The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
the sacrificing of one’s property, and so on. And the case of those
actions which are contrary to duty, is similar. Again, of duties, some
are always such, and some are not always. What is always a duty, is to
live in accordance with virtue; but to ask questions, to give answers, to
walk, and the like, are not always duties. And the same statement holds
good with respect to acts contrary to duty.
There is also a class of intermediate duties, such as the duty of boys
obeying their masters.
LXIII. The Stoics also say that the mind is divisible into eight parts;
for that the five organs of sensation, and the vocal power, and the
intellectual power, which is the mind itself, and the generative power,
are all parts of the mind. But by error, there is produced a perversion
which operates on the intellect, from which many perturbations arise, and
many causes of inconstancy. And all perturbation is itself, according
to Zeno, a movement of the mind, or superfluous inclination, which is
irrational, and contrary to nature. Moreover, of the superior class of
perturbations, as Hecaton says, in the second book of his treatise on
the Passions, and as Zeno also says in his work on the Passions, there
are four kinds, grief, fear, desire, and pleasure. And they consider
that these perturbations are judgments, as Chrysippus contends in his
work on the Passions; for covetousness is an opinion that money is a
beautiful object, and in like manner drunkenness and intemperance, and
other things of the sort, are judgments. And grief they define to be an
irrational contraction of the mind, and it is divided into the following
species, pity, envy, emulation, jealousy, pain, perturbation, sorrow,
anguish, confusion. Pity is a grief over some one, on the ground of his
being in undeserved distress. Envy is a grief, at the good fortune of
another. Emulation is a grief at that belonging to some one else, which
one desires one’s self. Jealousy is a grief at another also having what
one has one’s self. Pain is a grief which weighs one down. Perturbation
is grief which narrows one, and causes one to feel in a strait. Sorrow
is a grief arising from deliberate thought, which endures for some
time, and gradually increases. Anguish is a grief with acute pain.
Confusion is an irrational grief, which frets one, and prevents one from
clearly discerning present circumstances. But fear is the expectation
of evil; and the following feelings are all classed under the head of
fear: apprehension, hesitation, shame, perplexity, trepidation, and
anxiety. Apprehension is a fear which produces alarm. Shame is a fear
of discredit. Hesitation is a fear of coming activity. Perplexity is a
fear, from the imagination of some unusual thing. Trepidation is a fear
accompanied with an oppression of the voice. Anxiety is a fear of some
uncertain event.
Again, desire is an irrational appetite; to which head, the following
feelings are referrible: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love,
enmity, rage. Want is a desire arising from our not having something
or other, and is, as it were, separated from the thing, but is still
stretching, and attracted towards it in vain. And hatred is a desire that
it should be ill with some one, accompanied with a certain continual
increase and extension. Contentiousness is a certain desire accompanied
with deliberate choice. Anger is a desire of revenge, on a person who
appears to have injured one in an unbecoming way. Love is a desire not
conversant about a virtuous object, for it is an attempt to conciliate
affection, because of some beauty which is seen. Enmity is a certain
anger of long duration, and full of hatred, and it is a watchful passion,
as is shown in the following lines:—
For though we deem the short-liv’d fury past,
’Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last.[90]
But rage is anger at its commencement.
Again, pleasure is an irrational elation of the mind over something
which appears to be desirable; and its different species are enjoyment,
rejoicing at evil, delight, and extravagant joy. Enjoyment now, is a
pleasure which charms the mind through the ears. Rejoicing at evil
(ἐπιχαιρεκακία), is a pleasure which arises at the misfortunes of others.
Delight (τέρψις), that is to say turning (τρέψις), is a certain turning
of the soul (προτροπή τις ψυχῆς), to softness. Extravagant joy is the
dissolution of virtue. And as there are said to be some sicknesses
(ἀῤῥωστήματα), in the body, as, for instance, gout and arthritic
disorders; so too are those diseases of the soul, such as a fondness for
glory, or for pleasure, and other feelings of that sort. For an ἀῤῥώστημα
is a disease accompanied with weakness; and a disease is an opinion of
something which appears exceedingly desirable. And, as in the case of the
body, there are illnesses to which people are especially liable, such as
colds or diarrhœa; so also are there propensities which the mind is under
the influence of, such as enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and
so on.
There are also three good dispositions of the mind; joy, caution, and
will. And joy they say is the opposite of pleasure, since it is a
rational elation of the mind; so caution is the opposite of fear, being
a rational avoidance of anything, for the wise man will never be afraid,
but he will act with caution; and will, they define as the opposite of
desire, since it is a rational wish. As therefore some things fall under
the class of the first perturbations, in the same manner do some things
fall under the class of the first good dispositions. And accordingly,
under the head of will, are classed goodwill, placidity, salutation,
affection; and under the head of caution are ranged reverence and
modesty; under the head of joy, we speak of delight, mirth, and good
spirits.
LXIV. They say also, that the wise man is free from perturbations,
because he has no strong propensities. But that this freedom from
propensities also exists in the bad man, being, however, then quite
another thing, inasmuch as it proceeds in him only from the hardness and
unimpressibility of his nature. They also pronounce the wise man free
from vanity, since he regards with equal eye what is glorious and what is
inglorious. At the same time, they admit that there is another character
devoid of vanity, who, however, is only reckoned one of the rash men,
being in fact the bad man. They also say that all the virtuous men are
austere, because they do never speak with reference to pleasure, nor do
they listen to what is said by others with reference to pleasure. At the
same time, they call another man austere too, using the term in nearly
the same sense as they do when they speak of austere wine, which is used
in compounding medicines, but not for drinking.
They also pronounce the wise to be honest-hearted men, anxiously
attending to those matters which may make them better, by means of some
principle which conceals what is bad, and brings to light what is good.
Nor is there any hypocrisy about them; for they cut off all pretence in
their voice and appearance. They also keep aloof from business; for they
guard carefully against doing any thing contrary to their duty. They
drink wine, but they do not get drunk; and they never yield to frenzy.
Occasionally, extraordinary imaginations may obtain a momentary power
over them, owing to some melancholy or trifling, arising not according to
the principle of what is desirable, but contrary to nature. Nor, again,
will the wise man feel grief; because grief is an irrational contraction
of the soul, as Apollodorus defines it in his Ethics.
They are also, as they say, godlike; for they have something in them
which is as it were a God. But the bad man is an atheist. Now there are
two kinds of atheists; one who speaks in a spirit of hostility to, and
the other, who utterly disregards, the divine nature; but they admit
that all bad men are not atheists in this last sense. The good, on the
contrary, are pious; for they have a thorough acquaintance with the laws
respecting the Gods. And piety is a knowledge of the proper reverence
and worship due to the Gods. Moreover they sacrifice to the Gods, and
keep themselves pure; for they avoid all offences having reference to
the Gods, and the Gods admire them; for they are holy and just in all
that concerns the Deity; and the wise men are the only priests; for they
consider the matters relating to sacrifices, and the erection of temples,
and purifications, and all other things which peculiarly concern the
Gods. They also pronounce that men are bound to honour their parents,
and their brethren, in the second place after the Gods. They also say
that parental affection for one’s children is natural to them, and is a
feeling which does not exist in bad men. And they lay down the position
that all offences are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of
his Ethic Questions, and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that
is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one
thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so too,
one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the
man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one,
are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater
sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.
Heraclides of Tarsus, indeed, the friend of Antipater, of Tarsus, and
Athenodorus, both assert that offences are not equal.
Again, the Stoics, as for instance, Chrysippus, in the first book of his
work on Lives, say, that the wise man will take a part in the affairs of
the state, if nothing hinders him. For that he will restrain vice, and
excite men to virtue. Also, they say that he will marry, as Zeno says,
in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, that the wise man will
never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never agree to anything
that is false; and that he will become a Cynic; for that Cynicism is a
short path to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he
will even eat human flesh, if there should be occasion; that he is the
only free man, and that the bad are slaves; for that freedom is a power
of independent action, but slavery a deprivation of the same. That there
is besides, another slavery, which consists in subjection, and a third
which consists in possession and subjection; the contrary of which is
masterhood, which is likewise bad.
And they say, that not only are the wise free, but that they are also
kings, since kingly power is an irresponsible dominion, which can only
exist in the case of the wise man, as Chrysippus says in his treatise
on the Proper Application of his Terms made by Zeno; for he says that
a ruler ought to give decisions on good and evil, and that none of the
wicked understand these things. In the same way, they assert that they
are the only people who are fit to be magistrates or judges, or orators,
and that none of the bad are qualified for these tasks. Moreover, that
they are free from all error, in consequence of their not being prone to
any wrong actions. Also, that they are unconnected with injury, for that
they never injure any one else, nor themselves. Also, that they are not
pitiful, and that they never make allowance for any one; for that they do
not relax the punishments appointed by law, since yielding, and pity, and
mercifulness itself, never exist in any of their souls, so as to induce
an affectation of kindness in respect of punishment; nor do they ever
think any punishment too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never
wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary; as for instance,
at the stories about Charon, or the ebbing of the tide, or the springs