The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
the first, or the second; but it is the first; therefore, it is not the
second.” The fifth kind that is not demonstrative, is that in which the
whole argument consists of a disjunctive proposition, and the opposite of
one of the terms, and then one makes the conclusion identical with the
remainder; as, for instance, “It is either day or night; but it is not
night; therefore it is day.”
According to the Stoics, truth follows upon truth, as “It is light,”
follows upon “It is day.” And falsehood follows upon falsehood; as,
“If it is false that it is night, it is also false that it is dark.”
Sometimes too, truth follows from falsehood; for instance, though it is
false that “the earth flies,” it is true that “there is the earth.” But
falsehood does never follow from truth; for, from the fact that “there is
the earth,” it does not follow “that the earth flies.”
There are also some arguments which are perplexed, being veiled and
escaping notice; or such as are called sorites, the horned one, or the
nobody. That is a veiled argument[88] which resembles the following one;
“two are not a few, nor three, nor those, nor four, and so on to ten; but
two are few; therefore, so are ten few.”
The nobody is a conjunctive argument, and one that consists of the
indefinite and the definite, and which has a minor premiss and a
conclusion; as, for instance, “If any one is here, he is not in Rhodes.”
L. Such then are the doctrines which the Stoics maintain on the subject
of logic, in order as far as possible to establish their point that the
logician is the only wise man. For they assert that all affairs are
looked at by means of that speculation which proceeds by argument,
including under this assertion both those that belong to natural and also
those which belong to moral philosophy: for, say they, how else could one
determine the exact value of nouns, or how else could one explain what
laws are imposed upon such and such actions? Moreover, as there are two
habits both incidental to virtue, the one considers what each existing
thing is, and the other inquires what it is called. These then are the
notions of the Stoics on the subject of logic.
LI. The ethical part of philosophy they divide into the topic of
inclination, the topic of good and bad, the topic of the passions, the
topic of virtue, the topic of the chief good, and of primary estimation,
and of actions; the topic of what things are becoming, and of exhortation
and dissuasion. And this division is the one laid down by Chrysippus,
and Archedemus, and Zeno, of Tarsus, and Apollodorus, and Diogenes, and
Antipater, and Posidonius. For Zeno, of Cittium, and Cleanthes, have, as
being more ancient they were likely to, adopted a more simple method of
treating these subjects. But these men divided logical and the natural
philosophy.
LII. They say that the first inclination which an animal has is to
protect itself, as nature brings herself to take an interest in it from
the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on
Ends; where he says, that the first and dearest object to every animal
is its own existence, and its consciousness of that existence. For that
it is not natural for any animal to be alienated from itself, or even
to be brought into such a state as to be indifferent to itself, being
neither alienated from nor interested in itself. It remains, therefore,
that we must assert that nature has bound the animal to itself by the
greatest unanimity and affection; for by that means it repels all that
is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable. But as
for what some people say, that the first inclination of animals is to
pleasure, they say what is false. For they say that pleasure, if there
be any such thing at all, is an accessory only, which, nature, having
sought it out by itself, as well as those things which are adapted to its
constitution, receives incidentally in the same manner as animals are
pleased, and plants made to flourish.
Moreover, say they, nature makes no difference between animals and
plants, when she regulates them so as to leave them without voluntary
motion or sense; and some things too take place in ourselves in the same
manner as in plants. But, as inclination in animals tends chiefly to the
point of making them pursue what is appropriate to them, we may say that
their inclinations are regulated by nature. And as reason is given to
rational animals according to a more perfect principle, it follows, that
to live correctly according to reason, is properly predicated of those
who live according to nature. For nature is as it were the artist who
produces the inclination.
LIII. On which account Zeno was the first writer who, in his treatise
on the Nature of Man, said, that the chief good was confessedly to live
according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature
leads us to this point. And in like manner Cleanthes speaks in his
treatise on Pleasure, and so do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays
on Ends as the Chief Good. And again, to live according to virtue is
the same thing as living according to one’s experience of those things
which happen by nature; as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of
his treatise on the Chief Good. For our individual natures are all parts
of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a
manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one’s
own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the
common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law
is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the
same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing
things.
Again, this very thing is the virtue of the happy man and the perfect
happiness of life when everything is done according to a harmony
with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the
universal governor and manager of all things. Diogenes, accordingly, says
expressly that the chief good is to act according to sound reason in our
selection of things according to our nature. And Archedemus defines it
to be living in the discharge of all becoming duties. Chrysippus again
understands that the nature, in a manner corresponding to which we ought
to live, is both the common nature, and also human nature in particular;
but Cleanthes will not admit of any other nature than the common one
alone, as that to which people ought to live in a manner corresponding;
and repudiates all mention of a particular nature. And he asserts
that virtue is a disposition of the mind always consistent and always
harmonious; that one ought to seek it out for its own sake, without being
influenced by fear or hope by any external influence. Moreover, that it
is in it that happiness consists, as producing in the soul the harmony
of a life always consistent with itself; and that if a rational animal
goes the wrong way, it is because it allows itself to be misled by the
deceitful appearances of exterior things, or perhaps by the instigation
of those who surround it; for nature herself never gives us any but good
inclinations.
LIV. Now virtue is, to speak generally, a perfection in everything, as
in the case of a statue; whether it is invisible as good health, or
speculative as prudence. For Hecaton says, in the first book of his
treatise on Virtues, that the scientific and speculative virtues are
those which have a constitution arising from speculation and study,
as, for instance, prudence and justice; and that those which are not
speculative are those which are generally viewed in their extension as a
practical result or effect of the former; such for instance, as health
and strength. Accordingly, temperance is one of the speculative virtues,
and it happens that good health usually follows it, and is marshalled
as it were beside it; in the same way as strength follows the proper
structure of an arch.—And the unspeculative virtues derive their name
from the fact of their not proceeding from any acquiescence reflected by
intelligence; but they are derived from others, are only accessories,
and are found even in worthless people, as in the case of good health,
or courage. And Posidonius, in the first book of his treaties on Ethics,
says that the great proof of the reality of virtue is that Socrates, and
Diogenes, and Antisthenes, made great improvement; and the great proof
of the reality of vice may be found in the fact of its being opposed to
virtue.
Again, Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good,
and Cleanthes, and also Posidonius in his Exhortations, and Hecaton, all
agree that virtue may be taught. And that they are right, and that it
may be taught, is plain from men becoming good after having been bad. On
this account Panætius teaches that there are two virtues, one speculative
and the other practical; but others make three kinds, the logical, the
natural, and the ethical. Posidonius divides virtue into four divisions;
and Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater make the divisions more numerous
still; for Apollophanes asserts that there is but one virtue, namely,
prudence.
Among the virtues some are primitive and some are derived. The
primitive ones are prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance.
And subordinate to these, as a kind of species contained in them, are
magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in council.
And the Stoics define prudence as a knowledge of what is good, and bad,
and indifferent; justice as a knowledge of what ought to be chosen, what
ought to be avoided, and what is indifferent; magnanimity as a knowledge
of engendering a lofty habit, superior to all such accidents as happen
to all men indifferently, whether they be good or bad; continence they
consider a disposition which never abandons right reason, or a habit
which never yields to pleasure; endurance they call a knowledge or habit
by which we understand what we ought to endure, what we ought not, and
what is indifferent; presence of mind they define as a habit which is
prompt at finding out what is suitable on a sudden emergency; and wisdom
in counsel they think a knowledge which leads us to judge what we are to
do, and how we are to do it, in order to act becomingly. And analogously,
of vices too there are some which are primary, and some which are
subordinate; as, for instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and
intemperance, are among the primary vices; incontinence, slowness, and
folly in counsel among the subordinate ones. And the vices are ignorance
of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge.
LV. Good, looked at in a general way, is some advantage, with the more
particular distinction, being partly what is actually useful, partly
what is not contrary to utility. On which account virtue itself, and the
good which partakes of virtue are spoken of in a threefold view of the
subject. First, as to what kind of good it is, and from what it ensues;
as, for instance, in an action done according to virtue. Secondly, as to
the agent, in the case of a good man who partakes of virtue.…[89]
At another time, they define the good in a peculiar manner, as being what
is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as rational being.
And, secondly, they say that it is conformity to virtue, so that all
actions which partake of virtue, and all good men, are themselves in some
sense the good. And in the third place, they speak of its accessories,
joy, and mirth, and things of that kind. In the same manner they speak of
vices, which they divide into folly, cowardice, injustice, and things of
that kind. And they consider that those things which partake of vices,
and actions done according to vice, and bad men, are themselves in some