The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
centre produce the changes which we observe. Besides, to assign one
single cause to all these phænomena, when the experience of our senses
suggests us several, is folly. It is the conduct of ignorant astronomers
covetous of a vain knowledge, who, assigning imaginary causes to facts,
wish to leave wholly to the Deity the care of the government of the
universe.
“Some stars appear to be left behind by others in their progress; this
arises either from the fact of their having a slower motion, though
traversing the same circle; or, because, though they are drawn on by the
same propelling power, they have, nevertheless, a movement proper to
themselves in a contrary direction; or it may be caused by the fact that,
though all are placed in the same sphere of movement, still some have
more space to traverse, and others less. To give one uniform and positive
explanation of all these facts, is not consistent with the conduct of any
people but those who love to flash prodigies in the eyes of the multitude.
“Falling stars may be particles detached from the stars, or fragments
resulting from their collision; they may also be produced by the fall
of substances which are set on fire by the action of the wind; by the
re-union of inflammable atoms which are made to come together so as to
produce this effect by a sort of reciprocal attraction; or else by the
movement which is produced in consequence of the re-union of atoms in the
very place where they meet. It may also happen that the light vapours
re-unite and become condensed under the form of clouds, that they then
take fire in consequence of their rotatory motion, and that, bursting
the obstacles which surround them, they proceed towards the places
whither the force by which they are animated drags them. In short, this
phænomenon also may admit of a great number of explanations.
“The presages which are drawn from certain animals arise from a
fortuitous concourse of circumstances; for there is no necessary
connection between certain animals and winter. They do not produce it;
nor is there any divine nature sitting aloft watching the exits of these
animals, and then accomplishing signs of this kind. Nor can such folly as
this occur to any being who is even moderately comfortable, much less to
one which is possessed of perfect happiness.
“Imprint all these precepts in your memory, O Pythocles, and so you will
easily escape fables, and it will be easy for you to discover other
truths analogous to these. Above all, apply yourself to the study of
general principles, of the infinite, and of questions of this kind, and
to the investigation of the different criteria and of the passions, and
to the study of the chief good, with a view to which we prosecute all
our researches. When these questions are once resolved, all particular
difficulties will be made plain to you. As to those who will not apply
themselves to these principles, they will neither be able to give a good
explanation of these same questions, nor to reach that end to which all
our researches tend.”
XXVI. Such are his sentiments on the heavenly phænomena. But concerning
the rules of life, and how we ought to choose some things, and avoid
others, he writes thus. But first of all, let us go through the opinions
which he held, and his disciples held about the wise man.
He said that injuries existed among men, either in consequence of hatred,
or of envy, or of contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason.
Also, that a man who has once been wise can never receive the contrary
disposition, nor can he of his own accord invent such a state of things
as that he should be subjected to the dominion of the passions; nor can
he hinder himself in his progress towards wisdom. That the wise man,
however, cannot exist in every state of body, nor in every nation. That
even if the wise man were to be put to the torture, he would still be
happy. That the wise man will only feel gratitude to his friends, but
to them equally whether they are present or absent. Nor will he groan
and howl when he is put to the torture. Nor will he marry a wife whom
the laws forbid, as Diogenes says, in his epitome of the Ethical Maxims
of Epicurus. He will punish his servants, but also pity them, and show
indulgence to any that are virtuous. They do not think that the wise
man will ever be in love, nor that he will be anxious about his burial,
nor that love is a passion inspired by the Gods, as Diogenes says in
his twelfth book. They also assert that he will be indifferent to the
study of oratory. Marriage, say they, is never any good to a man, and we
must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never
marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays it down, in his Doubts
and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances of
life, he will forsake these rules and marry. Nor will he ever indulge in
drunkenness, says Epicurus, in his Banquet, nor will he entangle himself
in affairs of state (as he says in his first book on Lives). Nor will he
become a tyrant. Nor will he become a Cynic (as he says in his second
book about Lives). Nor a beggar. And even, though he should lose his
eyes, he will still partake of life (as he says in the same book).
The wise man will be subject to grief, as Diogenes says, in the fifth
book of his Select Opinions; he will also not object to go to law. He
will leave books and memorials of himself behind him, but he will not be
fond of frequenting assemblies. He will take care of his property, and
provide for the future. He will like being in the country, he will resist
fortune, and will grieve none of his friends. He will show a regard for a
fair reputation to such an extent as to avoid being despised; and he will
find more pleasure than other men in speculations.
All faults are not equal. Health is good for some people, but a matter
of indifference to others. Courage is a quality which does not exist by
nature, but which is engendered by a consideration of what is suitable.
Friendship is caused by one’s wants; but it must be begun on our side.
For we sow the earth; and friendship arises from a community of, and
participation in, pleasures. Happiness must be understood in two senses;
the highest happiness, such as is that of God, which admits of no
increase; and another kind, which admits of the addition or abstraction
of pleasures. The wise man may raise statues if it suits his inclination,
if it does not it does not signify. The wise man is the only person who
can converse correctly about music and poetry; and he can realise poems,
but not become a poet.
It is possible for one wise man to be wiser than another. The wise man
will also, if he is in need, earn money, but only by his wisdom; he will
propitiate an absolute ruler when occasion requires, and will humour him
for the sake of correcting his habits; he will have a school, but not
on such a system as to draw a crowd about him; he will also recite in a
multitude, but that will be against his inclination; he will pronounce
dogmas, and will express no doubts; he will be the same man asleep and
awake; and he will be willing even to die for a friend.
These are the Epicurean doctrines.
XXVII. We must now proceed to his letter:—
EPICURUS TO MENŒCEUS, GREETING
“Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is
old let him not become weary of the study; for no man can ever find the
time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who
asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour
is passed, is like a man who should say that the time is not yet come
to be happy, or that it is too late. So that both young and old should
study philosophy, the one in order that, when he is old, he may be young
in good things through the pleasing recollection of the past, and the
other in order that he may be at the same time both young and old, in
consequence of his absence of fear for the future.
“It is right then for a man to consider the things which produce
happiness, since, if happiness is present, we have everything, and when
it is absent, we do everything with a view to possess it. Now, what I
have constantly recommended to you, these things I would have you do and
practise, considering them to be the elements of living well. First of
all, believe that God is a being incorruptible and happy, as the common
opinion of the world about God dictates; and attach to your idea of him
nothing which is inconsistent with incorruptibility or with happiness;
and think that he is invested with everything which is able to preserve
to him this happiness, in conjunction with incorruptibility. For there
are Gods; for our knowledge of them is indistinct. But they are not of
the character which people in general attribute to them; for they do not
pay a respect to them which accords with the ideas that they entertain
of them. And that man is not impious who discards the Gods believed in
by the many, but he who applies to the Gods the opinions entertained
of them by the many. For the assertions of the many about the Gods are
not anticipations (προλήψεις), but false opinions (ὑπολήψεις). And in
consequence of these, the greatest evils which befall wicked men, and
the benefits which are conferred on the good, are all attributed to the
Gods; for they connect all their ideas of them with a comparison of human
virtues, and everything which is different from human qualities, they
regard as incompatible with the divine nature.
“Accustom yourself also to think death a matter with which we are not
at all concerned, since all good and all evil is in sensation, and
since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the
correct knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes
the mortality of life pleasant to us, inasmuch as it sets forth no
illimitable time, but relieves us for the longing for immortality. For
there is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that
there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live; so that he was a silly man
who said that he feared death, not because it would grieve him when it
was present, but because it did grieve him while it was future. For it is
very absurd that that which does not distress a man when it is present,
should afflict him when only expected. Therefore, the most formidable of
all evils, death, is nothing to us, since, when we exist, death is not
present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence. It
is no concern then either of the living or of the dead; since to the one
it has no existence, and the other class has no existence itself. But
people in general, at times flee from death as the greatest of evils,
and at times wish for it as a rest from the evils in life. Nor is the
not living a thing feared, since living is not connected with it: nor
does the wise man think not living an evil; but, just as he chooses food,
not preferring that which is most abundant, but that which is nicest; so
too, he enjoys time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest
length, but as to whether it is most agreeable. And he who enjoins a
young man to live well, and an old man to die well, is a simpleton,
not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life, but also
because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. And
he was still more wrong who said:—
“’Tis well to taste of life, and then when born
To pass with quickness to the shades below.[142]
“For if this really was his opinion why did he not quit life? for it was
easily in his power to do so, if it really was his belief. But if he was
joking, then he was talking foolishly in a case where it ought not to be
allowed; and, we must recollect, that the future is not our own, nor, on