The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
“One must also admit, that the most minute particle perceptible to the
sense, is neither absolutely like the objects which are susceptible
of transformation, nor absolutely different from them. It has some
characteristics in common with the object which admit of transformation,
but it also differs from them, inasmuch as it does not allow any distinct
parts to be discerned in it. When then, in virtue of these common
characteristics, and of this resemblance, we wish to form an idea of the
smallest particle perceptible by the senses, in taking the objects which
change for our terms of comparison, it is necessary that we should seize
on some characteristic common to these different objects. In this way, we
examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves,
nor as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in
other words, we consider the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract
manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the
smaller a smaller extent. This analogy applies to the atom, as far as we
consider it as having the smallest dimensions possible. Evidently by its
minuteness, it differs from all sensible objects, still this analogy is
applicable to it; in a word, we establish by this comparison, that the
atom really has some extent, but we exclude all considerable dimensions,
for the sake of only investing it with the smallest proportions.[141]
“We must also admit, in taking for our guide, the reasoning which
discourses to us things which are invisible to the senses, that the most
minute magnitudes, those which are not compound magnitudes, and which
from the limit of sensible extent, are the first measure of the other
magnitudes which are only called greater or less in their relation to the
others. For these relations which they maintain with these particles,
which are not subject to transformation, suffice to give them this
characteristic of first measure. But they cannot, like atoms, combine
themselves, and form compound bodies in virtue of any motion belonging to
themselves.
“Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such
or such a point is the highest point of it, or the lowest. For height
and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, in reality,
that if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our
head, this point, whatever it may be, will never appear to us to have the
character in question: otherwise, that which would be situated above the
point so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same
moment, and by virtue of its relation to the same point, both high and
low; and this is impossible to imagine.
“It follows that thought can only conceive that one single movement of
transference, from low to high, _ad infinitum_; and one single movement
from high to low. From low to high, when even the object in motion, going
from us to the places situated above our heads, meets ten thousand times
with the feet of those who are above us; and from high to low, when in
the same way it advances towards the heads of those who are below us.
For these two movements, looked at by themselves and in their whole,
are conceived as really opposed the one to the other, in their progress
towards the infinite.
“Moreover, all the atoms are necessarily animated by the same rapidity,
when they move across the vacuum, or when no obstacle thwarts them. For
why should heavy atoms have a more rapid movement than those which are
small and light, since in no quarter do they encounter any obstacle? Why,
on the other hand, should the small atoms have a rapidity superior to
that of the large ones, since both the one and the other find everywhere
an easy passage, from the very moment that no obstacle intervenes to
thwart their movements? Movement from low to high, horizontal movement to
and fro, in virtue of the reciprocal percussion of the atoms, movement
downwards, in virtue of their weight, will be all equal, for in whatever
sense the atom moves, it must have a movement as rapid as the thought,
till the moment when it is repelled, in virtue of some external cause, or
of its own proper weight, by the shock of some object which resists it.
“Again, even in the compound bodies, one atom does not move more rapidly
than another. In fact, if one only looks at the continued movement of an
atom which takes place in an indivisible moment of time, the briefest
possible, they all have a movement equally rapid. At the same time, an
atom has not, in any moment perceptible to the intelligence, a continued
movement in the same direction; but rather a series of oscillating
movements from which there results, in the last analysis, a continued
movement perceptible to the senses. If then, one were to suppose, in
virtue of a reasoning on things invisible, that, in the intervals of time
accessible to thought, the atoms have a continued movement one would
deceive one’s self, for that which is conceived by the thought is true as
well as that which is directly perceived.
“Let us now return to the study of the affections, and of the sensations;
for this will be the best method of proving that the soul is a bodily
substance composed of slight particles, diffused over all the members
of the body, and presenting a great analogy to a sort of spirit, having
an admixture of heat, resembling at one time one, and at another time
the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part,
endowed with an extreme mobility, in consequence of the exceeding
slightness of the elements which compose it, and also in reference to
its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body. That it is which
the faculties of the soul sufficiently prove, and the passions, and the
mobility of its nature, and the thoughts, and, in a word, everything, the
privation of which is death. We must admit that it is in the soul most
especially that the principle of sensation resides. At the same time, it
would not possess this power if it were not enveloped by the rest of the
body which communicates it to it, and in its turn receives it from it,
but only in a certain measure; for there are certain affections of the
soul of which it is not capable.
“It is on that account that, when the soul departs, the body is no longer
possessed of sensation; for it has not this power, (that of sensation
namely) in itself; but, on the other hand, this power can only manifest
itself in the soul through the medium of the body. The soul, reflecting
the manifestations which are accomplished in the substance which environs
it, realises in itself, in a virtue or power which belongs to it, the
sensible affections, and immediately communicates them to the body in
virtue of the reciprocal bonds of sympathy which unite it to the body;
that is the reason why the destruction of a part of the body does not
draw after it a cessation of all feeling in the soul while it resides in
the body, provided that the senses still preserve some energy; although,
nevertheless, the dissolution of the corporeal covering, or even of any
one of its portions, may sometimes bring on with it the destruction of
the soul.
“The rest of the body, on the other hand, even when it remains, either
as a whole, or in any part, loses all feeling by the dispersion of
that aggregate of atoms, whatever it may be, that forms the soul. When
the entire combination of the body is dissolved, then the soul too is
dissolved, and ceases to retain those faculties which were previously
inherent in it, and especially the power of motion; so that sensation
perishes equally as far as the soul is concerned; for it is impossible to
imagine that it still feels, from the moment when it is no longer in the
same conditions of existence, and no longer possesses the same movements
of existence in reference to the same organic system; from the moment, in
short, when the things which cover and surround it are no longer such,
that it retains in them the same movements as before.
(Epicurus expresses the same ideas in other works, and adds that the
soul is composed of atoms of the most perfect lightness and roundness;
atoms wholly different from those of fire. He distinguishes in it the
irrational part which is diffused over the whole body, from the rational
part which has its seat in the chest, as is proved by the emotions of
fear and joy. He adds that sleep is produced when the parts of the soul
diffused over the whole of the body concentre themselves, or when they
disperse and escape by the pores of the body; for particles emanate from
all bodies.)
“It must also be observed, that I use the word incorporeal (ἀσώματος) in
the usual acceptation of the word, to express that which is in itself
conceived as such. Now, nothing can be conceived in itself as incorporeal
except the vacuum; but the vacuum cannot be either passive or active; it
is only the condition and the place of movement. Accordingly, they who
pretend that the soul is incorporeal, utter words destitute of sense;
for, if it had this character, it would not be able either to do or to
suffer anything; but, as it is, we see plainly enough that it is liable
to both these circumstances.
“Let us then apply all these reasonings to the affections and sensations,
recollecting the ideas which we laid down at the beginning, and then we
shall see clearly that these general principles contain an exact solution
of all the particular cases.
“As to forms, and hues, and magnitudes, and weight, and the other
qualities which one looks upon as attributes, whether it be of every
body, or of those bodies only which are visible and perceived by
the senses, this is the point of view under which they ought to be
considered: they are not particular substances, having a peculiar
existence of their own, for that cannot be conceived; nor can one say
any more that they have no reality at all. They are not incorporeal
substances inherent in the body, nor are they parts of the body. But
they constitute by their union the eternal substance and the essence
of the entire body. We must not fancy, however, that the body is
composed of them, as an aggregate is formed of particles of the smallest
dimensions of atoms or magnitudes, whatever they may be, smaller than
the compound body itself; they only constitute by their union, I repeat,
the eternal substance of the body. Each of these attributes has ideas
and particular perceptions which correspond to it; but they cannot be
perceived independently of the whole subject taken entirely; the union of
all these perceptions forms the idea of the body. Bodies often possess
other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which,
nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the incorporeal and invisible
things. Accordingly, it is sufficient to express the general idea of the
movement of transference to enable us to conceive in a moment certain
distinct qualities, and those combined beings, which, being taken in
their totality, receive the name of bodies; and the necessary and eternal
attributes without which the body cannot be conceived.
“There are certain conceptions corresponding to these attributes; but,
nevertheless, they cannot be known abstractedly, and independently
of some subjects; and further, inasmuch as they are not attributes
necessarily inherent in the idea of a body, one can only conceive them in
the moment in which they are visible; they are realities nevertheless;
and one must not refuse them being an existence merely because they
have neither the characteristic of the compound beings to which we give
the name of bodies, nor that of the eternal attributes. We should be
equally deceived if we were to suppose that they have a separate and
independent existence; for that is true neither of them nor of the