The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
general, add also the perceptive impressions of the intellect. And he
says the same thing in his Abridgment, which he addresses to Herodotus,
and also in his Fundamental Principles. For, says he, the senses are
devoid of reason, nor are they capable of receiving any impressions of
memory. For they are not by themselves the cause of any motion, and when
they have received any impression from any external cause, then they can
add nothing to it, nor can they subtract anything from it. Moreover, they
are out of the reach of any control; for one sensation cannot judge of
another which resembles itself; for they have all an equal value. Nor can
one judge of another which is different from itself; since their objects
are not identical. In a word, one sensation cannot control another, since
the effects of all of them influence us equally. Again, the reason cannot
pronounce on the senses; for we have already said that all reasoning has
the senses for its foundation. Reality and the evidence of sensation
establish the certainty of the senses; for the impressions of sight and
hearing are just as real, just as evident, as pain.
It follows from these considerations that we ought to judge of things
which are obscure by their analogy to those which we perceive directly.
In fact, every notion proceeds from the senses, either directly, or in
consequence of some analogy, or proportion, or combination. Reasoning
having always a share in these last operations. The visions of insanity
and of sleep have a real object, for they act upon us; and that which has
no reality can produce no action.
XXI. By preconception, the Epicureans mean a sort of comprehension as
it were, or right opinion, or notion, or general idea which exists in
us; or, in other words, the recollection of an external object often
perceived anteriorly. Such for instance, is this idea: “Man is a being
of such and such a nature.” At the same moment that we utter the word
man, we conceive the figure of a man, in virtue of a preconception which
we owe to the preceding operations of the senses. Therefore, the first
notion which each word awakens in us is a correct one; in fact, we could
not seek for anything if we had not previously some notion of it. To
enable us to affirm that what we see at a distance is a horse or an ox,
we must have some preconception in our minds which makes us acquainted
with the form of a horse and an ox. We could not give names to things, if
we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were.
XXII. These preconceptions then furnish us with certainty. And with
respect to judgments, their certainty depends on our referring them to
some previous notion, of itself certain, in virtue of which we affirm
such and such a judgment; for instance, “How do we know whether this
thing is a man?”
The Epicureans call opinion (δόξα) also supposition (ὑπόληψις). And
say that it is at times true, and at times false; for that, if it is
supported by testimony, and not contradicted by testimony, then it is
true; but if it is not supported by testimony, and is contradicted by
testimony, then it is false. On which account they have introduced the
expression of “waiting,” as if, before pronouncing that a thing seen is a
tower, we must wait till we come near, and learn what it looks like when
we are near it.
XXIII. They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, which
affect everything alive. And that the one is natural, and the other
foreign to our nature; with reference to which all objects of choice
and avoidance are judged of. They say also, that there are two kinds of
investigation; the one about facts, the other about mere words. And this
is as far as an elementary sketch can go—their doctrine about division,
and about the criterion.
XXIV. Let us now go to the letter:—
EPICURUS TO HERODOTUS, WISHING HE MAY DO WELL.
“For those, O Herodotus, who are not able accurately to comprehend
all the things which I have written about nature, nor to investigate
those larger books which I have composed on the subject, I have made an
abridgment of the whole discussion on this question, as far as I thought
sufficient to enable them to recollect accurately the most fundamental
points; that so, on all grave occasions, they might be able to assist
themselves on the most important and undeniable principles; in proportion
as they devoted themselves to speculations on natural philosophy. And
here it is necessary for those who have made sufficient progress in
their view of the general question, to recollect the principles laid
down as elements of the whole discussion; for we have still greater
need of a correct notion of the whole, than we have even of an accurate
understanding of the details. We must, therefore, give preference to the
former knowledge, and lay up in our memory those principles on which we
may rest, in order to arrive at an exact perception of things, and at a
certain knowledge of particular objects.
“Now one has arrived at that point when one has thoroughly embraced the
conceptions, and, if I may so express myself, the most essential forms,
and when one has impressed them adequately on one’s senses. For this
clear and precise knowledge of the whole, taken together, necessarily
facilitates one’s particular perceptions, when one has brought one’s
ideas back to the elements and simple terms. In short, a veritable
synthesis, comprising the entire circle of the phænomena of the universe,
ought to be able to resume in itself, and in a few words, all the
particular facts which have been previously studied. This method being
useful even to those who are already familiarised with the laws of the
universe, I recommend them, while still pursuing without intermission
the study of nature, which contributes more than anything else to the
tranquillity and happiness of life, to make a concise statement or
summary of their opinions.
“First of all, then, Herodotus, one must determine with exactness the
notion comprehended under each separate word, in order to be able to
refer to it, as to a certain criterion, the conceptions which emanate
from ourselves, the ulterior researches and the difficulties; otherwise
the judgment has no foundation. One goes on from demonstration to
demonstration _ad infinitum_; or else one gains nothing beyond mere
words. In fact, it is absolutely necessary that in every word we should
perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the
fundamental notion which it expresses, if we wish to have any foundation
to which we may refer our researches, our difficulties, and our personal
judgments, whatever in other respects may be the criterion which we
adopt, whether we take as our standard the impressions produced on our
senses, or the actual impression in general; or whether we cling to the
idea by itself, or to any other criterion.
“We must also note carefully the impressions which we receive in the
presence of objects, in order to bring ourselves back to that point in
the circumstances in which it is necessary to suspend the judgment, or
even when the question is about things, the evidence of which is not
immediately perceived.
“When these foundations are once laid we may pass to the study of those
things, the evidence of which is not immediate. And, first of all, we
must admit that nothing can come of that which does not exist; for, were
the fact otherwise, then every thing would be produced from everything,
and there would be no need of any seed. And if that which disappeared
were so absolutely destroyed as to become non-existent, then every thing
would soon perish, as the things with which they would be dissolved would
have no existence. But, in truth, the universal whole always was such as
it now is, and always will be such. For there is nothing into which it
can change; for there is nothing beyond this universal whole which can
penetrate into it, and produce any change in it.”
(And Epicurus establishes the same principles at the beginning of the
great Abridgment; and in the first book of his treatise on Nature.)[140]
“Now the universal whole is a body; for our senses bear us witness in
every case that bodies have a real existence; and the evidence of the
senses, as I have said before, ought to be the rule of our reasonings
about everything which is not directly perceived. Otherwise, if that
which we call the vacuum, or space, or intangible nature, had not a real
existence, there would be nothing on which the bodies could be contained,
or across which they could move, as we see that they really do move. Let
us add to this reflection that one cannot conceive, either in virtue of
perception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality
peculiar to all beings which is not either an attribute, or an accident
of the body, or of the vacuum.”
(The same principles are laid down in the first, and fourteenth,
and fifteenth book of the treatise on Nature; and also in the Great
Abridgment.)
“Now, of bodies, some are combinations, and some the elements out of
which these combinations are formed. These last are indivisible, and
protected from every kind of transformation; otherwise everything would
be resolved into non-existence. They exist by their own force, in the
midst of the dissolution of the combined bodies, being absolutely
full, and as such offering no handle for destruction to take hold of.
It follows, therefore, as a matter of absolute necessity, that the
principles of things must be corporeal, indivisible elements.
“The universe is infinite. For that which is finite has an extreme, and
that which has an extreme is looked at in relation to something else.
Consequently, that which has not an extreme, has no boundary; and if it
has no boundary, it must be infinite, and not terminated by any limit.
The universe then is infinite, both with reference to the quantity of
bodies of which it is made up, and to the magnitude of the vacuum; for
if the vacuum were infinite, the bodies being finite, then, the bodies
would not be able to rest in any place; they would be transported about,
scattered across the infinite vacuum for want of any power to steady
themselves, or to keep one another in their places by mutual repulsion.
If, on the other hand, the vacuum were finite, the bodies being infinite,
then the bodies clearly could never be contained in the vacuum.
“Again: the atoms which form the bodies, these full elements from which
the combined bodies come, and into which they resolve themselves, assume
an incalculable variety of forms, for the numerous differences which
the bodies present cannot possibly result from an aggregate of the same
forms. Each variety of forms contains an infinity of atoms, but there is
not for that reason an infinity of atoms; it is only the number of them
which is beyond all calculation.”
(Epicurus adds, a little lower down, that divisibility, _ad infinitum_,
is impossible; for, says he, the only things which change are the
qualities; unless, indeed, one wishes to proceed from division to
division, till one arrives absolutely at infinite littleness.)
“The atoms are in a continual state of motion.”
(He says, farther on, that they move with an equal rapidity from all
eternity, since the vacuum offers no more resistance to the lightest than
it does to the heaviest.)
“Among the atoms, some are separated by great distances, others come very
near to one another in the formation of combined bodies, or at times are
enveloped by others which are combining; but in this latter case they,
nevertheless, preserve their own peculiar motion, thanks to the nature
of the vacuum, which separates the one from the other, and yet offers
them no resistance. The solidity which they possess causes them, while