The Federalist Papers
compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree
of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of
particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would
then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any
other point--no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number
would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,
whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a
particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There
can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an
amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete
Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been
urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national
government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of
the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I
acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on
this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.
The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further
consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the
observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever
nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth
article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of
the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount
to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by
conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are
peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this
particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence,
all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in
air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or
three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect
local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty
in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty
or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the
State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself
deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances
in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me,
however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety
of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the
truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and
ingenious: "To balance a large state or society (says he), whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great
difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the
mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many
must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must
bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct
the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials
and experiments."(3) These judicious reflections contain a lesson of
moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put
them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual
alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military
despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not
likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect
of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an
equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a
longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION,
without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the
voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of
which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to
no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an
enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having
passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the
course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I
know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies
to a general national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS
1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York."
2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the
measure, three fourths must ratify.
3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."