The Federalist Papers
form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred
systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental
principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of
sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the
laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body,
incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external
dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the
princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves;
of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of
foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and
money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce
them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation,
involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility,
confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on
his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one
of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near
being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia
was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly
proved an overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members
themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded
with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of
Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the
emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with
the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated,
and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which
foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic
constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the
necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military
preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising
from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of
sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the
enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take
it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in
time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with
local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate
contributions to the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among
these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the
empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior
organization, and of charging them with the military execution of the
laws against delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment
has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the
constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of
this political monster. They either fail to execute their commissions,
or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war.
Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the
mischief which they were instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a
sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the
circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities
which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public
occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The
consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and
the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an
appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a
corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had
secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on
the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered
from his territory,(1) he took possession of it in his own name,
disarmed, and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his
domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine
from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of
most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members,
compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight
and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary
dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which
his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first
prince in Europe;--these causes support a feeble and precarious Union;
whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty,
and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever,
founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this
obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer
a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force
and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long
considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in
this constitution; and have, on various occasions, betrayed their policy
of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local
sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof
more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions.
Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long been at
the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to
disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the
stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common
coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical
position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear
of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject;
by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and
homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent
possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing
insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often
required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and
permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The
provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges
out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose
an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces
definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The
competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their
treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges
himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to
employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with
that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended
to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary
cases, it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up,
capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controversies on the
subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and
bloody contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The
Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets,
where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left
the general diet little other business than to take care of the common
bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It
produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the
head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of
Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.
PUBLIUS
1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says
the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.
FEDERALIST No. 20
The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787.
MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of
aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the
lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each
state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities.
In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be
unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces.
They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one
years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances;
to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain
quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity
and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have
authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and
alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties
on imports and exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the
provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories.
The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from
entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to
others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own
subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges
of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an
hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic
are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial
estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates
of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in
the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial
quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain
regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in
the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between
the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations
of the States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give
audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular
affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for
garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all
appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts
of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and
directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval
affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints