The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
some with the Timæus, some with the Phædrus, others again with the
Theætetus. Many make the Defence of Socrates the first piece.
There are some dialogues attributed to him which are confessedly
spurious. The Midon, or the Horse-breeder; the Eryxias, or Erasistratus;
the Alcyon; the Acephali, or Sisyphi; the Axiochus; the Phæacians; the
Demodorus; the Chelidon; the Seventh; the Epimenides. Of which the Alcyon
is believed to be the work of a man named Leon; as Phavorinus tells us in
the seventh book of his Commentaries.
XXXVIII. But he employs a great variety of terms in order to render his
philosophical system unintelligible to the ignorant. In his phraseology
he considers wisdom as the knowledge of things which can be understood
by the intellect, and which have a real existence: which has the Gods
for its object, and the soul as unconnected with the body. He also, with
a peculiarity of expression, calls wisdom also philosophy, which he
explains as a desire for divine wisdom. But wisdom and experience are
also used by him in their common acceptation; as, for instance, when he
calls an artisan wise (σοφὸς). He also uses the same words in different
senses at different times. Accordingly he uses φαῦλος in the sense of
ἁπλοῦς, _simple_, in which meaning also the word occurs in Euripides, in
the Licymonius, where the poet speaks of Hercules in the following terms:—
Mean looking (φαῦλος), rude, virtuous in great affairs,
Measuring all wisdom by its last results,
A hero unrefined in speech.
But Plato uses the word sometimes even for what is beautiful; and
sometimes for small and insignificant; and very often he uses different
words to express the same idea. Accordingly, besides the word ἰδέα for
a class, he uses also εἶδος, and γένος, and παράδειγμα, and ἀρχὴ, and
αἴτιον. Sometimes he uses opposite expressions for the same thing;
accordingly, he says that it is an object of sensation that exists, while
at other times he says it is that which does not exist; speaking of it
as existing because of its origin, and as non-existent with reference to
its continual changes. Then again, he defines his ἰδέα as something which
is neither moving nor stationary, at one time calling the same thing, at
another time one thing, at a third time many things. And he is in the
habit of doing this in many instances.
And the explanation of his arguments is three-fold. For first of all, it
is necessary to explain what each thing that is said is; secondly, on
what account it is said, whether because of its bearing on the principal
point, or figuratively, and whether it is said for the purpose of
establishing an opinion of his own, or of refuting the arguments brought
forward by the other party to the conversation; and thirdly, whether it
has been said truly.
XXXIX. But since there are some particular marks put in his books, we
must also say something about them. × indicates peculiar expressions and
figures of speech, and generally any peculiarities of Plato’s style. When
doubled it points to the doctrines and peculiar opinions of Plato; ※
when dotted all round, points to some select bits of beautiful writing.
When doubled and dotted it indicates corrections of some passages. A
dotted obelus indicates hasty disapprovals. An inverted sigma dotted
all round points out passages which may be taken in a double sense, and
transpositions of words. The Ceraunium[33] indicates a connection of
philosophical ideas. An asterisk points out an agreement in doctrine. And
an obelus marks the rejection of the expression or of the passage. These
then are the marginal marks which occur, and the writings of which Plato
was the author:—which, as Antigonus the Carystian says, in his treatise
on Zeno, when they had been but lately published, brought in some gain to
the possessors, if any one else was desirous of reading them.
XL. These now were his chief opinions. He affirmed that the soul was
immortal and clothed in many bodies successively, and that its first
principle was number, and that the first principle of the body was
geometry. And he defined it as an abstract idea of spirit diffused in
every direction. He said also, that it was self-moving and threefold. For
that that part of it which was capable of reasoning was situated in the
head, that that portion which was affected by passion was seated around
the heart, and that which was appetitive was placed around the navel and
the liver. And that it is placed in the middle of the body, and embraces
it at the same time in all its parts, and that it consists of elements;
and that when it is divided according to harmonic intervals it forms
two connected circles; of which the inner circle is divided into six
portions, and makes in all seven circles; and that this is placed on the
left hand of the diameter, and situated in the interior. But the other
is on the right hand of the same line; on which account, and because it
is one only, it is the superior of the two. For the other is divided
internally; and this too, is the circle of that which is always the same;
the other, the circle of that which is changeable and different. And the
one he says is the motion of the soul, but the other is the motion of the
universe and of the planets.
On the other side, the division of the circles from the centre to the
extremities, being harmoniously appropriated to the essence of the soul,
the one knows existing things and establishes harmony between them,
because it is itself composed of harmonious elements. The circle of what
is changeable, engenders opinion by its regular movements; but the circle
of that which is always the same produces knowledge.
XLI. Plato lays down two primary causes or principles of all things, God
and matter, which he also calls mind, and the cause. And he defines
matter as something without shape and without limitation, and says that
from it all concretions arise. He affirms also that as it was moving
about at random, it was brought by God into one settled place, as God
thought order better than disorder; and that this nature is divided into
four elements, fire, water, air, and earth, of which the world itself and
everything in it was made. But he says that the earth is the only thing
that is unchangeable, as he considers the cause to be the difference of
the figures of which it is composed; for he says that the figures of the
others are homogeneous; for that they are all composed equally of scalene
triangles. The figure of the earth, however, is peculiar to itself;
for the element of fire is a pyramid; of air, an octagon; of water, an
eicosagon; and of the earth, a cube; owing to which these things cannot
be changed into earth, nor earth into them. He teaches also that these
elements are not separated so as to occupy each a peculiar and distinct
place; for the spherical motion collects and compresses all the small
things towards the centre, and the small things separate the great ones,
on which account the species, as they change, do also change their
positions.
Moreover he asserts that the world is one, and has been produced,
since it has been made by God, in such a manner as to be an object
of sensation. And he considers it endowed with life, because that
which is so endowed, is superior to that which is not, and it must be
the production of the most excellent producer. It is also one, and
illimitable; because the model after which it was made was one; and it
is spherical, because its creator was of that form; for it also contains
all other animals, and God who made it comprises all forms. And it is
smooth, and has no instruments whatever all round it, because it has no
need of any. But the whole world remains imperishable, because it cannot
be resolved into God; and God is the cause of universal production,
because it is the nature of the good to be productive of good; and the
best is the cause of the production of the heaven; for the best of all
productions can have no other cause than the best of all intelligible
existences. And since God is of that character, and since heaven
resembles the best, inasmuch as it is at least the most beautiful of all
things, it cannot be like anything else that is produced, except God.
He also teaches that the world consists of fire, water, air, and earth;
of fire, in order that it may be visible; of earth, in order that it may
be firm; of water and air, that it may not be destitute of proportion;
for two middle terms are indispensable to keep the solid bodies in due
proportion to one another, and to realize the unity of the whole. In
short, the world is formed of all the elements together, in order that it
may be perfect and imperishable.
Again, time is the image of eternity; eternity subsists for ever; but the
motion of the heaven is time; for day, and night, and the months, and all
such divisions, are parts of time, on which account there could be no
such thing as time apart from the nature of the world; for time existed
contemporaneously and simultaneously with the world. And it was with
reference to time that the sun, and the moon, and the planets were made;
and it was in order that the number of the seasons might be manifest, and
that the animals might partake of number, that God kindled the light of
the sun; and that the moon was above the circle of the earth, and that
the sun was next to it, and in the still higher circles were the planets.
And that the universe was animated, because it was altogether bound up
in animated motion, and that the race of all other animals was produced
in order that the world might be made perfect, and resembling an animal
such as could be comprehended by intellect. Since then God had life, the
heaven also must have life; and the Gods are to a great extent composed
of fire. And there are three other races of animals, those which fly in
the air; those which live in the water; those which walk in the earth.
The oldest of all the deities in heaven is the Earth; she was formed in
order to be the dispenser of night and day; and as she is placed in the
centre, she is constantly in motion around the centre.
And since there are two efficient causes, some things must, he says,
be affirmed to exist in consequence of intellect, and some from some
necessary cause. Now necessary causes are the air, fire, earth, and
water, these not being real elements, but rather receptacles; and
they too are formed of triangles in combination, and are resolvable
into triangles; and their elements are the scalene triangle and the
isosceles. These two before mentioned elements are the principles and
causes of things, of which the models are God and matter, which last must
necessarily be destitute of form, as is the case of other receptacles.
And that the cause of these things was a necessary cause, which,
receiving the ideas, produced the substances, and was moved by the
dissimilarity of its own power, and again by its motion compelled those
things which were moved by it to move other things in their turn.
But all these things were formerly moved without any reason or order;
but after they began to form the world by their combination, they then
received symmetry and regularity from God, according to the principles
applicable to them; for the efficient causes, even before the creation
of the heaven, were two in number. There was also a third, namely
production; but these were not very evident, but rather traces than
actual things, and quite devoid of regularity. But after the world was
made, then they too assumed a regular form and arrangement; but the
heaven was made of all existing bodies. And Plato considers that God is
incorporeal just as the soul is, and that it is owing to that that he is
not affected by any destruction or external circumstances. And ideas, as