The Federalist Papers
should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the
accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much
as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their
emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into
the channels of the national government, instead of making federal
influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions
of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the
consideration of the great question before the people. They can answer
no other end than to cast a mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants
of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by
the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by
that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the
community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if
the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital resource of
commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can
be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under
State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur
to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as
far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of
internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in the
choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it
a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as
may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the
public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions
which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous
classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the
government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a
proper distribution of the public burdens, and tends to guard the least
wealthy part of the community from oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them;
and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1)
which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I
should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national
government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that
they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose
taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in
practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies,
because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety
can the like power justify such a charge against the national
government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little
friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough
conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the
federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which
expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne,
become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the
possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making
use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may
be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar
to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils
in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous
conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable
resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe
from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I
acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm
the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency
might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.
(I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed
to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an
immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavored
to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have
passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either too
inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the
opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of
controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed
an investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration
that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously
considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the
branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)
(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to be
conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to
its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary
objects of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in
order to render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice
of under the next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress
already made will have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious
part of the community that some of the objections which have been
most strenuously urged against the Constitution, and which were
most formidable in their first appearance, are not only destitute of
substance, but if they had operated in the formation of the plan, would
have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public happiness and
national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and more
critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still
more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government
and will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety
and expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more
honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set
so glorious an example to mankind!)(E1)
PUBLIUS
1. The New England States.
E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.
FEDERALIST No. 37
Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form
of Government.
From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that
they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before
the public, several of the most important principles of the latter
fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of
these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this
Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be
complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work
of the convention, without examining it on all its sides, comparing
it in all its parts, and calculating its probable effects. That this
remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just
and fair result, some reflections must in this place be indulged, which
candor previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public
measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which
is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance
or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt to be
diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an unusual
exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to
this consideration, it could not appear surprising, that the act of the
convention, which recommends so many important changes and innovations,
which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches
the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or excite
dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair
discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too
evident from their own publications, that they have scanned the proposed
Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a
predetermination to condemn; as the language held by others betrays an
opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their opinions also
of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these different
characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I
wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in
the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the
latter description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be
peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably that something should
be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has been
actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these
considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. The
predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no
venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as
they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot be
upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these papers are
not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. They
solicit the attention of those only, who add to a sincere zeal for the
happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the
means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan
submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find
or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that
a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make
allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to
which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in
mind, that they themselves also are but men, and ought not to assume an
infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these
inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the
difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to
the convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been
shown in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is
founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently
change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting
upon it. It has been shown, that the other confederacies which could
be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous
principles, and can therefore furnish no other light than that of
beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without
pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the
convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors
suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our
own; and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as
future experiences may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important
one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in
government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the
republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their
undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of
their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could
not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to
betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential
to that security against external and internal danger, and to that
prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very