The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
the body; and that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.
They consider that bodily exercise contributes to the comprehension of
virtue; and that the wise man will feel neither envy, nor love, nor
superstition; for that these things originate in a fallacious opinion.
They admit, at the same time, that he is liable to grief and fear,
for that these are natural emotions. They said also that wealth is an
efficient cause of pleasure, but that it is not desirable for its own
sake. That the sensations are things which can be comprehended; but they
limited this assertion to the sensations themselves, and did not extend
it to the causes which produce them. They left out all investigation of
the subjects of natural philosophy because of the evident impossibility
of comprehending them; but they applied themselves to the study of logic,
because of its utility.
Meleager, in the second book of his Treatise on Opinions and Clitomachus
in the first book of his Essay on Sects says, that they thought natural
philosophy and dialectics useless for that the man who had learnt to
understand the question of good and evil could speak with propriety,
and was free from superstition, and escaped the fear of death,
without either. They also taught that there was nothing naturally and
intrinsically just, or honourable, or disgraceful; but that things were
considered so because of law and fashion. The good man will do nothing
out of the way, because of the punishments which are imposed on, and the
discredit which is attached to, such actions: and that the good man is a
wise man. They admit, too, that there is such a thing as improvement in
philosophy, and in other good studies. And they say that one man feels
grief more than another; and that the sensations are not always to be
trusted as faithful guides.
IX. But the philosophers who were called Hegesiaci, adopted the same
chief goods, pleasure and pain; and they denied that there was any
such thing as gratitude, or friendship, or beneficence, because we do
not choose any of those things for their own sake, but on account of
the use of which they are, and on account of these other things which
cannot subsist without them. But they teach that complete happiness
cannot possibly exist; for that the body is full of many sensations, and
that the mind sympathizes with the body, and is troubled when that is
troubled, and also that fortune prevents many things which we cherished
in anticipation; so that for all these reasons, perfect happiness
eludes our grasp. Moreover, that both life and death are desirable.
They also say that there is nothing naturally pleasant or unpleasant,
but that owing to want, or rarity, or satiety, some men are pleased and
some vexed; and that wealth and poverty have no influence at all on
pleasure, for that rich men are not affected by pleasure in a different
manner from poor men. In the same way they say that slavery and freedom
are things indifferent, if measured by the standard of pleasure, and
nobility and baseness of birth, and glory and infamy. They add that,
for the foolish man it is expedient to live, but to the wise man it
is a matter of indifference; and that the wise man will do everything
for his own sake; for that he will not consider any one else of equal
importance with himself; and he will see that if he were to obtain ever
such great advantages from any one else, they would not be equal to what
he could himself bestow. They excluded the sensations, inasmuch as they
had no certain knowledge about them; but they recommended the doing of
everything which appeared consistent with reason.
They asserted also that errors ought to meet with pardon; for that a man
did not err intentionally, but because he was influenced by some external
circumstance; and that one ought not to hate a person who has erred, but
only to teach him better. They likewise said that the wise man would not
be so much absorbed in the pursuit of what is good, as in the attempt to
avoid what is bad, considering the chief good to be living free from all
trouble and pain; and that this end was attained best by those who looked
upon the efficient causes of pleasure as indifferent.
X. The Annicereans, in many respects, agreed with these last; but they
admitted the existence in life of friendship and gratitude and respect
for one’s parents, and the principle of endeavouring to serve one’s
country. On which principle, even if the wise man should meet with some
annoyance, he would be no less happy—even though he should have but few
actual pleasures. They thought that the happiness of a friend was not to
be desired by us for its own sake; for that in fact such happiness was
not capable of being felt by the person’s neighbour; and that reason
is not sufficient to give one confidence, and to authorise one to look
down upon the opinions of the multitude; but that one must learn a
deference for the sentiments of others by custom, because the opposite
bad disposition being bred up with infirm and early age. They also taught
that one ought not to like friends solely on account of the advantage
that we may derive from them, and not discard them when these hopes or
advantages fail; but that we ought rather to cultivate them on account of
one’s natural feelings of benevolence, in compliance with which we ought
also to encounter trouble for their sakes, so that though they consider
pleasure the chief good, and the deprivation of it an evil, still they
think that a man ought voluntarily to submit to this deprivation out of
his regard for his friend.
XI. The Theodoreans, as they are called, derived their name from the
Theodorus who has been already mentioned, and adopted all his doctrines.
XII. Now Theodorus utterly discarded all previous opinions about the
Gods: and we have met with a book of his which is entitled, On Gods,
which is not to be despised; and it is from that that they say that
Epicurus derived the principal portions of his sentiments. But Theodorus
had been a pupil of Anniceris, and of Dionysius the Dialectician, as
Antisthenes tells us in his Successions of Philosophers.
XIII. He considered joy and grief as the chief goods: and that the former
resulted from knowledge, and the latter from ignorance. And he called
prudence and justice goods: the contrary qualities evils, and pleasure
and pain something intermediate. He discarded friendship from his system,
because it could not exist either in foolish men or in wise men. For
that, in the case of the former, friendship was at an end the moment
that the advantage to be derived from it was out of sight. And that wise
men were sufficient for themselves, and so had no need of friends. He
used also to say that it was reasonable for a good man not to expose
himself to danger for the sake of his country, for that he ought not to
discard his own prudence for the sake of benefiting those who had none.
And he said that a wise man’s country was the World. He allowed that
a wise man might steal, and commit adultery and sacrilege, at proper
seasons: for that none of these actions were disgraceful by nature, if
one only put out of sight the common opinion about them, which owes its
existence to the consent of fools. And he said that the wise man would
indulge his passions openly, without any regard to circumstances: on
which principle he used to ask the following questions: “Is a woman
who is well instructed in literature of use just in proportion to the
amount of her literary knowledge?” “Yes,” said the person questioned.
“And is a boy, and is a youth, useful in proportion to his acquaintance
with literature?” “Yes.” “Is not then, also, a beautiful woman useful
in proportion as she is beautiful; and a boy and a youth useful in
proportion to their beauty?” “Yes.” “Well, then, a handsome boy and
a handsome youth must be useful exactly in proportion as they are
handsome?” “Yes.” “Now the use of beauty is, to be embraced.” And when
this was granted he pressed the argument thus:—If then a man embraces a
woman just as it is useful that he should, he does not do wrong; nor,
again, will he be doing wrong in employing beauty for the purposes for
which it is useful. And with such questions as these he appeared to
convince his hearers.
XIV. But he appears to have got the name of θεὸς from Stilpo one day
asking him, “Are you, Theodorus, what you say you are?” And when he said
he was, “And you said that you are θεὸς,” continued his questioner; he
admitted that also. “Then,” continued the other, “you are θεὸς.” And as
he willingly received the title, the other laughed and said, “But you,
wretched man, according to this principle, you would also admit that you
were a raven, or a hundred other things.” One day Theodorus sat down by
Euryclides the hierophant, and said to him, “Tell me now, Euryclides, who
are they who behave impiously with respect to the mysteries?” And when
Euryclides answered, “Those who divulge them to the uninitiated;” “Then,”
said he, “you also are impious, for you divulge them to those who are not
initiated.”
XV. And indeed he was very near being brought before the Areopagus if
Demetrius of Phalereus had not saved him. But Amphicrates in his Essay on
Illustrious Men, says that he was condemned to drink hemlock.
XVI. While he was staying at the court of Ptolemy, the son of Lagus,
he was sent once by him to Lysimachus as an ambassador. And as he was
talking very freely, Lysimachus said to him, “Tell me, Theodorus, have
not you been banished from Athens?” And he replied, “you have been
rightly informed; for the city of the Athenians could not bear me, just
as Semele could not bear Bacchus; and so we were both cast out.” And when
Lysimachus said again, “Take care that you do not come to me again;” “I
never will,” he replied, “unless Ptolemy sends me.” And as Mythras, the
steward of Lysimachus was present, and said, “You appear to me to be
the only person who ignores both Gods and Sovereigns;” “How,” rejoined
Theodorus, “can you say that I ignore the Gods, when I look upon you as
their enemy?”
XVII. They say also that on one occasion he came to Corinth, bringing
with him a great many disciples; and that Metrocles the Cynic, who was
washing leeks, said to him, “You, who are a Sophist, would not have
wanted so many pupils, if you had washed vegetables.” And Theodorus,
taking him up, replied, “And if you had known how to associate with men,
you would not have cared about those vegetables.” But this rejoinder, as
I have said already, is attributed both to Diogenes and Aristippus.
XVIII. Such was Theodorus, and such were his circumstances and opinions.
But at last he went away to Cyrene, and lived there with Megas, being
treated by him with the greatest distinction. And when he was first
driven away from Cyrene, he is reported to have said very pleasantly,
“You do wrong, O men of Cyrene, driving me from Africa to Greece.”
XIX. But there were twenty different people of the name of Theodorus. The
first was a Samian, the son of Rhœcus; he it was who advised the putting
of coals under the foundations of the temple of Diana at Ephesus; for as
the ground was very swampy, he said that the coals, having got rid of
their ligneous qualities, would retain their solidity in a way that could
not be impaired by water. The second was a Cyrenean, a geometrician,
and had Plato for one of his pupils. The third was the philosopher whom
we have been describing. The fourth was an author who wrote a very
remarkable treatise on the art of exercising the voice. The fifth was a
man who wrote a treatise on Musical Composers, beginning with Terpander.
The sixth was a Stoic. The seventh was the historian of Rome. The eighth
was a Syracusan, who wrote an Essay on Tactics. The ninth was a citizen