The Lives of the Twelve Caesars, Complete
relinquishing it. Either of these motives might have been a sufficient
inducement for retaining his authority; but when they both concurred, as
they seem to have done upon this occasion, their united force was
irresistible. The argument, so far as relates to the love of power,
rests upon a ground, concerning the solidity of which, little doubt can
be entertained: but it may be proper to inquire, in a few words, into the
foundation of that personal danger which he dreaded to incur, on
returning to the station of a private citizen.
Augustus, as has been already observed, had formerly sided with the party
which had attempted to restore public liberty after the death of Julius
Caesar: but he afterwards abandoned the popular cause, and joined in the
ambitious plans of Antony and Lepidus to usurp amongst themselves the
entire dominion of the state. By this change of conduct, he turned his
arms against the supporters of a form of government which he had
virtually recognized as the legal constitution of Rome; and it involved a
direct implication of treason against the sacred representatives of that
government, the consuls, formally and duly elected. Upon such a charge
he might be amenable to the capital laws of his country. This, however,
was a danger which might be fully obviated, by procuring from the senate
and people an act of oblivion, previously to his abdication of the
supreme power; and this was a preliminary which doubtless they would have
admitted and ratified with unanimous approbation. It therefore appears
that he could be exposed to no inevitable danger on this account: but
there was another quarter where his person was vulnerable, and where even
the laws might not be sufficient to protect him against the efforts of
private resentment. The bloody proscription of the Triumvirate no act of
amnesty could ever erase from the minds of those who had been deprived by
it of their nearest and dearest relations; and amidst the numerous
connections of the illustrious men sacrificed on that horrible occasion,
there might arise some desperate avenger, whose indelible resentment
nothing less would satisfy than the blood of the surviving delinquent.
Though Augustus, therefore, might not, like his great predecessor, be
stabbed in the senate-house, he might perish by the sword or the poniard
in a less conspicuous situation. After all, there seems to have been
little danger from this quarter likewise for Sylla, who in the preceding
age had been guilty of equal enormities, was permitted, on relinquishing
the place of perpetual dictator, to end his days in quiet retirement; and
the undisturbed security which Augustus ever afterwards enjoyed, affords
sufficient proof, that all apprehension of danger to his person was
merely chimerical.
(151) We have hitherto considered this grand consultation as it might be
influenced by the passions or prejudices of the emperor: we shall now
take a short view of the subject in the light in which it is connected
with considerations of a political nature, and with public utility. The
arguments handed down by history respecting this consultation are few,
and imperfectly delivered; but they may be extended upon the general
principles maintained on each side of the question.
For the restoration of the republican government, it might be contended,
that from the expulsion of the kings to the dictatorship of Julius
Caesar, through a period of upwards of four hundred and sixty years, the
Roman state, with the exception only of a short interval, had flourished
and increased with a degree of prosperity unexampled in the annals of
humankind: that the republican form of government was not only best
adapted to the improvement of national grandeur, but to the security of
general freedom, the great object of all political association: that
public virtue, by which alone nations could subsist in vigour, was
cherished and protected by no mode of administration so much as by that
which connected, in the strongest bonds of union, the private interests
of individuals with those of the community: that the habits and
prejudices of the Roman people were unalterably attached to the form of
government established by so long a prescription, and they would never
submit, for any length of time, to the rule of one person, without making
every possible effort to recover their liberty: that though despotism,
under a mild and wise prince, might in some respects be regarded as
preferable to a constitution which was occasionally exposed to the
inconvenience of faction and popular tumults, yet it was a dangerous
experiment to abandon the government of the nation to the contingency of
such a variety of characters as usually occurs in the succession of
princes; and, upon the whole, that the interests of the people were more
safely entrusted in the hands of annual magistrates elected by
themselves, than in those of any individual whose power was permanent,
and subject to no legal control.
In favour of despotic government it might be urged, that though Rome had
subsisted long and gloriously under a republican form of government, yet
she had often experienced such violent shocks from popular tumults or the
factions of the great, as had threatened her with imminent destruction:
that a republican government was only accommodated to a people amongst
whom the division of property gave to no class of citizens such a degree
of pre-eminence as might prove dangerous to public freedom: that there
was required in that form of political constitution, a simplicity (152)
of life and strictness of manners which are never observed to accompany a
high degree of public prosperity: that in respect of all these
considerations, such a form of government was utterly incompatible with
the present circumstances of the Romans that by the conquest of so many
foreign nations, by the lucrative governments of provinces, the spoils of
the enemy in war, and the rapine too often practised in time of peace, so
great had been the aggrandizement of particular families in the preceding
age, that though the form of the ancient constitution should still remain
inviolate, the people would no longer live under a free republic, but an
aristocratical usurpation, which was always productive of tyranny: that
nothing could preserve the commonwealth from becoming a prey to some
daring confederacy, but the firm and vigorous administration of one
person, invested with the whole executive power of the state, unlimited
and uncontrolled: in fine, that as Rome had been nursed to maturity by
the government of six princes successively, so it was only by a similar
form of political constitution that she could now be saved from
aristocratical tyranny on one hand, or, on the other, from absolute
anarchy.
On whichever side of the question the force of argument may be thought to
preponderate, there is reason to believe that Augustus was guided in his
resolution more by inclination and prejudice than by reason. It is
related, however, that hesitating between the opposite opinions of his
two counsellors, he had recourse to that of Virgil, who joined with
Mecaenas in advising him to retain the imperial power, as being the form
of government most suitable to the circumstances of the times.
It is proper in this place to give some account of the two ministers
above-mentioned, Agrippa and Mecaenas, who composed the cabinet of
Augustus at the settlement of his government, and seem to be the only
persons employed by him in a ministerial capacity during his whole reign.
M. Vipsanius Agrippa was of obscure extraction, but rendered himself
conspicuous by his military talents. He obtained a victory over Sextus
Pompey; and in the battles of Philippi and Actium, where he displayed
great valour, he contributed not a little to establish the subsequent
power of Augustus. In his expeditions afterwards into Gaul and Germany,
he performed many signal achievements, for which he refused the honours
of a triumph. The expenses which others would have lavished on that
frivolous spectacle, he applied to the more laudable purpose of
embellishing Rome with magnificent buildings, one of which, the Pantheon,
still remains. In consequence of a dispute with Marcellus, the nephew of
Augustus, he retired to Mitylene, (153) whence, after an absence of two
years, he was recalled by the emperor. He first married Pomponia, the
daughter of the celebrated Atticus, and afterwards one of the Marcellas,
the nieces of Augustus. While this lady, by whom he had children, was
still living, the emperor prevailed upon his sister Octavia to resign to
him her son-in-law, and gave him in marriage his own daughter Julia; so
strong was the desire of Augustus to be united with him in the closest
alliance. The high degree of favour in which he stood with the emperor
was soon after evinced by a farther mark of esteem: for during a visit to
the Roman provinces of Greece and Asia, in which Augustus was absent two
years, he left the government of the empire to the care of Agrippa.
While this minister enjoyed, and indeed seems to have merited, all the
partiality of Augustus, he was likewise a favourite with the people. He
died at Rome, in the sixty-first year of his age, universally lamented;
and his remains were deposited in the tomb which Augustus had prepared
for himself. Agrippa left by Julia three sons, Caius, Lucius, and
Posthumus Agrippa, with two daughters, Agrippina and Julia.
C. Cilnius Mecaenas was of Tuscan extraction, and derived his descent
from the ancient kings of that country. Though in the highest degree of
favour with Augustus, he never aspired beyond the rank of the equestrian
order; and though he might have held the government of extensive
provinces by deputies, he was content with enjoying the praefecture of
the city and Italy; a situation, however, which must have been attended
with extensive patronage. He was of a gay and social disposition. In
principle he is said to have been of the Epicurean sect, and in his dress
and manners to have bordered on effeminacy. With respect to his
political talents, we can only speak from conjecture; but from his being
the confidential minister of a prince of so much discernment as Augustus,
during the infancy of a new form of government in an extensive empire, we
may presume that he was endowed with no common abilities for that
important station. The liberal patronage which he displayed towards men
of genius and talents, will render his name for ever celebrated in the
annals of learning. It is to be regretted that history has transmitted
no particulars of this extraordinary personage, of whom all we know is
derived chiefly from the writings of Virgil and Horace; but from the
manner in which they address him, amidst the familiarity of their
intercourse, there is the strongest reason to suppose, that he was not
less amiable and respectable in private life, than illustrious in public
situation. “O my glory!” is the emphatic expression employed by them
both.
(154) O decus, O famae merito pars maxima nostrae. Vir. Georg. ii.
Light of my life, my glory, and my guide!
O et praesidium et dulce decus meum. Hor. Ode I.
My glory and my patron thou!
One would be inclined to think, that there was a nicety in the sense and
application of the word decus, amongst the Romans, with which we are
unacquainted, and that, in the passages now adduced, it was understood to
refer to the honour of the emperor’s patronage, obtained through the
means of Mecaenas; otherwise, such language to the minister might have
excited the jealousy of Augustus. But whatever foundation there may be
for this conjecture, the compliment was compensated by the superior
adulation which the poets appropriated to the emperor, whose deification