The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
we have said before, he defines as certain causes and principles, owing
to which it is that such and such things are by nature what they are.
XLII. On the subject of good and evil, these were his sentiments: that
the end was to become like God; and that virtue was sufficient of herself
for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as
instruments to work with; such as health, strength, the integrity of
the senses, and things of that kind; and also external advantages, such
as riches, and noble birth, and glory. Still that the wise man would be
not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances;
for he would enjoy the constitution of his country, and would marry, and
would not transgress the established laws, and that he would legislate
for his country, as well as he could under existing circumstances,
unless he saw affairs in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of
the excessive factiousness of the people. He thinks too that the Gods
superintend all the affairs of men, and that there are such beings
as dæmons. And he was the first person who defined the notion of the
honourable, as that which borders on the praiseworthy, and the logical,
and the useful, and the becoming, and the expedient, all which things are
combined with that which is suitable to, and in accordance with, nature.
XLIII. He also discussed in his dialogues the correctness of terms, so
that he was the first person who reduced the science of giving correct
answers, and putting correct questions to a system, which he himself used
to satiety.
XLIV. In his dialogues he used to speak of justice as a kind of law of
God, as being of influence sufficient to excite men to act justly, in
order to avoid suffering punishment as malefactors after death. Owing
to which he appeared to some people rather fond of mythical stories,
as he mingled stories of this kind with his writings, in order by the
uncertainty of all the circumstances that affect men after their death,
to induce them to abstain from evil actions. And these were his opinions.
XLV. He used too, says Aristotle, to divide things in this manner:—Of
good, some have their place in the mind, some in the body, and some are
wholly external. As, for instance, justice, and prudence, and manly
courage, and temperance, and qualities of that sort exist in the soul.
Beauty, and a good constitution, and health, and strength exist in the
body. But friends, and the prosperity of one’s country, and wealth, are
external goods. There are then three species of goods, some in the soul,
some in the body, and some external to either.
XLVI. There are also three species of friendship. For one kind is
natural, another that which arises from companionship; and the third
is that which is produced by ties of hospitality. We call that natural
friendship which parents feel towards their offspring, and relations
towards one another; and this is partaken of by other animals besides
men. We call that the friendship of companionship which arises from a
habit of association, and which has no reference to ties of blood, such
as the friendship of Pylades for Orestes. That which arises from ties
of hospitality is one which owes its origin to agreements, and which is
carried on by means of letters between strangers. There is, therefore,
natural friendship, and friendship between companions, and between
strangers. Some also add a fourth kind, namely, the friendship of love.
XLVII. Of political constitutions there are five species. There is one
kind which is democratical, a second which is aristocratical, a third is
oligarchical, a fourth monarchical, and the fifth is tyrannical. Now,
the democratical form of constitution exists in those cities in which
the multitude has the chief power, and elects magistrates, and passes
laws at its own pleasure. But an aristocracy is that form in which
neither the rich, nor the poor, nor the most illustrious men of the
city rule, but the most nobly born have the chief sway. And oligarchy is
that constitution in which the magistracies are distributed according
to some sort of rating: for the rich are fewer in number than the poor.
The monarchical constitution is either dependent on law or on family.
That in Carthage depends on law; that in Lacædemon and Macedonia on
family; for they select their sovereign out of some particular family.
But a tyranny is that kind of government in which the people are either
cajoled or constrained into being governed by a single individual. Forms
of government then, are divided into democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy,
monarchy, and tyranny.
XLVIII. Again, of justice there are three species. For there is one kind
which is conversant with the gods; a second which has reference to men;
and a third, which concerns the dead. For they who sacrifice according to
the laws, and who pay due respect to the temples, are manifestly pious
to the gods. And those who repay what has been lent to them, and restore
what has been deposited with them, act justly as to men. And those who
pay due respect to the tombs, clearly are pious towards the dead. There
is, therefore, one justice towards the Gods, a second towards men, and a
third towards the dead.
XLIX. In the same way, there are also three species of knowledge. There
is one kind which is practical, a second which is productive, a third
which is theoretical. For the science of building houses or ships, is
production. For one can see the work which is produced by it. Political
science, and the science of playing the flute, or the harp, or such
things as that, is practical; for one cannot see any visible result which
has been produced by them, and yet they are doing something. For one man
plays the flute or plays the harp, and another occupies himself with
state affairs. Again, geometrical, and harmonic, and astronomical science
are all theoretical, for they do nothing, and produce nothing. But the
geometrician theorizes as to what relation lines bear to one another; and
the harmonist speculates about sounds, and the astronomer about stars and
about the world. Accordingly, of sciences some are theoretical, others
productive, and a third species is practical.
L. Of medical science there are five species: one, pharmaceutical; a
second, manual; a third, conversant about the regulation of the manner
of life, and the diet; a fourth, the business of which is to detect
diseases; and the fifth is remedial. The pharmaceutical relieves
infirmities by means of medicines; the manual heals men by cutting and
cauterizing; the one which attends to the diet, gets rid of diseases
by altering and regulating the diet; the fourth produces its effects
by a thorough comprehension of the nature of the disease; and the last
relieves men from suffering by bringing prompt assistance at the moment.
Medical science, then, is divided into the pharmaceutical, the manual,
the dietetic, the diagnostic, and the remedial.
LI. Of law there are two divisions. For there is a written and an
unwritten law. The one by which we regulate our constitutions in our
cities, is the written law; that which arises from custom, is the
unwritten law. As, for instance, for a man to come naked into the market
place, or to wear woman’s clothes, are actions which are not prohibited
by any law, and yet we never do them because they are forbidden by the
unwritten law. Law, therefore, is divided into the written and the
unwritten law.
LII. Discourse is divided into five heads; one of which heads is that
which statesmen employ when they speak in the public assemblies; and
this is called political. Another division is that which orators use in
their written harangues, and bring forward for the sake of display in
panegyrics or reproaches, or impeachments. And such a description of
discourse as this is the rhetorical. A third class is that which private
individuals use when conversing with one another. This is called private
discourse. Another kind is that which is employed when men converse
by means of putting short questions and giving brief answers to those
who question them. This is called the dialectic kind of discourse.
The fifth division is that which artists adopt when conversing on
their own particular art, and this is called professional discourse.
Thus discourse, then, is divided into political, rhetorical, private,
dialectic, and professional.
LIII. Music again is divided into three species. For there is the music
of the mouth alone, such as song; secondly, there is the music which is
performed by the hands and mouth together, such as singing to the harp;
thirdly, there is that which is executed by the hands alone, such as harp
playing. Music, therefore, is divided into music of the mouth, music of
the mouth and hands, and music of the hands.
LIV. Nobleness of birth is divided into four species; the first is when
one’s ancestors are noble, and valiant, and just; in which case they
say that their posterity are nobly born. The second kind is when one’s
ancestors have been princes and rulers of nations, and their posterity
also we call noble. Another kind is when one’s ancestors have been
distinguished for personal renown, such, for instance, as is gained by
generalship or by victory at the games. For their offspring also we
address as nobly born. And the last kind is when a man is himself noble
in his spirit, and magnanimous. For that man also we call noble, and this
is the last kind of nobility. There is, therefore, nobility arising from
virtuous ancestors, from royal ancestors, from illustrious ancestors, and
from one’s own excellent qualities.
LV. Beauty also is divided into three kinds. For there is one kind
which is praiseworthy, as that of a beautiful face. Another which is
useful, as an instrument or a house, and things of that kind which are
beautiful, with reference to our use of them. There is also a beauty with
reference to laws, and habits, and things of that kind, which is likewise
beautiful, because of its utility. So that beauty again is looked at in
three ways, with reference to its praise, its utility, and to our use of
it.
LVI. The soul is divided into three parts; for one part of it is capable
of reason, another is influenced by appetite, the third part is liable to
passion. Of these the reasoning part is the cause of deliberating, and
reasoning, and understanding, and everything of that kind. The appetite
part is that portion of the soul which is the cause of desiring to eat,
and to embrace and things of that kind. The passionate part is the cause
of men feeling confidence and delight, and grief and anger. The soul
therefore is divided into the reasoning part, the appetitive part, and
the passionate part.
LVII. Of perfect virtue there are four species. One is prudence, one is
justice, the third is manly gallantry, and the fourth is temperance.
Of these, prudence is the cause of a man acting rightly in affairs;
justice is the cause of his acting justly in partnerships and bargains;
manly gallantry is the cause of a man’s not being alarmed amid dangers
and formidable circumstances, but standing firm; and temperance is the
cause of his subduing his appetites, and being enslaved by no pleasure,
but living decorously. So that virtue is divided into prudence, justice,
manly gallantry, and temperance.
LVIII. Rule is divided into five parts. One is rule according to law;
another is rule according to nature; a third kind is rule according to
custom; a fourth division is rule with reference to family; the fifth is
rule by force. Now when the rulers in cities are elected by the citizens,
then they rule according to law; those who rule according to nature are
the males, not only among men, but also among all other animals; for