The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
some one of the subjects with which philosophy is conversant, or with
which statesmanship is concerned, with a becoming attention to the
characters of the persons who are introduced as speakers, and with a
careful selection of language governed by the same consideration. And
dialectics is the art of conversing, by means of which we either overturn
or establish the proposition contended for, by means of the questions and
answers which are put in the mouths of the parties conversing. Now, of
the Platonic discourse there are two characteristics discernible on the
very surface; one fitted for guiding, the other for investigating.
The first of these has two subordinate species, one speculative, the
other practical; and of these two again, the speculative is divided into
the natural and the logical, and the practical into the ethical and the
political. Again, the kind fitted for investigating has also two primary
divisions with their separate characteristics, one object of which is
simply practice, the other being also disputatious: and the first of
these two is again subdivided into two; one of which may be compared
to the art of the midwife, and the other is as it were tentative;
the disputatious one is also divided into the demonstrative and the
distinctive.
But we are not unaware that some writers distinguish the various
dialogues in a different manner from what we do. For they say that
some of them are dramatic, and others narrative, and others of a mixed
nature. But they, in this division, are classifying the dialogues in a
theatrical rather than in a philosophical manner. Some of the dialogues
also refer to subjects of natural philosophy, such as the Timæus. Of the
logical class, there are the Politics, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and
the Sophist. Of the ethical kind there is the defence of Socrates, the
Crito, the Phædo, the Phædrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus, the Clitophon,
the Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. Of
the political class there is the Republic, the Laws, the Minos, the
Epinomis, and the Atlanticus. Of the midwife description we have the
two Alcibiades’s, the Theages, the Lysis, the Laches. Of the tentative
kind, there is the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the
Theætetus. Of the demonstrative description, we have the Protagoras,
and of the distinctive class the Euthydemus, the two Hippias’s, and the
Gorgias. And this is enough to say about the dialogues as to what they
are, and what their different kinds are.
XXXIII. But since there is also a great division of opinion respecting
them, from some people asserting that in them Plato dogmatizes in a
positive manner, while others deny this, we had better also touch upon
this part of the question. Now, dogmatizing is laying down dogmas, just
as legislating is making laws. But the word dogma is used in two senses;
to mean both that which we think, and opinion itself. Now of these,
that which we think is the proposition, and opinion is the conception
by which we entertain it in our minds. Plato then explains the opinions
which he entertains himself, and refutes false ones; and about doubtful
matters he suspends his judgment. His opinions of matters as they appear
to him he puts into the mouth of four persons, Socrates, Timæus, an
Athenian poet, and an Eleatic stranger. But the strangers are not, as
some people have supposed, Plato and Parmenides, but certain nameless
imaginary characters. Since Plato asserts as undeniable axioms all the
opinions which he puts into the mouth of Socrates or Timæus. But when
he is refuting false propositions, he introduces such characters as
Thrasymachus, and Callicles, and Polus, and Gorgias, and Protagoras,
Hippias too, and Euthydemus, and men of that stamp. But when he is
demonstrating anything, then he chiefly uses the inductive form of
argument, and that too not of one kind only, but of two. For induction is
an argument, which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally
other truths which resemble them. But there are two kinds of induction;
the one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. Now,
the one which proceeds from contraries, is one in which from the answer
given, whatever that answer may be, the contrary of the principle
indicated in the question must follow. As for instance. My father is
either a different person from your father, or he is the same person.
If now your father is a different person from my father, then as he is
a different person from a father, he cannot be a father. If, on the
other hand, he is the same person as my father, then, since he is the
same person as my father, he must be my father. And again, if man be not
an animal, he must be either a stone or a piece of wood; but he is not
a stone or a piece of wood, for he is a living animal, and capable of
independent motion. Therefore, he is an animal. But, if he is an animal,
and a dog or an ox is likewise an animal, then man must be an animal, and
a dog, and an ox.—This then is the method of induction in contradiction
and contention, which Plato was accustomed to employ, not for the purpose
of establishing principles of his own, but with the object of refuting
the arguments of others.
Now, the inductive kind of argument drawn from consequents is of a
twofold character. The one proving a particular opinion by an admitted
fact of an equally particular nature; or else going from particulars to
generals. And the first of these two divisions is the oratorical one,
the second the dialectic one. As for instance, in the former kind the
question is whether this person has committed a murder; the proof is that
he was found at the time covered with blood. But this is the oratorical
method of employing the induction; since oratory is conversant about
particulars, and does not concern itself about generals. For its object
is not to ascertain abstract justice, but only particular justice.
The other is the dialectic kind, the general proposition having been
established by particular ones. As for instance, the question is whether
the soul is immortal, and whether the living consist of those who have
once been dead; and this proposition Plato establishes in his book on
the Soul, by a certain general proposition, that contraries arise out
of contraries; and this identical general proposition is established by
certain particular ones. As, for instance, that sleep follows on waking,
and waking from sleeping, and the greater from the less, and reversely
the less from the greater. And this kind of induction he used to employ
for the establishment of his own opinions.
XXXIV. Anciently, in tragedy, it was only the chorus who did the whole
work of the play; but subsequently, Thespis introduced one actor for the
sake of giving the chorus some rest, and Æschylus added a second, and
Sophocles a third, and so they made tragedy complete. So in the same
manner, philosophical discourse was originally uniform, concerning itself
solely about natural philosophy; then Socrates added to it a second
character, the ethical: and Plato a third, the dialectic: and so he
brought philosophy to perfection.
XXXV. But Thrasybulus says that he published his dialogues as the
dramatic poets published their tetralogies. For, they contended with
four plays, (and at four festivals, the Dionysiac, the Lenæan, the
Panathenæan, and the Chytri), one of which was a satiric drama, and
the whole four plays were called a tetralogy. Now, people say, the
whole of his genuine dialogues amount to fifty-six; the treatise on the
Republic being divided into ten books, (which Phavorinus, in the second
book of his Universal History, says may be found almost entire in the
Contradictions of Protagoras), and that on Laws into twelve. And there
are nine tetralogies, if we consider the Republic as occupying the place
of one book, and the Laws of another. He arranges, therefore, the first
tetralogy of these dialogues which have a common subject, wishing to show
what sort of life that of the philosopher may have been. And he uses two
titles for each separate book, taking one from the name of the principal
speaker, and the other from the subject.
This tetralogy then, which is the first, is commenced by the Euthyphron,
or what is Holy; and that dialogue is a tentative one. The second is the
Defence of Socrates, a moral one. The third is the Criton, or What is to
be done, a moral one. The fourth is the Phædo, or the Dialogue on the
Soul, a moral one.
The second tetralogy is that of which the first piece is the Cratylus, or
the correctness of names, a logical one. The Theætetus, or Knowledge, a
tentative one. The Sophist, or a dialogue on the Existent, a logical one.
The Statesman, or a dialogue of Monarchy, a logical one.
The first dialogue in the third tetralogy is the Parmenides, or a
dialogue of Ideas, a logical one. The second is the Philebus, or on
Pleasure, a moral one. The Banquet, or on the Good, a moral one. The
Phædrus, or on Love, a moral one.
The fourth tetralogy opens with the Alcibiades, or a treatise on the
Nature of Man, a midwife-like work. The second Alcibiades, or on Prayer,
a piece of the same character. The Hipparchus, or on the Love of Gain, a
moral one. The Rival Lovers, or a treatise on Philosophy, a moral one.
The first dialogue in the fifth is the Theages, or another treatise on
Philosophy, another midwife-like work. The Charmides, or on Temperance,
a tentative essay. The Laches, or on Manly Courage, midwife-like. The
Lysis, or a dissertation on Friendship, also midwife-like.
The sixth tetralogy commences with the Euthydemus, or the Disputatious
Man, a distinctive dialogue. Then comes the Protagoras, or the Sophists,
a demonstrative one. The Gorgias, or a dissertation on Rhetoric, another
distinctive one. And the Meno, or on Virtue, a tentative dialogue.
The seventh begins with the two Hippias’s. The first being a dissertation
on the Beautiful, the second one on Falsehood, both distinctive. The
third is the Ion, or a dissertation on the Iliad, a tentative one. The
fourth is the Menexenus, or the Funeral Oration, a moral one.
The first dialogue in the eighth is the Clitophon, or the Exhortation,
a moral piece. Then comes the Republic, or the treatise on Justice, a
political one. The Timæus, or a dissertation on Nature, a dialogue on
Natural Philosophy. And the Critias, or Atlanticus, a moral one.
The ninth begins with the Minos, or a treatise on Law, a political work.
The Laws, or a dissertation on Legislation, another political work. The
Epinomis, or the Nocturnal Conversation, or the Philosopher, a third
political one.
XXXVI. And this last tetralogy is completed by thirteen epistles, all
moral; to which is prefixed as a motto, εὖ πράττειν, just as Epicurus
inscribed on his εὖ διάγειν, and Cleon on his χαίρειν. They are, one
letter to Aristodemus, two to Archytas, four to Dionysius, one to
Hermeias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one to Leodamas, one to Dion, one to
Perdiccas, and two to the friends of Dion.
XXXVII. And this is the way in which some people divide his works. But
others, among whom is Aristophanes, the grammarian, arrange his dialogues
in trilogies; and they make the first to consist of the Republic, the
Timæus and the Critias.
The second of the Sophist, the Statesman, the Cratylus.
The third of the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis.
The fourth of the Theætetus, the Euthyphro, the Defence of Socrates.
The fifth of the Crito, the Phædo, the Epistles.
And the rest they arrange singly and independently, without any regular
order. And some authors, as has been said already, place the Republic at
the head of his works: others begin with the Greater Alcibiades: others
with the Theages; some with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon;