The Federalist Papers
the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of
Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As these
States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with
peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reapportionments
of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,
therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have
nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually
conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most growing
States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which
their States will feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and
ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been
indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be
insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their
predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a constitutional
and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which
they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The
House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose,
the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word,
hold the purse--that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the
history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation
of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and
importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all
the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every
grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the
Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and will
they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation
on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of firmness between
the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to
yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with
those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number, and the more
permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger
must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever
concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their
country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to
every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public
affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of
the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government,
whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute
inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not
have failed to involve every department of the state in the general
confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost
degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or
President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they
will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I
have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the present
state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary
number of representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have
been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been
shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any remarks
on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in
engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as
the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must be
permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very
serious attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater
the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in
fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous an
assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known
to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the
larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of
limited information and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on
characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few
are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where
the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single orator, or an
artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as
if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle,
the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the
more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings
of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the
slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than
in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain
limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.
Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER
SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL
INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will
counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives.
The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the
soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be
enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs
by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number of representatives,
may properly be here noticed, that which has been suggested against the
number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that
more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in
particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for
a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a
precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to
some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty
and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the
inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the
general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be
reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power
would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege
limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage
of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general
weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of
secessions; a practice which has shown itself even in States where a
majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles
of order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to
public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other
which has yet been displayed among us.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 59
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place,
that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national
legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own
members. It is in these words: "The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding
elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each
State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by
law, make or alter SUCH REGULATIONS, except as to the PLACES of choosing
senators."(1) This provision has not only been declaimed against
by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been
censured by those who have objected with less latitude and greater
moderation; and, in one instance it has been thought exceptionable by a
gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of
the system.
I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the
whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests
upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY GOVERNMENT
OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. Every just
reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in
the work of the convention; and will disapprove every deviation from
it which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of
incorporating into the work some particular ingredient, with which a
rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though
he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and
to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of
imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness,
and perhaps anarchy.
It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and
inserted in the Constitution, which would have been always applicable
to every probable change in the situation of the country; and it will
therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought
to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded,
that there were only three ways in which this power could have been
reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged
wholly in the national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures,
or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former. The last mode
has, with reason, been preferred by the convention. They have submitted
the regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first
instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary cases, and
when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more
satisfactory; but they have reserved to the national authority a right
to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that
interposition necessary to its safety.
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of regulating
elections for the national government, in the hands of the State
legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their
mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide
for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little
purpose to say, that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be
likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing,
without an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor
has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that
risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy can never be
dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses
of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State
governments as on the part of the general government. And as it is more
consonant to the rules of a just theory, to trust the Union with the
care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other
hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on
the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power would
naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed.
Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering