The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
the other hand, is it wholly not our own, I mean so that we can never
altogether await it with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor
altogether despair of it as what will never be. And we must consider that
some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones
some are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones
some are necessary to happiness, and others, with regard to the exemption
of the body, from trouble; and others with respect to living itself; for
a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and
avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom from disquietude of
the soul. Since this is the end of living happily; for it is for the sake
of this that we do everything, wishing to avoid grief and fear; and when
once this is the case, with respect to us, then the storm of the soul is,
as I may say, put an end to; since the animal is unable to go as if to
something deficient, and to seek something different from that by which
the good of the soul and body will be perfected.
“For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is
not present; but when we do not grieve, then we have no need of pleasure;
and on this account, we affirm, that pleasure is the beginning and end
of living happily; for we have recognized this as the first good, being
connate with us; and with reference to it, it is that we begin every
choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by
passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate
with us, on this account we do not choose every pleasure, but at times
we pass over many pleasures when any difficulty is likely to ensue from
them; and we think many pains better than pleasures, when a greater
pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain for a time.
“Every pleasure is therefore a good on account of its own nature, but
it does not follow that every pleasure is worthy of being chosen; just
as every pain is an evil, and yet every pain must not be avoided. But
it is right to estimate all these things by the measurement and view of
what is suitable and unsuitable; for at times we may feel the good as an
evil, and at times, on the contrary, we may feel the evil as good. And,
we think, contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have
but a little, but in order that, if we have not much, we may make use
of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most
completely who are the best able to do without it; and that everything
which is natural is easily provided, and what is useless is not easily
procured. And simple flavours give as much pleasure as costly fare, when
everything that can give pain, and every feeling of want, is removed;
and corn and water give the most extreme pleasure when any one in need
eats them. To accustom one’s self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive
habits is a great ingredient in the perfecting of health, and makes a
man free from hesitation with respect to the necessary uses of life.
And when we, on certain occasions, fall in with more sumptuous fare, it
makes us in a better disposition towards it, and renders us fearless
with respect to fortune. When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a
chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man,
or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant,
and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely;
but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from
confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment
of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things, as a costly
table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which
examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts
to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion
arises which troubles the soul.
“Now, the beginning and the greatest good of all these things is
prudence, on which account prudence is something more valuable than
even philosophy, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it,
teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless one also
lives prudently, and honourably, and justly; and that one cannot live
prudently, and honestly, and justly, without living pleasantly; for
the virtues are connate with living agreeably, and living agreeably
is inseparable from the virtues. Since, who can you think better than
that man who has holy opinions respecting the Gods, and who is utterly
fearless with respect to death, and who has properly contemplated the end
of nature, and who comprehends that the chief good is easily perfected
and easily provided; and the greatest evil lasts but a short period, and
causes but brief pain. And who has no belief in necessity, which is set
up by some as the mistress of all things, but he refers some things to
fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is an irresponsible power,
and because he sees that fortune is unstable, while our own will is
free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which
makes us encounter blame and praise. Since it would be better to follow
the fables about the Gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural
philosopher; for the fables which are told give us a sketch, as if we
could avert the wrath of God by paying him honour; but the other presents
us with necessity who is inexorable.
“And he, not thinking fortune a goddess, as the generality esteem her
(for nothing is done at random by a God), nor a cause which no man can
rely on, for he thinks that good or evil is not given by her to men so
as to make them live happily, but that the principles of great goods or
great evils are supplied by her; thinking it better to be unfortunate in
accordance with reason, than to be fortunate irrationally; for that those
actions which are judged to be the best, are rightly done in consequence
of reason.
“Do you then study these precepts, and those which are akin to them, by
all means day and night, pondering on them by yourself, and discussing
them with any one like yourself, and then you will never be disturbed by
either sleeping or waking fancies, but you will live like a God among
men; for a man living amid immortal Gods, is in no respect like a mortal
being.”
In other works, he discards divination; and also in his Little Epitome.
And he says divination has no existence; but, if it has any, still we
should think that what happens according to it is nothing to us.
These are his sentiments about the things which concern the life of man,
and he has discussed them at greater length elsewhere.
XXVIII. Now, he differs with the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do
not admit that to be pleasure which exists as a condition, but place it
wholly in motion. He, however, admits both kinds to be pleasure, namely,
that of the soul, and that of the body, as he says in his treatise on
Choice and Avoidance; and also in his work on the Chief Good; and in
the first book of his treatise on Lives, and in his Letter against
the Mitylenian Philosophers. And in the same spirit, Diogenes, in the
seventeenth book of his Select Discourses, and Metrodorus, in his
Timocrates, speak thus. “But when pleasure is understood, I mean both
that which exists in motion, and that which is a state.…” And Epicurus,
in his treatise on Choice, speaks thus: “Now, freedom from disquietude,
and freedom from pain, are states of pleasure; but joy and cheerfulness
are beheld in motion and energy.”
XXIX. For they make out the pains of the body to be worse than those of
the mind; accordingly, those who do wrong, are punished in the body.
But he considers the pains of the soul the worst; for that the flesh is
only sensible to present affliction, but the soul feels the past, the
present, and the future. Therefore, in the same manner, he contends that
the pleasures of the soul are greater than those of the body; and he uses
as a proof that pleasure is the chief good, the fact that all animals
from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure, and are
offended with pain by their natural instinct, and without the employment
of reason. Therefore, too, we, of our own inclination, flee from pain; so
that Hercules, when devoured by his poisoned tunic, cries out:—
Shouting and groaning, and the rocks around
Re-echoed his sad wails, the mountain heights
Of Locrian lands, and sad Eubœa’s hills.[143]
XXX. And we choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on
their own account; just as we seek the skill of the physician for the
sake of health, as Diogenes says, in the twentieth book of his Select
Discourses, where he also calls virtue a way of passing one’s life
(διαγωγή). But Epicurus says, that virtue alone is inseparable from
pleasure, but that every thing else may be separated from it as mortal.
XXXI. Let us, however, now add the finishing stroke, as one may say, to
this whole treatise, and to the life of the philosopher; giving some of
his fundamental maxims, and closing the whole work with them, taking that
for our end which is the beginning of happiness.
1. “That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor
does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to the feelings
of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is
weak.
(In other passages he says that the Gods are speculated on by reason,
some existing according to number, and others according to some
similarity of form, arising from the continual flowing on of similar
images, perfected for this very purpose in human form.)
2. “Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of
sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.
3. “The limit of the greatness of the pleasures is the removal of
everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it
lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them,
are absent.
4. “Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity
it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds
the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases
have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.
5. “It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently,
and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and
justly, without living pleasantly. But he to whom it does not happen to
live prudently, honourably, and justly, cannot possibly live pleasantly.
6. “For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men,
and not with reference to the nature of government and kingly power being
a good, some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, in order that
others might attain this feeling by their means; thinking that so they
would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that, if the life of
such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is
not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which
they originally desired power according to the order of nature.[144]
7. “No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the efficient causes of some
pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure.
8. “If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each
lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it,
then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.
9. “If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end
to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly
bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the
limit of our desires, we should have no pretence for blaming those who