The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
everywhere we shall find it as a general rule that the male rules the
female; the rule of him who rules according to custom is such as this,
when schoolmasters rule their pupils, and teachers their disciples. Rule
according to family is that which prevails in places like Lacedæmon,
where hereditary sovereigns reign. For the kingdom there belongs to a
certain family; and in Macedonia they rule on the same principle. For
there, too, the kingdom depends on family. But those who rule by force,
only cajoling the citizens, rule in spite of them; and such a sway is
called rule by force. So that there is rule by law, and by nature, and by
custom, and by family, and by force.
LIX. Of rhetoric he speaks of six species. For when orators exhort the
people to make war upon or to form alliances against any one, this
species of oratory is called exhortation. When they persuade the people
not to make war, or to form alliances, but to keep quiet, this kind of
rhetoric is called dissuasion. The third species of rhetoric, is when any
one says that he has been injured by some one else, and impeaches that
person as guilty of many crimes; for this species is called accusation.
The fourth kind of rhetoric is called defence, when a man shows that he
has done no wrong, and that he is not guilty of anything out of the way.
Such a kind of speech they call a defence. The fifth species of rhetoric,
is when any one speaks well of another, and shows him to be virtuous and
honourable; and this kind is called encomium. The sixth species, is when
any one shows that another person is worthless; and this kind is called
blame. So that rhetoric is divided into encomium and blame, exhortation
and dissuasion, accusation and defence.
Speaking correctly is divided under four heads. One, the saying what is
right; one, the saying as much as is right; thirdly, the saying it to the
proper people; and fourthly, the saying it at the proper time. Now as to
the saying what is right, that is the saying what will be advantageous
both to the speaker and to the hearer. The saying as much as is right, is
saying neither more nor less than what is sufficient. The saying it to
the proper people, is supposing one is speaking to one’s elders who are
mistaken in any point, the using expressions proper to be addressed to
those older than one’s self; or, on the other hand, if one is addressing
those younger, then the using language such as is suitable to young
people. The saying it at the proper time, is speaking neither too soon
nor too late; for if one does, one will err and speak improperly.
LX. Beneficence is divided under four heads. For it may be exerted
either in money, or by personal exertion, or by knowledge, or by words.
In money when any one assists those who are in want, so as to put them
at ease with respect to money. And men benefit one another by personal
exertion when they come upon those who are being beaten and assist them.
Again, those who instruct, or heal, or who teach any good thing, benefit
others by their knowledge; and when one person comes down to the court
of justice as an advocate for another, and delivers some speech full of
sense and good feeling in his behalf, that man assists his friend by
words. So that there is one beneficence which is displayed in money,
another in personal exertion, a third by means of knowledge, and the
fourth kind by words.
LXI. Again, Plato divides the end of all affairs into four species. An
affair has one end in accordance with law, when a decree is passed, and
when the law establishes it; it has an end in accordance with nature,
when it is such a thing as a day, or a year, or the seasons. It has an
end according to art, when it is architecture for instance, for a man
builds a house; or when it is ship-building, for it makes a ship. And
affairs also come to an end by chance, when they turn out differently
from what any one expected. So that an end of an affair is regulated
either by law, or by nature, or by art, or by chance.
LXII. Power again is divided into four species. There is one power which
we possess by our ability to reason and form conceptions by means of our
intellect. There is another power which we owe to the body, such as the
power of walking, or giving, or taking, and such like. There is a third
which we possess through the multitude of soldiers or riches, on which
account a king is said to have great power. And the fourth division of
power consists in the being well or ill treated, and treating others well
or ill; as, for instance, we may be sick, or we may be taught, or we may
be in vigorous health, and many more cases of that sort. So that one kind
of power dwells in the intellect, another in the body, another in an army
and riches, and another in our capacity as agents or patients.
LXIII. Of philanthropy there are three sorts. One which is displayed
in addressing people, when some persons address every one whom they
meet, and give them their right hand, and greet them heartily; another
species is when one is disposed to assist every one who is unfortunate.
The last kind is that sort of philanthropy which makes men pleasant
boon companions. So that there is one kind of philanthropy displayed in
addressing people, another in benefiting them, and a third in feasting
and making merry with them.
LXIV. Happiness is divided into five parts. For one part of it is wisdom
in counsel; another is a healthy condition of the sensations and general
health of body; a third is good fortune in one’s affairs; a fourth kind
is good reputation among men; a fifth is abundance of riches and of all
those things which are useful in life. Now wisdom in counsel arises from
good instruction, and from a person’s having experience of many things.
A healthy condition of the sensations depends on the limbs of the body;
as, for instance, when one sees with one’s eyes, and hears with one’s
ears, and smells with one’s nose, and feels with one’s body, just what
one ought to see, and hear, and smell, and feel. Such a condition as
this is a healthy condition. And good fortune is when a man does rightly
and successfully what a good and energetic man ought to do. And good
reputation is when a man is well spoken of. And abundance of riches is
when a man has such a sufficiency of everything which relates to the uses
of life, that he is able to benefit his friends, and to discharge all
public obligations in a splendid and liberal manner. And the man who has
all these different parts of happiness, is a perfectly happy man. So
that happiness is made up of wisdom in counsel, a good condition of the
sensations and health of body, good fortune, good reputation, and riches.
LXV. The arts are divided into three kinds. The first, the second, and
the third. The first are those of working mines and cutting wood, for
these are preparatory arts. The second are such as working metals and
carpentry, for they are alterative arts. For working in metals makes arms
out of iron; and carpentry makes flutes and lyres out of wood. The third
is the art which makes use of instruments; such as horsemanship, which
uses bridles; the military art, which uses arms; music, which uses flutes
and lyres. So that there are three species of art; one of which is the
first, another the second, and another the third.
LXVI. Good is divided into four kinds. One of which we mean when we speak
of a man endowed with private virtue, as good; another kind is that which
we indicate, when we call virtue and justice, good. A third kind is that
which we attribute to suitable food, and exercise, and medicine. The
fourth good, is that which we mean, when we speak of good flute playing,
good acting, and things of that sort. There are therefore four kinds of
good. One the having virtue; another, virtue itself; a third, useful food
and exercise; and fourthly, we call skill in flute playing and acting,
good.
LXVII. Of things existing, some are bad, some good, and some neither
one thing nor the other. Of these, we call those things bad, which
are invariably capable of doing injury, such as intemperance, folly,
injustice, and things of that sort. And the opposites to these qualities
are good. But those things, which may at times be beneficial, and at
times injurious, such as walking, sitting down, and eating; or which have
absolutely no power in any case to benefit or injure any one; these are
neither bad nor good. Of things existing then, there are some bad, and
some good, and some of a neutral character, neither bad nor good.
LXVIII. A good state of affairs with reference to the laws, is divided
under three heads. One when the laws are good, for that is a good state
of affairs; so too is it, when the citizens abide by the existing laws;
and the third case is, when although there are no positive laws,
still men are good citizens in deference to custom and to established
institutions; and this is also called a good state of affairs. So that
of these three heads, one depends on the laws being good, another on
obedience to existing laws, and the third on men yielding to good customs
and institutions.
So again, lawlessness is divided into three heads. One of which is,
when the laws are bad, both as concerns strangers, and the citizens;
another, when the citizens do not obey the laws that are established; and
the third is when there is actually no law at all. So that one kind of
lawlessness arises from bad laws, another from disobedience to existing
laws, and the third from the absence of laws.
LXIX. Contraries are of three sorts; for instance, we say that good
is contrary to evil, as justice to injustice, wisdom to folly, and so
on. Again, some evils are contrary to others, as extravagance is to
stinginess, and the being tortured with justice to the being tortured
with injustice. And such evils as these are the contraries of other
evils. Again, the heavy is contrary to the light, the swift to the slow,
the black to the white; so that some things which are of a neutral
character, neither good nor evil, are contrary to other things of a
neutral character. Of contraries then, there are some which are so, as
what is good is contrary to what is evil; others, as one evil is contrary
to another; and others again, as neutral things are contrary to other
things of a neutral character.
LXX. Of good things there are three kinds; for there are some which can
be possessed; others, which can be shared; others, which one realizes
in one’s self. Those which can be possessed, are those which it is
possible for a person to have, such as justice, or good health; those
can be shared, which it is not possible for a person to have entirely
to himself, but which he may participate in; as for instance, a person
cannot be the sole possessor of abstract good, but he may participate in
it. Those again a person realizes in himself, when they are such, that
he cannot possess them himself, or share them with others, and yet they
ought to exist; as for instance, it is good to be virtuous and just, but
yet a man does not possess the being virtuous, or participate in it;
but the being virtuous and just ought to exist in him. Of good things,
therefore, there are those which are possessed, those which are shared,
and those which ought to exist in a man.
LXXI. In the same manner, good counsel is divisible into three kinds.
For there is one kind which is derived from past time, another from the
future, another from the present. That which is derived from past time is
made up of instances, as for instance what the Lacedæmonians suffered by
trusting to such and such people. That which relates to the present, is
when what is wanted, is to show that the fortifications are weak, the men
cowardly, or the provisions scanty. That which concerns the future, is