The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
of hot water, or the bursting forth of flames. But, say they further,
the wise man will not live in solitude; for he is by nature sociable and
practical. Accordingly, he will take exercise for the sake of hardening
and invigorating his body. And the wise man will pray, asking good things
from the Gods, as Posidonius says in the first book of his treatise on
Duties, and Hecaton says the same thing in the thirteenth book of his
treatise on Extraordinary Things.
They also say, that friendship exists in the virtuous alone, on account
of their resemblance to one another. And they describe friendship itself
as a certain communion of the things which concern life, since we use
our friends as ourselves. And they assert that a friend is desirable for
his own sake, and that a number of friends is a good; and that among the
wicked there is no such thing as friendship, and that no wicked man can
have a friend.
Again, they say that all the foolish are mad; for that they are not
prudent, and that madness is equivalent to folly in every one of its
actions; but that the wise man does everything properly, just as we say
that Ismenias can play every piece of flute-music well. Also, they say
that everything belongs to the wise man, for that the law has given them
perfect and universal power; but some things also are said to belong to
the wicked, just in the same manner as some things are said to belong
to the unjust, or as a house is said to belong to a city in a different
sense from that in which a thing belongs to the person who uses it.
LXV. And they say that virtues reciprocally follow one another, and that
he who has one has all; for that the precepts of them all are common,
as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Laws; and
Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, according to the ancient system;
and Hecaton, in the third book of his treatise on Virtues. For they
say that the man who is endued with virtue, is able to consider and
also to do what must be done. But what must be done must be chosen, and
encountered, and distributed, and awaited; so that if the man does some
things by deliberate choice, and some in a spirit of endurance, and some
distributively, and some patiently; he is prudent, and courageous, and
just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject
of its own, about which it is conversant; as, for instance, courage is
conversant about the things which must be endured: prudence is conversant
about what must be done and what must not, and what is of a neutral
or indifferent character. And in like manner, the other virtues are
conversant about their own peculiar subjects; and wisdom in counsel and
shrewdness follow prudence; and good order and decorum follow temperance;
and equality and goodness of judgment follow justice; and constancy and
energy follow courage.
Another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate
between virtue and vice; while the Peripatetics assert that there is a
stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not
yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either
straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot
be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same
rule applies to all cases. Moreover, Chrysippus is of opinion that virtue
can be lost, but Cleanthes affirms that it cannot; the one saying that it
can be lost by drunkenness or melancholy, the other maintaining that it
cannot be lost on account of the firm perceptions which it implants in
men. They also pronounce it a proper object of choice; accordingly, we
are ashamed of actions which we do improperly, while we are aware that
what is honourable is the only good. Again, they affirm that it is of
itself sufficient for happiness, as Zeno says, and he is followed in this
assertion by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, and
by Hecaton in the second book of his treatise on Goods.
“For if,” says he, “magnanimity be sufficient of itself to enable us to
act in a manner superior to all other men; and if that is a part of
virtue, then virtue is of itself sufficient for happiness, despising all
things which seem troublesome to it.” However, Panætius and Posidonius
do not admit that virtue has this sufficiency of itself, but say that
there is also need of good health, and competency, and strength. And
their opinion is that a man exercises virtue in everything, as Cleanthes
asserts, for it cannot be lost; and the virtuous man on every occasion
exercises his soul, which is in a state of perfection.
LXVI. Again, they say that justice exists by nature, and not because
of any definition or principle; just as law does, or right reason, as
Chrysippus tells us in his treatise on the Beautiful; and they think
that one ought not to abandon philosophy on account of the different
opinions prevailing among philosophers, since on this principle one would
wholly quit life, as Posidonius argues in his Exhortatory Essays. Another
doctrine of Chrysippus is, that general learning is very useful.
And the School in general maintain that there are no obligations of
justice binding on us with reference to other animals, on account of
their dissimilarity to us, as Chrysippus asserts in the first book of his
treatise on Justice, and the same opinion is maintained by Posidonius
in the first book of his treatise on Duty. They say too, that the wise
man will love those young men, who by their outward appearance, show a
natural aptitude for virtue; and this opinion is advanced by Zeno, in
his Republic, and by Chrysippus in the first book of his work on Lives,
and by Apollodorus in his Ethics. And they describe love as an endeavour
to benefit a friend on account of his visible beauty; and that it is an
attribute not of acquaintanceship, but of friendship. Accordingly, that
Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from
her, because he was hated by her. Love, therefore, according to them is a
part of friendship, as Chrysippus asserts in his essay on Love; and it is
not blameable. Moreover, beauty is the flower of virtue.
And as there are three kinds of lives; the theoretical, the practical,
and the logical; they say that the last is the one which ought to be
chosen. For that a logical, that is a rational, animal was made by nature
on purpose for speculation and action. And they say that a wise man will
very rationally take himself out of life, either for the sake of his
country or of his friends, or if he be in bitter pain, or under the
affliction of mutilation, or incurable disease. And they also teach that
women ought to be in common among the wise, so that whoever meets with
any one may enjoy her, and this doctrine is maintained by Zeno in his
Republic, and by Chrysippus in his treatise on Polity, and by Diogenes
the Cynic, and by Plato; and then, say they, we shall love all boys
equally after the manner of fathers, and all suspicion on the ground of
undue familiarity will be removed.
They affirm too, that the best of political constitutions is a mixed one,
combined of democracy, and kingly power, and aristocracy. And they say
many things of this sort, and more too, in their Ethical Dogmas, and they
maintain them by suitable explanations and arguments. But this may be
enough for us to say of their doctrines on this head by way of summary,
and taking them in an elementary manner.
LXVII. They divide natural philosophy into the topics of bodies, and
of principles, and of elements, and of Gods, and of boundaries, and of
place, and of the vacuum. And they make these divisions according to
species; but according to genera they divide them into three topics,
that of the world, that of the elements, and the third is that which
reasons on causes. The topic about the world, they say, is subdivided
into two parts. For that in one point of view, the mathematicians also
have a share in it; and according to it it is that they prosecute their
investigations into the nature of the fixed stars and the planets; as,
for instance, whether the sun is of such a size as he appears to be, and
similarly, whether the moon is; and in the same way they investigate
the question of spherical motion, and others of the same character. The
other point of view is that which is reserved exclusively for natural
philosophers, according to which it is that the existence and substance
of things are examined, [for instance, whether the sun and the stars
consist of matter and form,] and whether the sun is born or not born,
whether it is living or lifeless, corruptible or incorruptible, whether
it is regulated by Providence, and other questions of this kind.
The topic which examines into causes they say is also divisible into
two parts; and with reference to one of its considerations, the
investigations of physicians partake of it; according to which it is
that they investigate the dominant principle of the soul, and the
things which exist in the soul, and seeds, and things of this kind.
And its other division is claimed as belonging to them also by the
mathematicians, as, for instance, how we see, what is the cause of our
appearance being reflected in a mirror, how clouds are collected, how
thunder is produced, and the rainbow, and the halo, and comets, and
things of that kind.
LXVIII. They think that there are two general principles in the universe,
the active and the passive. That the passive is matter, an existence
without any distinctive quality. That the active is the reason which
exists in the passive, that is to say, God. For that he, being eternal,
and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. And Zeno, the
Cittiæan, lays down this doctrine in his treatise on Essence, and so does
Cleanthes in his essay on Atoms, Chrysippus in the first book of his
Investigations in Natural Philosophy, towards the end, Archedemus in his
work on Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his treatise on
Natural Philosophy. But they say that principles and elements differ from
one another. For that the one had no generation or beginning, and will
have no end; but that the elements may be destroyed by the operation of
fire. Also, that the elements are bodies, but principles have no bodies
and no forms, and elements too have forms.
Now a body, says Apollodorus in his Natural Philosophy, is extended in
a threefold manner; in length, in breadth, in depth; and then it is
called a solid body; and the superficies is the limit of the body having
length and breadth alone, but not depth. But Posidonius, in the third
book of his Heavenly Phænomena, will not allow a superficies either
any substantial reality, or any intelligible existence. A line is the
limit of a superficies, or length without breadth, or something which
has nothing but length. A point is the boundary of a line, and is the
smallest of all symbols.
They also teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, and Fate,
and Jupiter, and by many other names besides. And that, as he was in the
beginning by himself, he turned into water the whole substance which
pervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the produce, so too, he
being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind in moisture,
making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production of those
things which were to come after; and then, first of all, he made the
four elements, fire, water, air, and earth. And Zeno speaks of these in
his treatise on the Universe, and so does Chrysippus in the first book of
his Physics, and so does Archedemus in some treatise on the Elements.
LXIX. Now an element is that out of which at first all things which are
are produced, and into which all things are resolved at last. And the