The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
of discontented officers, and shortly afterwards again fell into
trouble under a charge of corruption while he was in command of
transports during the war between Egypt and Abyssinia. Subsequently,
Ismail allowed Arabi to join a regiment, whereupon he became chief of
the secret society. One of its members divulged the secret to the
Khedive, who adopted the Oriental method of buying the allegiance of
the disaffected officers by promoting in one day seventy of them to be
lieutenant-colonels. He also presented one of his slaves to Arabi to
wife.
So much for Ismail Pasha. When, by order of the Sultan, he was
superseded by Tewfik, Arabi made haste to do obeisance to the new
Khedive, who made him a full colonel. But when Tewfik reduced the
army, the Three Colonels presented a petition to the Khedive,
demanding, among other matters, that an Egyptian should be made
Minister of War in place of Osman Rifki. The Three Colonels were
thereupon arrested. Mahmoud Sami Pasha, a member of the Cabinet,
secretly arranged that when they were brought before the Court-martial,
the soldiers should rescue them. On the 1st February, 1881,
accordingly, the soldiers burst into the court, turned it inside out,
and carried the Three Colonels to the Palace. The Khedive, confronted
with physical force to which he had nothing to oppose, consented to
supersede his War Minister in favour of the crafty Mahmoud Sami, to
increase the army by 18,000 men, and to abolish favouritism.
The Khedive very soon discovered that Mahmoud Sami {172} was by no
means a desirable Minister of War, and also that the Three Colonels and
their friends continued to stir up trouble. He therefore dismissed
Mahmoud Sami and appointed in his stead the Khedive's brother-in-law,
Daoud Pasha, a Circassian, and ordered the disaffected regiments to
leave Cairo. At the same time it was rumoured that the Khedive had
obtained a secret decree from the Sultan condemning Arabi and his
friends to death. When the order to remove his regiment from Cairo was
received by Arabi, that leader of revolt informed the Minister of War
on 9th September, 1881, that the troops in Cairo would proceed the same
afternoon to the Palace of Abdin, there to demand of the Khedive the
dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of the National Assembly,
and the increase of the army. Then came Tewfik's opportunity, which,
as already observed, he let slip.
When the Khedive entered the Square, accompanied by Mr. Colvin, British
Controller, and a few native and European officers, he was confronted
with some 4000 soldiers and thirty guns. The following account of the
critical moment is given by the Hon. Charles Royle, in his excellent
history of _The Egyptian Campaigns_ (London, 1900).
"The Khedive advanced firmly towards a little group of officers and men
(some of whom were mounted) in the centre. Colvin said to him, 'When
Arabi presents himself, tell him to give up his sword and follow you.
Then go the round of the regiments, address each separately, and give
them the "order to disperse."' The soldiers all this time were
standing in easy attitudes, chatting, laughing, rolling up cigarettes,
and eating pistachio nuts, looking, in fact, as little like desperate
mutineers as could well be imagined. They apparently were there in
obedience only to orders, and, without being either loyal or disloyal,
might almost be regarded as disinterested spectators.
"Arabi approached on horseback: the Khedive called out to him to
dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot with several others, and
a guard with fixed bayonets, {173} and saluted. As he advanced, Colvin
said to the Khedive, 'Now is the moment, give the word.' He replied,
'We are between four fires. We shall be killed.' Colvin said, 'Have
courage.' Tewfik again wavered, he turned for counsel to a native
officer at his side, and repeated, 'What can I do? We are between four
fires.' He then told Arabi to sheathe his sword. Arabi did so at
once, his hand trembling so with nervousness that he could scarcely get
the weapon back into its scabbard. The moment was lost. Instead of
following Colvin's advice, and arresting Arabi on the spot, a step
which would have at once put an end to the whole disturbance, the
Khedive walked towards him and commenced to parley."
The Khedive subsequently agreed to dismiss the Ministry at Arabi's
request; and Arabi thus advanced another step towards obtaining
military control of the country. For a time he prevented Cherif Pasha
from forming a Ministry, and summoned to Cairo the Chamber of Notables.
The members of the Chamber, however, whose office was purely advisory,
supported Cherif Pasha. By means of a skilful intrigue, Mahmoud Sami
contrived to obtain the appointment of Minister of War. Arabi then
effected a temporary retreat with his regiment to El Ouady, in the
Delta, and waited upon events. It was then October. The Khedive had
convoked an assembly of the Chamber of Notables at the end of December,
and in the meantime the elections were proceeding.
It should here be observed that Arabi did not merely represent
discontent in the army. He had behind him a genuine and largely just
popular agitation, the result of many evils suffered by the natives.
"Ismail's merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign
moneylenders, had given rise to a desire to limit the power of the
Khedive, and, above all, to abolish the Anglo-French control, which was
considered as ruling the country simply for the benefit of the foreign
bondholders. The control was further hated by the large landholders,
because the law of liquidation (with {174} which the Controllers in the
minds of the people were associated) had in a measure sacrificed their
claims for compensation in respect of the cancelling of a forced loan
known as the 'Moukabaleh,' and it was still more detested by the Pashas
and native officials, because it interfered with the reckless
squandering of public money, and the many opportunities for corruption
by which they had so long been benefited. In addition to this, there
was a great deal of irritation at the increasing number of highly paid
European officials which the reformed administration inaugurated in the
latter days of Ismail involved. The people began to suspect that what
was occurring was only part of a plan for handing the country over to
Europeans. The examples lately set by England with regard to Cyprus,
and by France in Tunis, were, it must be owned, but little calculated
to inspire confidence in the political morality of either of these two
Powers" (Royle, _The Egyptian Campaigns_).
In these things consisted the reserve strength of Arabi; and while he
was ostensibly in retirement at El Ouady (probably spending a good deal
of time in Cairo with his fellow-conspirators), the native press
continued to excite irritation against the Europeans; and when the new
Chamber of Notables assembled on 25th December, 1881, they at once
presented demands which brought the whole situation in Egypt to the
notice of Europe. The Chamber demanded control of the revenues outside
those assigned to the Public Debt, together with other new powers
directly infringing the prerogatives of the Sultan and of the Khedive.
It seems that Mahmoud Sami inspired these manifestations, not with any
hope or desire that the demands of the Chamber would be granted, but
because, as they were inadmissible, the Ministry of Cherif Pasha would
be wrecked, and Mahmoud Sami thereby advantaged.
The British and French Governments declared that the demands of the
Chamber were unacceptable. At the same time they learned that the
coast fortifications were being strengthened and that the army was to
be increased. On {175} behalf of the two Powers, a Joint Note was
presented to the Khedive in Cairo, on 8th January, 1882, stating that
England and France were united in opposing "the dangers to which the
Government of the Khedive might be exposed."
The presentation of the Joint Note marks the beginning of that European
intervention which might have prevented, but which did not prevent, the
massacre in Alexandria of the 11th June, 1882, and which eventually
resulted in the bombardment of that city on 11th July, 1882. The
jealousy existing between France and England at that time in respect of
intervention in Egypt, nullified the effective action of either party.
Had M. Gambetta continued in power, he would probably have forced Lord
Granville to adopt a decisive policy. But M. de Freycinet, who
succeeded Gambetta while the question was still under discussion, was
as much afraid of responsibility as Lord Granville was. Diplomacy thus
returned to its customary routine of addressing Circular Notes to the
European Powers, and generally avoiding definition as long as possible.
Arabi seized his opportunity and announced that intervention on the
part of England and France was inadmissible. The Chamber of Notables
also saw their chance, and demanded the dismissal of the Ministry. The
Khedive, apparently deserted by England and France, and much afraid of
offending the Sultan, had no choice but to dismiss Cherif Pasha and to
appoint in his stead Mahmoud Sami, who thus attained his object.
Mahmoud Sami immediately appointed Arabi Pasha Minister of War. Arabi
thus achieved a military dictatorship. It will be observed that his
success was directly due to the vacillation of the English and French
Governments. Mahmoud Sami at once forced the Khedive to assent to the
demands of the Chamber, and the English and French Controllers
resigned, upon the ground that "the Khedive's power no longer exists."
The dictators, Mahmoud Sami and Arabi (now Arabi Pasha), strengthened
the coast fortifications, ordered ninety {176} guns of Herr Krupp, and
rapidly increased the army. Then the dictators, considering that the
hour of their vengeance had arrived, arrested fifty of the hated
Circassian officers, (it is said) tortured them, and sentenced forty of
them to perpetual exile. The Khedive refused to sign the Decree;
whereupon Mahmoud Sami threatened that his refusal would be followed by
a general massacre of foreigners. A month later, on 11th June, such a
massacre occurred. In the meantime, the open quarrel between the
Khedive on the one side, and his Ministers, backed by the army, on the
other, created general alarm. Mahmoud Sami convoked the Chamber; only
to discover that the Notables were afraid to support him. Under these
circumstances, Mahmoud Sami and Arabi Pasha informed the Khedive that,
on condition that he would guarantee the maintenance of public order,
they would resign. The Khedive replied in effect that it was not he
but Arabi that troubled Israel. On the next day, 15th May, 1882, the
English and French Consuls-General warned Arabi that in the event of
disturbance, England, France and Turkey would deal with him. Arabi
retorted that if a Fleet arrived, he could not be responsible for the
safety of the public. Upon the same day the Consul-General informed
the Khedive that an Anglo-French Fleet was on its way to Alexandria,
whereupon Mahmoud Sami and the rest of the Ministry made a formal
submission to the Khedive.
Such was the first influence, exerted from afar, of naval power. But
when, upon the 19th and 20th May, the ships arrived at Alexandria, the
effect was considerably lessened; for the force consisted of no more
than one British line-of-battle ship, H.M.S. _Invincible_, with two
gunboats, and one French line-of-battle ship, _La Gallisonière_, with
two gunboats. The object of the Granville-Freycinet diplomacy, to do
something and yet not to do it, had thus been triumphantly achieved.
The instructions given to the British and French admirals respectively
are worth noting.
{177}