The Federalist Papers
therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd
to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the convention. It
may be said that it does not go far enough, though it will not be easy
to make this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended that
there is no such thing. It certainly must be immaterial what mode is
observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if
they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the
government. And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has been
said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions,
entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.
Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency of
its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature:
"It is improper (say the objectors) to confer such large powers, as
are proposed, upon the national government, because the seat of that
government must of necessity be too remote from many of the States
to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent, of the
conduct of the representative body." This argument, if it proves any
thing, proves that there ought to be no general government whatever. For
the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested
in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under
every requisite control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show that
the objection is in reality not well founded. There is in most of
the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the
imagination. What are the sources of information by which the people in
Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their
representatives in the State legislature? Of personal observation they
can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They
must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in whom
they confide; and how must these men obtain their information? Evidently
from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from
correspondences with their representatives, and with other persons who
reside at the place of their deliberations. This does not apply to
Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any considerable
distance from the seat of government.
It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open
to the people in relation to the conduct of their representatives in the
general government, and the impediments to a prompt communication which
distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects
of the vigilance of the State governments. The executive and legislative
bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed
in every department of the national administration; and as it will be
in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of
intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of those
who represent their constituents in the national councils, and can
readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition
to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its interests from
another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalship
of power. And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the
people, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of
their national representatives, than they can be by any means they now
possess of that of their State representatives.
It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country
at and near the seat of government will, in all questions that affect
the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those
who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm
when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project.
The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the
most remote inhabitants of the Union.
Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the
proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable is
derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due to the
United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of
those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters.
The newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this
head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely
void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme
dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in
another place, I shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of
common-sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law,
that "States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged
from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil
government."(4)
The last objection of any consequence, which I at present recollect,
turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the
adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable
increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no
weight against the plan.
The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason convinced,
that Union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of
all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved
under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new
and extensive powers ought to be granted to the national head, and that
these require a different organization of the federal government--a
single body being an unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. In
conceding all this, the question of expense must be given up; for it
is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon
which the system is to stand. The two branches of the legislature are,
in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons, which is
the same number of which Congress, under the existing Confederation, may
be composed. It is true that this number is intended to be increased;
but this is to keep pace with the progress of the population and
resources of the country. It is evident that a less number would, even
in the first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance of the
present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very
inadequate representation of the people.
Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source
indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new government.
Let us examine this a little.
It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under
the present government, are the same which will be required under the
new. There are now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a
Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury, consisting of
three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, etc. These officers are
indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new as well
as the old. As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign
countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference than
to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable,
and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the
collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will
form a very considerable addition to the number of federal officers;
but it will not follow that this will occasion an increase of public
expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State
for national officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance,
the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The
States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose.
What difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers of the
customs appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good
reason to suppose that either the number or the salaries of the latter
will be greater than those of the former.
Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which
are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented
to us? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the
judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there
is now a president of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any
thing, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President
of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra
expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may
be adopted in regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it
amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.
Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that
may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The first thing
which presents itself is that a great part of the business which now
keeps Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the
President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally
devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the
Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident that
a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives; we may suppose about a fourth for the
latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business
of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the
Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that, until the House of
Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number,
there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference
between the constant session of the present and the temporary session of
the future Congress.
But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of
economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied
the State legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made
requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it
has happened that the sessions of the State legislatures have been
protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the
mere local business of the States. More than half their time has been
frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now
the members who compose the legislatures of the several States amount to
two thousand and upwards, which number has hitherto performed what under
the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons,
and probably at no future period by above a fourth or fifth of that
number. The Congress under the proposed government will do all the
business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of
the State legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to
the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any
proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in the
time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear gain,
and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an
equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned
by the adoption of the new system.
The result from these observations is that the sources of additional
expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution are much
fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by
considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on
which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government
less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.
PUBLIUS
1. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, p. 136.
2. Idem, Vol. 4, p. 438.