The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or
grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter.
10. “If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb
us, and if the terrors of death have no concern with us, and if we had
the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we
should have no need of physiological studies.
11. “It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those
things which are called most essential, unless he knew what is the nature
of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it
could be true; and therefore, it is, that a person cannot enjoy unmixed
pleasure without physiological knowledge.
12. “It would be no good for a man to secure himself safety as far as men
are concerned, while in a state of apprehension as to all the heavenly
bodies, and those under the earth, and in short, all those in the
infinite.
13. “Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point,
give us security as far as men are concerned; but the security of men in
general depends upon the tranquillity of their souls, and their freedom
from ambition.
14. “The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain
desires are insatiable.
15. “The wise man is but little favoured by fortune; but his reason
procures him the greatest and most valuable goods, and these he does
enjoy, and will enjoy the whole of his life.
16. “The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the
unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.
17. “Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain arising
from want is removed; it is only diversified.
18. “The most perfect happiness of the soul depends on these reflections,
and on opinions of a similar character on all those questions which cause
the greatest alarm to the mind.
19. “Infinite and finite time both have equal pleasure, if any one
measures its limits by reason.
20. “If the flesh could experience boundless pleasure, it would want to
dispose of eternity.[145]
21. “But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the
body, and liberating us from the fears relative to eternity, procures
for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that
we have no further occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this
disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage him
to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of
happiness.
22. “He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows, that that which
removes the pain which arises from want, and which makes the whole of
life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those
things which can only be attained with trouble.
23. “But as to the subsisting end, we ought to consider it with all the
clearness and evidence which we refer to whatever we think and believe;
otherwise, all things will be full of confusion and uncertainty of
judgment.
24. “If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left
to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the
falsehood of the senses which you condemn.
25. “If you simply discard one sense, and do not distinguish between the
different elements of the judgment, so as to know on the one hand, the
induction which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the
actual and immediate notion; the affections, and all the conceptions of
the mind which lean directly on the sensible representation, you will be
imputing trouble into the other sense, and destroying in that quarter
every species of criterion.
26. “If you allow equal authority to the ideas, which, being only
inductive, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them
an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be
confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true
judgments with those of a different character.
27. “If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to
the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some
other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our
actions.
28. “Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the
whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.
29. “The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be
everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees that, in the space
of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and
trustworthy.
30. “Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but
not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but owe their
existence to vain opinions.”
(Epicurus thinks that those are natural and necessary which put an end to
pains, as drink when one is thirsty; and that those are natural but not
necessary which only diversify pleasure, but do not remove pain, such as
expensive food; and that these are neither natural nor necessary, which
are such as crowns, or the erection of statues.)
31. “Those desires which do not lead to pain, if they are not satisfied,
are not necessary. It is easy to impose silence on them when they appear
difficult to gratify, or likely to produce injury.
32. “When the natural desires, the failing to satisfy which is,
nevertheless, not painful, are violent and obstinate, it is a proof that
there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not
arise from their own nature, but from the vain opinions of men.
33. “Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable, leading men to
avoid injuring one another, and being injured.
34. “Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this
nature, or to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury, have no
such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those
nations, the members of which are either unwilling or unable to enter
into a covenant to respect their mutual interests.
35. “Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual
contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement
to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.
36. “Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only
because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping those who are
appointed to punish actions marked with that character.
37. “It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in
contravention of the agreement which men have made with one another, to
guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he
shall always escape notice, even if he have escaped notice already ten
thousand times; for, till his death, it is uncertain whether he will not
be detected.
38. “In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one;
for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the
difference of place, and divers other circumstances, make justice vary.
39. “From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally
recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really
just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not.
40. “But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really
useful for the social relations, then it is not just; and if that which
was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having
been for some time considered so, it is not less true that, during
that time, it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex
themselves about vain words, but who prefer, in every case, examining and
judging for themselves.
41. “When, without any fresh circumstances arising, a thing which has
been declared just in practice does not agree with the impressions of
reason, that is a proof that the thing was not really just. In the same
way, when in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been
pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the
thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations
and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the moment when it ceases
to be useful.
42. “He who desires to live tranquilly without having any thing to fear
from other men, ought to make himself friends; those whom he cannot make
friends of, he should, at least, avoid rendering enemies; and if that is
not in his power, he should, as far as possible, avoid all intercourse
with them, and keep them aloof, as far as it is for his interest to do so.
43. “The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having
nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live with one
another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one
another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fulness, and
not lamenting, as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their
friends.”
FOOTNOTES
[1] “The religion of the ancient Persians was the worship of fire or
of the elements, in which fire was symbolical of the Deity. At a later
period, in the time of the Greeks, the ancient worship was changed into
the adoration of the stars (Sabæism), especially of the sun and of the
morning star. This religion was distinguished by a simple and majestic
character. Its priests were called Magi.”—_Tenneman’s Manual of the
History of Philosophy, Introd._ § 70.
[2] “The Chaldæans were devoted to the worship of the stars and to
astrology; the nature of their climate and country disposing them to it.
The worship of the stars was revived by them and widely disseminated even
subsequently to the Christian era.”—_Ibid._ § 71.
[3] “Cicero speaks of those who in India are accounted philosophers,
living naked and enduring the greatest severity of winter without
betraying any feeling of pain, and displaying the same insensibility when
exposed to the flames.”—_Tusc. Quæst._ v. 27.
[4] “The religion of the Britons was one of the most considerable parts
of their government, and the Druids who were their priests, possessed
great authority among them. Besides ministering at the altar, and
directing all religious duties, they presided over the education of
youth; they possessed both the civil and criminal jurisdiction, they
decided all controversies among states as well as among private persons,
and whoever refused to submit to their decree was exposed to the most
severe penalties. The sentence of excommunication was pronounced against
him; he was forbidden access to the sacrifices of public worship; he was
debarred all intercourse with his fellow citizens even in the common
affairs of life: his company was universally shunned as profane and
dangerous, he was refused the protection of law, and death itself became
an acceptable relief from the misery and infamy to which he was exposed.
Thus the bonds of government, which were naturally loose among that rude
and turbulent people, were happily corroborated by the terrors of their
superstition.
“No species of superstition was ever more terrible than that of the
Druids; besides the several penalties which it was in the power of the
ecclesiastics to inflict in this world, they inculcated the eternal
transmigration of souls, and thereby extended their authority as far
as the fears of their timorous votaries. They practised their rites in
dark groves or other secret recesses, and in order to throw a greater
mystery over their religion, they communicated their doctrines only to
the initiated, and strictly forbade the committing of them to writing,
lest they should at any time be exposed to the examination of the profane
and vulgar. Human sacrifices were practised among them; the spoils of
war were often devoted to their divinities, and they punished with the
severest tortures whoever dared to secrete any part of the consecrated