The Federalist Papers
of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative
authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of
our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given by our governor,
are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the
laws passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of power,
whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much
legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature;
and therefore, whatever name be given to the power of making treaties,
or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the
people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body
from the legislature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does
not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the
legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to
do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound
and affected.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode
proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They
insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly,
should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar
to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear.
These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another
name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation
who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them
ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to
be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter
or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not
by only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently,
that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first,
so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed
Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation
of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful
reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or
under any form of government.
However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in
the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both
become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that
malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed
the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may
make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States.
Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and
ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their
conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and
if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those
treaties?
As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men
the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their
constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that
body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper
persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as
the United States assume a national form and a national character, so
will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention, and
the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the
good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each
of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the
power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and
their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with
the rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct
from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect
the latter.
As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been
very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart
very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that
the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of
such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and too invidious to be
entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so
obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and
void by the law of nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how
it could be increased. Every consideration that can influence the
human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love
of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for
their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care
that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be
persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all
circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of
punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is
amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 65
The Powers of the Senate Continued
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the
Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation
with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial
character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business
of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the
provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the
examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head
with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not
more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly
elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly
to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of
them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the
whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or
inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with
the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and
in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision
will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by
the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns
the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the
administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty
of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis
of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is
considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that
circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning
or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be
expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct
may be the subject of scrutiny.
The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary
of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic
difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion,
and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may
be supposed to have produced it.
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself?
Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct
of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be
the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation
themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the
inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be
lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative body. Will not the
reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead
for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the
inquiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been
borrowed, pointed out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it
is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment,
and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State
constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the
former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle
in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the
government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded?
Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal
sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body
would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to
preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an
INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?
Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this
description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that
tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of
fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a
task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the
degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be
indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that
should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate
representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the
accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard
in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering
that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable
attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of
impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This
can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation
of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the
judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in
favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the
judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party
who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy
the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the
community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of
persons.
These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion,
that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for
the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further
consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It
is this: The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender.
After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still
be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.
Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and