The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
transposition when we fancy eyes in a man’s breast; combination, when we
take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to
death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a
comparison of words and places.
There is also nature; as by nature we comprehend what is just and
good. And privation, when for instance, we form a notion of a man
without hands. Such are the doctrines of the Stoics, on the subject of
phantasia, and sensation, and thought.
XXXVII. They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension,
φαντασία; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as
Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics; and he is followed
by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethus leaves a great many criteria,
such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus
dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason,
says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And
preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of
general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason
as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of
Posidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria.
XXXVIII. On the subject of logical speculation, there appears to be
a great unanimity among the greater part of the Stoics, in beginning
with the topic of the voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air; or,
as Diogenes, the Babylonian, defines it, in his essay on the Voice,
a sensation peculiar to the hearing. The voice of a beast is a mere
percussion of the air by some impetus: but the voice of a man is
articulate, and is emitted by intellect, as Diogenes lays it down, and is
not brought to perfection in a shorter period than fourteen years. And
the voice is a body according to the Stoics; for so it is laid down by
Archedemus, in his book on the Voice, and by Diogenes, and Antipater, and
also by Chrysippus, in the second volume of his Physics. For everything
which makes anything, is a body; and the voice makes something when it
proceeds to those who hear from those who speak.
A word (λέξις), again, is, according to Diogenes, a voice consisting of
letters, as “Day.” A sentence (λόγος) is a significant voice, sent out by
the intellect, as for instance, “It is day;” but dialect is a peculiar
style imprinted on the utterance of nations, according to their race;
and causes varieties in the Greek language, being a sort of local habit,
as for instance, the Attics say θάλαττα, and the Ionians say ἡμέρη.
The elements of words are the twenty-four letters; and the word letter
is used in a triple division of sense, meaning the element itself, the
graphical sign of the element, and the name, as Alpha. There are seven
vowels, α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω; six mutes, β, γ, δ, κ, π, τ. But voice
is different from a word, because voice is a sound; but a word is an
articulate sound. And a word differs from a sentence, because a sentence
is always significative of something, but a word by itself has no
signification, as for instance, βλίτρι. But this is not the case with a
sentence. Again, there is a difference between speaking and pronouncing;
the sounds are pronounced, but what are spoken are things which are
capable of being spoken of.
XXXIX. Now of sentences there are five parts, as Diogenes tells us in his
treatise on Voice; and he is followed by Chrysippus. There is the noun,
the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. Antipater
adds also quality, in his treatise upon Words and the things expressed
by them. And a common noun (προσηγορία) is, according to Diogenes, a
part of a sentence signifying a common quality, as for instance, man,
horse. But a noun is a part of a sentence signifying a peculiar quality,
such as Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is a part of a sentence signifying
an uncombined categorem, as Diogenes (ὁ Διογένης) or, as others define
it, an element of a sentence, devoid of case, signifying something
compound in reference to some person or persons, as, “I write,” “I say.”
A conjunction is a part of a sentence destitute of case, uniting the
divisions of the sentence. An article is an element of a sentence, having
cases, defining the genders of nouns and their numbers, as ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ,
αἱ, τὰ.
XL. The excellences of a sentence are five,—good Greek, clearness,
conciseness, suitableness, elegance. Good Greek (Ἑλληνισμὸς) is a
correct style, according to art, keeping aloof from any vulgar form of
expression; clearness is a style which states that which is conceived in
the mind in such a way that it is easily known; conciseness is a style
which embraces all that is necessary to the clear explanation of the
subject under discussion; suitableness is a style suited to the subject;
elegance is a style which avoids all peculiarity of expression. Of the
vices of a sentence, on the other hand, barbarism is a use of words
contrary to that in vogue among the well-educated Greeks; solecism is a
sentence incongruously put together.
XLI. A poetical expression is, as Posidonius defines it in his
introduction on Style, “A metrical or rhythmical diction, proceeding
in preparation, and avoiding all resemblance to prose.” For instance,
“The vast and boundless earth,” “Th’ expanse of heaven,” are rhythmical
expressions; and poetry is a collection of poetical expressions
signifying something, containing an imitation of divine and human beings.
XLII. A definition is, as Antipater explains it in the first book of his
treatise on Definitions, a sentence proceeding by analysis enunciated
in such a way as to give a complete idea; or, as Chrysippus says in his
treatise on Definitions, it is the explanation of an idea. Description is
a sentence which, in a figurative manner, brings one to a knowledge of
the subject, or it may be called a simpler kind of definition, expressing
the power of a definition in plainer language. Genus is a comprehending
of many ideas indissolubly connected, as animal; for this one expression
comprehends all particular kinds of animals. An idea is an imagination of
the mind which does not express actually anything real, or any quality,
but only a _quasi_ reality and a _quasi_ quality; such, for instance, is
the idea of a horse when a horse is not present. Species is that which is
comprehended under genus, as man is comprehended under animal.
Again, that is the most general genus which, being a genus itself, has no
other genus, as the existent. And that is the most special species, which
being a species has no other species, as, for instance, Socrates.
XLIII. The division of genus is a dissection of it into the proximate
species; as, for instance, “Of animals, some are rational, others
irrational.” Contrary division is the dissection of genus into species on
the principle of the contrary; so as to be by a sort of negation; as, for
instance, “Of existent things, some are good and some not good;” and, “Of
things which are not good, some are bad and some indifferent.” Partition
is an arrangement of a genus with reference to place, as Crinis says,
for instance, “Of goods, some have reference to the mind and some to the
body.”
XLIV. Ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) is an expression signifying two or more
things having an ordinary or a peculiar meaning, according to the
pronunciation, in such a way that more things than one may be understood
by the very same expression. Take, for instance, the words αὐλητρὶς
πέπτωκε. For you may understand by them, a house has fallen down three
times (αὐλὴ τρὶς πέπτωκε), or, a female flute-player has fallen, taking
αὐλητρὶς as synonymous with αὐλητρία.
LV. Dialectics are, as Posidonius explains them, the science of what is
true and false, and neither one or the other, and it is, as Chrysippus
explains it, conversant about words that signify and things that are
signified; these then are the doctrines asserted by the Stoics in their
speculations on the subject of the voice.
XLVI. But in that part of dialectics which concerns things and ideas
signified, they treat of propositions, of perfect enunciations, of
judgments, of syllogisms, of imperfect enunciations, of attributes and
deficiencies, and of both direct and indirect categorems or predicaments.
XLVII. And they say that enunciation is the manifestation of the ideal
perception; and these enunciations the Stoics pronounce some to be
perfect in themselves, and some to be defective; now those are defective,
which furnish an incomplete sense, as for instance, “He writes.” For
then we ask further, “Who writes?” But those are perfect in themselves,
which give a sense entirely complete, as for instance, “Socrates writes.”
Accordingly, in the defective enunciations, categorems are applied; but
in those which are perfect in themselves, axioms, and syllogisms, and
questions, and interrogations, are brought into play. Now a categorem is
something which is predicated of something else, being either a thing
which is added to one or more objects, according to the definition of
Apollodorus, or else a defective enunciation added to the nominative
case, for the purpose of forming a proposition.
Now of categorems, some are accidents …[84] as for instance, “The sailing
through a rock.” … And of categorems, some are direct, some indirect,
and some neither one nor the other. Now those are correct, which are
construed with one of the oblique cases, in such a manner as to produce
a categorem, as for instance, “He hears, he sees, he converses.” And
those are indirect, which are construed with the passive voice, as for
instance, “I am heard, I am seen.” And those which are neither one nor
the other, are those which are construed in a neutral kind of manner, as
for instance, “To think, to walk.” And those are reciprocal, which are
among the indirect ones, without being indirect themselves. Those are
effects, ἐνεργήματα, which are such words as, “He is shaved;” for then,
the man who is shaved, implies himself.
The oblique cases, are the genitive, the dative, and the accusative.
XLVIII. An axiom, is that thing which is true, or false, or perfect
in itself, being asserted, or denied positively, as far as depends
upon itself; as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions;
as for instance, “It is day,” “Dion is walking.” And it has received
the name of axiom, ἀξίωμα, because it is either maintained, ἀξιοῦται,
or repudiated. For the man who says, “It is day,” appears to maintain
the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the axiom put before one
is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. And an axiom, a
question, and an interrogation, differ from one another, and so does an
imperative proposition from one which is adjurative, or imprecatory,
or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an axiom which
we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or
false. And a question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an axiom,
but which requires an answer, as for instance, “Is it day?” Now this
is neither true nor false; but, as “It is day” is an axiom; so is, “Is
it day?” a question. But an interrogation, πύσμα, is a thing to which
it is not possible to make an answer symbolically, as in the case of a
question, ἐρώτημα, saying merely “Yes,” but we must reply, “He does live
in this place.”
The imperative proposition is a thing which we utter when we give an
order, as for instance this:—
Do you now go to the sweet stream of Inachus.[85]
…
The appellative proposition is one which is used in the case in which,
when a man says anything, he must address somebody, as for instance:—
Atrides, glorious king of men,
Most mighty Agamemnon.[86]
A false judgment is a proposition, which, while it has at the same time