The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
another one arrives at the conclusion, that there is nothing in all
these notions, but contradiction and confusion; as Ænesidemus says in
his Introduction to Pyrrhonism. As to the contradictions which are found
in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact
is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from
it; for they say that we regard as certain, those things which always
produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring
of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give
pleasure or excite wonder. And they prove that the reasons opposite to
those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief.
IX. The difficulties which they suggest, relating to the agreement
subsisting between what appears to the senses, and what is comprehended
by the intellect, divide themselves into ten modes of argument, according
to which the subject and object of our knowledge is incessantly changing.
And these ten modes Pyrrho lays down in the following manner.
The first relates to the difference which one remarks between the
sentiments of animals in respect of pleasure, and pain, and what is
injurious, and what is advantageous; and from this we conclude, that
the same objects do not always produce the same impressions; and that
the fact of this difference ought to be a reason with us for suspending
our judgment. For there are some animals which are produced without
any sexual connexion, as those which live in the fire, and the Arabian
Phœnix, and worms. Others again are engendered by copulation, as men
and others of that kind; and some are composed in one way, and others
in another; on which account they also differ in their senses, as for
instance, hawks are very keen-sighted; dogs have a most acute scent. It
is plain, therefore, that the things seen produce different impressions
on those animals which differ in their power of sight. So, too, young
branches are eagerly eaten by the goat, but are bitter to mankind; and
hemlock is nutritious for the quail, but deadly to man; and pigs eat
their own dung, but a horse does not.
The second mode refers to the nature and idiosyncracies of men. According
to Demophon, the steward of Alexander used to feel warm in the shade,
and to shiver in the sun. And Andron, the Argive, as Aristotle tells us,
travelled through the dry parts of Libya, without once drinking. Again,
one man is fond of medicine, another of farming, another of commerce;
and the same pursuits are good for one man, and injurious to another; on
which account, we ought to suspend our opinions.
The third mode, is that which has for its object the difference of the
organs of sense. Accordingly, an apple presents itself to the sight as
yellow, to the taste as sweet, to the smell as fragrant; and the same
form is seen, in very different lights, according to the differences of
mirrors. It follows, therefore, that what is seen is just as likely to be
something else as the reality.
The fourth refers to the dispositions of the subject, and the changes in
general to which it is liable. Such as health, sickness, sleep, waking,
joy, grief, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, abundance, hatred,
friendship, warmth, cold, easiness of breathing, oppression of the
respiratory organs, and so on. The objects, therefore, appear different
to us according to the disposition of the moment; for, even madmen are
not in a state contrary to nature. For, why are we to say that of them
more than of ourselves? For we too look at the sun as if it stood still.
Theon, of Tithora, the Stoic, used to walk about in his sleep; and a
slave of Pericles’ used, when in the same state, to walk on the top of
the house.
The fifth mode is conversant with laws, and established customs, and
belief in mythical traditions, and the conventions of art, and dogmatical
opinions. This mode embraces all that relates to vice, and to honesty; to
the true, and to the false; to the good, and to the bad; to the Gods, and
to the production, and destruction of all visible objects. Accordingly,
the same action is just in the case of some people, and unjust in that
of others. And good in the case of some, and bad in that of others. On
this principle we see that the Persians do not think it unnatural for a
man to marry his daughter; but among the Greeks it is unlawful. Again,
the Massagetæ, as Eudoxus tells us in the first book of his Travels over
the World, have their women in common; but the Greeks do not. And the
Cilicians delight in piracy, but the Greeks avoid it. So again, different
nations worship different Gods; and some believe in the providence of
God, and others do not. The Egyptians embalm their dead, and then bury
them; the Romans burn them; the Pæonians throw them into the lakes. All
these considerations show that we ought to suspend our judgment.
The sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of
objects; according to which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself;
but in combination either with air, or with light, or with moisture, or
with solidity, or heat, or cold, or motion, or evaporation or some other
power. Accordingly, purple exhibits a different hue in the sun, and in
the moon, and in a lamp. And our own complexions appear different when
seen at noonday and at sunset. And a stone which one cannot lift in the
air, is easily displaced in the water, either because it is heavy itself
and is made light by the water, or because it is light in itself and is
made heavy by the air. So that we cannot positively know the peculiar
qualities of anything, just as we cannot discover oil in ointment.
The seventh mode has reference to distances, and position, and space, and
to the objects which are in space. In this mode one establishes the fact
that objects which we believe to be large, sometimes appear small; that
those which we believe to be square, sometimes appear round; that those
which we fancy even, appear full of projections; those which we think
straight, seem bent; and those which we believe to be colourless, appear
of quite a different complexion. Accordingly, the sun, on account of its
distance from us, appears small. The mountains too, at a distance,[135]
appear airy masses and smooth, but when beheld close, they are rough.
Again, the sun has one appearance at his rise, and quite a different one
at midday. And the same body looks very different in a wood from what
it does on plain ground. So too, the appearance of an object changes
according to its position as regards us; for instance, the neck of a dove
varies as it turns. Since then, it is impossible to view these things
irrespectively of place and position, it is clear that their real nature
is not known.
The eighth mode has respect to the magnitudes or quantities of things; or
to the heat or coldness, or to the speed or slowness, or to the paleness
or variety of colour of the subject. For instance, a moderate quantity of
wine when taken invigorates, but an excessive quantity weakens. And the
same is the case with food, and other similar things.
The ninth depends upon the frequency, or rarity, or strangeness of the
thing under consideration. For instance, earthquakes excite no wonder
among those nations with whom they are of frequent occurrence; nor does
the sun, because he is seen every day.
The ninth mode is called by Phavorinus, the eighth, and by Sextus and
Ænesidemus, the tenth; and Sextus calls the tenth the eighth, which
Phavorinus reckons the tenth as the ninth in order.
The tenth mode refers to the comparison between one thing and another;
as, for instance, between what is light and what is heavy; between
what is strong and what is weak; between what is greater and what is
less; what is above and what is below. For instance, that which is on
the right, is not on the right intrinsically and by nature, but it is
looked upon as such in consequence of its relation to something else;
and if that other thing be transposed, then it will no longer be on the
right. In the same way, a man is spoken of as a father, or brother, or
relation to some one else; and day is called so in relation to the sun:
and everything has its distinctive name in relation to human thought:
therefore, those things which are known in relation to others, are
unknown of themselves.
And these are the ten modes.
X. But Agrippa adds five other modes to them. One derived from the
disagreement of opinions; another from the necessity of proceeding _ad
infinitum_ from one reasoning to another; a third from relation; a fourth
from hypothesis; and the last from the reciprocal nature of proofs.
That which refers to the disagreement of opinions, shows that all the
questions which philosophers propose to themselves, or which people in
general discuss, are full of uncertainty and contradiction.
That which is derived from the necessity of proceeding incessantly from
one reasoning to another, demonstrates that it is impossible for a man
ever, in his researches, to arrive at undeniable truth; since one truth
is only to be established by another truth; and so on, _ad infinitum_.
The mode which is derived from relation rests on the doctrine that no
object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself, but always
in its relation to something else; so that it is impossible to know its
nature correctly.
That which depends on hypothesis is directed against those arguers who
pretend that it is necessary to accept the principles of things taken
absolutely, and that one must place one’s faith in them without any
examination, which is an absurdity, for one may just as well lay down the
opposite principles.
The fifth mode, that one namely which arises from the reciprocal nature
of proofs, is capable of application whenever the proof of the truth
which we are looking for supposes, as a necessary preliminary, our belief
in that truth; for instance, if, after we have proved the porosity of
bodies by their evaporations, we return and prove the evaporations by the
porosity.
XI. These Sceptics then deny the existence of any demonstration, of
any test of truth, of any signs, or causes, or motion, or learning,
and of anything as intrinsically or naturally good or bad. For every
demonstration, say they, depends either on things which demonstrate
themselves, or on principles which are indemonstrable. If on things
which demonstrate themselves, then these things themselves require
demonstration; and so on _ad infinitum_. If on principles which are
indemonstrable, then, the very moment that either the sum total of these
principles, or even one single one of them, is incorrectly urged, the
whole demonstration falls instantly to pieces. But if any one supposes,
they add, that there are principles which require no demonstration, that
man deceives himself strangely, not seeing that it is necessary for him
in the first place to establish this point, that they contain their proof
in themselves. For a man cannot prove that there are four elements,
because there are four elements.
Besides, if particular proofs are denied in a complex demonstration, it
must follow that the whole demonstration is also incorrect. Again, if we
are to know that an argument is really a demonstrative proof, we must
have a test of truth; and in order to establish a test, we require a
demonstrative proof; and these two things must be devoid of every kind of
certainty, since they bear reciprocally the one on the other.
How then is any one to arrive at certainty about obscure matters, if one
is ignorant even how one ought to attempt to prove them? For what one is
desirous to understand is not what the appearance of things is, but what
their nature and essence is.