The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times, in princes'
affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and
mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep
them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men
beware, how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared;
for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The
difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest
difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes
(saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque regum voluntates
vehementes, et inter se contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to
think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children,
their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their second-nobles or
gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and
from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for
occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that
princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow
so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or
the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were.
And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to foresee and to
hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth
of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth
Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a
palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either
by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise
take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that league (which
Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made between Ferdinando
King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the
one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of
the Schoolmen, to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but
upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question, but
a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a
lawful cause of a war.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is infamed,
for the poisoning of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife, was the
destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise
troubled his house and succession; Edward the Second of England, his
queen, had the principal hand in the deposing and murder of her husband.
This kind of danger, is then to be feared chiefly, when the wives have
plots, for the raising of their own children; or else that they be
advoutresses.
For their children; the tragedies likewise of dangers from them, have
been many. And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of
their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha
(that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession
of the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is suspected to be untrue,
and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second, was thought to
be suppositious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare
towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner
fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died
violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better; who
died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against
him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of Macedon,
turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And many like examples
there are; but few or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust;
except it were, where the sons were up in open arms against them; as
was Selymus the First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry the
Second, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger
from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket,
Archbishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers, did almost try it
with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty
kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger
is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign
authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the
collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to
depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less
able to perform, any thing that he desires. I have noted it, in
my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his
nobility; whereupon it came to pass, that his times were full of
difficulties and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal
unto him, yet did they not co-operate with him in his business. So that
in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a
body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little
hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they
grow not too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate in authority,
with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; and if they flourish not,
a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish
little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's
revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire;
the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading,
rather decreased.
For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where
they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of
religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state, where they live and
remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in
the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men, and
arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without
donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and
which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings,
are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es
homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their
power, and the other their will.
Of Counsel
THE greatest trust, between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel.
For in other confidences, men commit the parts of life; their lands,
their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but
to such as they make their counsellors, they commit the whole: by how
much the more, they are obliged to all faith and integrity. The
wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or
derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is
not without, but hath made it one of the great names of his blessed Son:
The Counsellor. Solomon hath pronounced, that in counsel is stability.
Things will have their first, or second agitation: if they be not tossed
upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of
fortune; and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling
of a drunken man. Solomon's son found the force of counsel, as his
father saw the necessity of it. For the beloved kingdom of God, was
first rent, and broken, by ill counsel; upon which counsel, there are
set for our instruction, the two marks whereby bad counsel is for ever
best discerned; that it was young counsel, for the person; and violent
counsel, for the matter.
The ancient times, do set forth in figure, both the incorporation, and
inseparable conjunction, of counsel with kings, and the wise and politic
use of counsel by kings: the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry
Metis, which signifieth counsel; whereby they intend that Sovereignty,
is married to Counsel: the other in that which followeth, which was
thus: They say, after Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by
him, and was with child, but Jupiter suffered her not to stay, till she
brought forth, but eat her up; whereby he became himself with child, and
was delivered of Pallas armed, out of his head. Which monstrous fable
containeth a secret of empire; how kings are to make use of their
counsel of state. That first, they ought to refer matters unto them,
which is the first begetting, or impregnation; but when they are
elaborate, moulded, and shaped in the womb of their counsel, and grow
ripe, and ready to be brought forth, that then they suffer not their
counsel to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it
depended on them; but take the matter back into their own hands, and
make it appear to the world, that the decrees and final directions
(which, because they come forth, with prudence and power, are resembled
to Pallas armed) proceeded from themselves; and not only from their
authority, but (the more to add reputation to themselves) from their
head and device.
Let us now speak of the inconveniences of counsel, and of the remedies.
The inconveniences that have been noted, in calling and using counsel,
are three. First, the revealing of affairs, whereby they become less
secret. Secondly, the weakening of the authority of princes, as if
they were less of themselves. Thirdly, the danger of being unfaithfully
counselled, and more for the good of them that counsel, than of him
that is counselled. For which inconveniences, the doctrine of Italy,
and practice of France, in some kings' times, hath introduced cabinet
counsels; a remedy worse than the disease.
As to secrecy; princes are not bound to communicate all matters, with
all counsellors; but may extract and select. Neither is it necessary,
that he that consulteth what he should do, should declare what he will
do. But let princes beware, that the unsecreting of their affairs, comes
not from themselves. And as for cabinet counsels, it may be their motto,
plenus rimarum sum: one futile person, that maketh it his glory to tell,
will do more hurt than many, that know it their duty to conceal. It is
true there be some affairs, which require extreme secrecy, which will
hardly go beyond one or two persons, besides the king: neither are those
counsels unprosperous; for, besides the secrecy, they commonly go on
constantly, in one spirit of direction, without distraction. But then
it must be a prudent king, such as is able to grind with a handmill; and
those inward counsellors had need also be wise men, and especially true
and trusty to the king's ends; as it was with King Henry the Seventh of
England, who, in his great business, imparted himself to none, except it
were to Morton and Fox.
For weakening of authority; the fable showeth the remedy. Nay, the
majesty of kings, is rather exalted than diminished, when they are in
the chair of counsel; neither was there ever prince, bereaved of his
dependences, by his counsel, except where there hath been, either an
over-greatness in one counsellor, or an over-strict combination in
divers; which are things soon found, and holpen.
For the last inconvenience, that men will counsel, with an eye to
themselves; certainly, non inveniet fidem super terram is meant, of the
nature of times, and not of all particular persons. There be, that are
in nature faithful, and sincere, and plain, and direct; not crafty
and involved; let princes, above all, draw to themselves such
natures. Besides, counsellors are not commonly so united, but that one