The Federalist Papers
other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in
the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and
virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of
the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of
the poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest--That which is best
administered is best,"--yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test
of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect
to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in
respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been
objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged,
that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to
elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But
two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in
this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of
a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President
should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State
from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the
Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came,
a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that
as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the
President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which
recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great
if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is
remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which
is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a
Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in
the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in
casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to
exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide federal farmer.
E1. Some editions substitute "desired" for "wished for".
FEDERALIST No. 69
The Real Character of the Executive
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 14, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive,
as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. This will serve to
place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have
been made in regard to it.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive
authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate.
This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any
comparison can be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be
a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a
resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of
the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be
re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think
him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a
total dissimilitude between him and a king of Great Britain, who is an
hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible
to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between him and a
governor of New York, who is elected for three years, and is re-eligible
without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much less time
would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single
State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United
States, we must conclude that a duration of four years for the Chief
Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded
in that office, than a duration of three years for a corresponding
office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached,
tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person
of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable; there is no
constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to
which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national
revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal
responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon
no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than
the governors of Maryland and Delaware.
The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill,
which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature, for
reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon
that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The
king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the
acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a
considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence;
and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of
substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority
in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a
prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree
of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs
widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies
exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of
this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect
the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New
York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares
with the chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with
that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose constitution, as to this
article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have
copied.
The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called
into the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States,
except in cases of impeachment; to recommend to the consideration of
Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to
convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or
either of them, and, in case of disagreement between them with respect
to the time of adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall
think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and
to commission all officers of the United States." In most of these
particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally that of
the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most
material points of difference are these:--First. The President will have
only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation
as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the
Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at
all times the entire command of all the militia within their several
jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President
would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. Second.
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same
with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior
to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral
of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies--all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature.(1) The governor of New York, on the other
hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command
of its militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States
expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well of
the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New
Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance,
confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be
claimed by a President of the United States. Third. The power of the
President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, except
those of impeachment. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases,
even in those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. Is not the
power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political
consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and
plots against the government, which have not been matured into
actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the
interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New
York, therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until
the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his
accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union,
on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted
in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree,
from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect
of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater
temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the
public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and
confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an actual
appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any
influence at all, when the probability was computed, that the person
who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the
consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency
in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of
this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed
Constitution, the offense of treason is limited "to levying war upon
the United States, and adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort"; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar
bounds. Fourth. The President can only adjourn the national legislature
in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment.
The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. The
governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for
a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may be employed to
very important purposes.
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators
present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute
representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of
his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every