twenty hours of night and day: of which, the first hath the rest to
come; the last hath them past; and any of the middle hath those before
it past, those behind it to come. Yea, that one hour passeth away in
flying particles. Whatsoever of it hath flown away, is past; whatsoever
remaineth, is to come. If an instant of time be conceived, which cannot
be divided into the smallest particles of moments, that alone is it,
which may be called present. Which yet flies with such speed from future
to past, as not to be lengthened out with the least stay. For if it be,
it is divided into past and future. The present hath no space. Where
then is the time, which we may call long? Is it to come? Of it we do not
say, "it is long"; because it is not yet, so as to be long; but we say,
"it will be long." When therefore will it be? For if even then, when it
is yet to come, it shall not be long (because what can be long, as yet
is not), and so it shall then be long, when from future which as yet is
not, it shall begin now to be, and have become present, that so there
should exist what may be long; then does time present cry out in the
words above, that it cannot be long.
And yet, Lord, we perceive intervals of times, and compare them, and
say, some are shorter, and others longer. We measure also, how much
longer or shorter this time is than that; and we answer, "This is
double, or treble; and that, but once, or only just so much as that."
But we measure times as they are passing, by perceiving them; but past,
which now are not, or the future, which are not yet, who can measure?
unless a man shall presume to say, that can be measured, which is not.
When then time is passing, it may be perceived and measured; but when it
is past, it cannot, because it is not.
I ask, Father, I affirm not: O my God, rule and guide me. "Who will tell
me that there are not three times (as we learned when boys, and taught
boys), past, present, and future; but present only, because those two
are not? Or are they also; and when from future it becometh present,
doth it come out of some secret place; and so, when retiring, from
present it becometh past? For where did they, who foretold things to
come, see them, if as yet they be not? For that which is not, cannot be
seen. And they who relate things past, could not relate them, if in mind
they did not discern them, and if they were not, they could no way be
discerned. Things then past and to come, are."
Permit me, Lord, to seek further. O my hope, let not my purpose be
confounded. For if times past and to come be, I would know where they
be. Which yet if I cannot, yet I know, wherever they be, they are not
there as future, or past, but present. For if there also they be future,
they are not yet there; if there also they be past, they are no longer
there. Wheresoever then is whatsoever is, it is only as present.
Although when past facts are related, there are drawn out of the memory,
not the things themselves which are past, but words which, conceived by
the images of the things, they, in passing, have through the senses left
as traces in the mind. Thus my childhood, which now is not, is in time
past, which now is not: but now when I recall its image, and tell of it,
I behold it in the present, because it is still in my memory. Whether
there be a like cause of foretelling things to come also; that of
things which as yet are not, the images may be perceived before, already
existing, I confess, O my God, I know not. This indeed I know, that we
generally think before on our future actions, and that that forethinking
is present, but the action whereof we forethink is not yet, because it
is to come. Which, when we have set upon, and have begun to do what
we were forethinking, then shall that action be; because then it is no
longer future, but present.
Which way soever then this secret fore-perceiving of things to come be;
that only can be seen, which is. But what now is, is not future,
but present. When then things to come are said to be seen, it is not
themselves which as yet are not (that is, which are to be), but their
causes perchance or signs are seen, which already are. Therefore they
are not future but present to those who now see that, from which
the future, being foreconceived in the mind, is foretold. Which
fore-conceptions again now are; and those who foretell those things, do
behold the conceptions present before them. Let now the numerous variety
of things furnish me some example. I behold the day-break, I foreshow,
that the sun, is about to rise. What I behold, is present; what I
foresignify, to come; not the sun, which already is; but the sun-rising,
which is not yet. And yet did I not in my mind imagine the sun-rising
itself (as now while I speak of it), I could not foretell it. But
neither is that day-break which I discern in the sky, the sun-rising,
although it goes before it; nor that imagination of my mind; which two
are seen now present, that the other which is to be may be foretold.
Future things then are not yet: and if they be not yet, they are not:
and if they are not, they cannot be seen; yet foretold they may be from
things present, which are already, and are seen.
Thou then, Ruler of Thy creation, by what way dost Thou teach souls
things to come? For Thou didst teach Thy Prophets. By what way dost
Thou, to whom nothing is to come, teach things to come; or rather of the
future, dost teach things present? For, what is not, neither can it be
taught. Too far is this way of my ken: it is too mighty for me, I cannot
attain unto it; but from Thee I can, when Thou shalt vouchsafe it, O
sweet light of my hidden eyes.
What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past
are. Nor is it properly said, "there be three times, past, present,
and to come": yet perchance it might be properly said, "there be three
times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a
present of things future." For these three do exist in some sort, in the
soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory;
present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation.
If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there
are three. Let it be said too, "there be three times, past, present, and
to come": in our incorrect way. See, I object not, nor gainsay, nor find
fault, if what is so said be but understood, that neither what is to be,
now is, nor what is past. For but few things are there, which we
speak properly, most things improperly; still the things intended are
understood.
I said then even now, we measure times as they pass, in order to be able
to say, this time is twice so much as that one; or, this is just so
much as that; and so of any other parts of time, which be measurable.
Wherefore, as I said, we measure times as they pass. And if any should
ask me, "How knowest thou?" I might answer, "I know, that we do measure,
nor can we measure things that are not; and things past and to come, are
not." But time present how do we measure, seeing it hath no space? It
is measured while passing, but when it shall have passed, it is not
measured; for there will be nothing to be measured. But whence, by what
way, and whither passes it while it is a measuring? whence, but from the
future? Which way, but through the present? whither, but into the past?
From that therefore, which is not yet, through that, which hath no
space, into that, which now is not. Yet what do we measure, if not time
in some space? For we do not say, single, and double, and triple, and
equal, or any other like way that we speak of time, except of spaces
of times. In what space then do we measure time passing? In the future,
whence it passeth through? But what is not yet, we measure not. Or in
the present, by which it passes? but no space, we do not measure: or in
the past, to which it passes? But neither do we measure that, which now
is not.
My soul is on fire to know this most intricate enigma. Shut it not up, O
Lord my God, good Father; through Christ I beseech Thee, do not shut up