The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
On 28th February, 1884, Graham defeated the enemy, inflicting upon them
severe losses, at El-Teb, near the spot upon which Baker's disastrous
action had occurred some three weeks previously. On 13th March, after
a hard and at times a dubious fight, Graham won another victory at
Tamaai, and the power of Osman Digna was broken. Graham was then
ordered to return, and the expedition was over.
By withdrawing Graham's troops, the Government both threw away the
fruits of his success, and deliberately abandoned the control of the
Souakim-Berber route from Khartoum, by which alone Gordon could have
brought away the refugees. Berber was the key to the Soudan.
Thenceforth, the Souakim-Berber route was impracticable; and it was for
this reason that Lord Wolseley was obliged to take the much longer Nile
route.
On the very day after Graham's victory at El-Teb, and before Graham had
left Souakim, Gordon had telegraphed from Khartoum as follows:--
"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance
of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better.
You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an
attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected
before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send
200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and
then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will
cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."
On 2nd March he telegraphed again to the same effect; but Lord
Granville declined to accede to General Gordon's suggestions. A few
days later, when the Eastern Soudan and the Souakim-Berber route had
been definitely abandoned, Sir Evelyn Baring strongly advised the
British Government to obtain command of the Souakim-Berber route. But
the {217} advice was refused by Lord Granville, and the most urgent
appeals continued to be addressed to him in vain.
Deserted by the Government, Gordon tried, and failed, to raise money
privately for the purpose of engaging Turkish troops. Early in April,
Khartoum was closely besieged. At this time, Lord Wolseley urged upon
the Government the necessity of relieving Gordon. In May, preparations
for war were begun. A part of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt
was sent up the Nile; and Commander Hammill and other naval officers
were employed to report upon the navigation of the river. These facts
did not prevent Lord Hartington from informing the House of Commons,
early in July, that the Government had no intention of sending an
expedition to relieve General Gordon, unless it were made clear that by
no other means could he be relieved, and adding that the Government had
"received no information making it desirable that we should depart from
that decision" (Royce, _The Egyptian Campaigns_). On 24th July, Lord
Wolseley made a spirited protest against the procrastination of the
Government. The pressure of public opinion could no longer be entirely
withstood. On 30th July, Gordon sent a message in which he declared
his retreat to be impossible.
On 5th August, Mr. Gladstone asked and obtained a vote of credit.
Then, and not until then, were the preparations for war begun in
England. Having decided, upon the advice of Lord Wolseley, to follow
the Nile route instead of the Souakim-Berber route, the Government
ordered 800 boats. These were 30 feet long, having six feet six inches
beam, two feet six inches draught, fitted with 12 oars, two masts and
lug sails; each designed to carry two boatmen and 10 soldiers with
provisions, arms and ammunition. Eight steam pinnaces and two
stern-wheel paddle-boats were also fitted out; the Nile steamers
belonging to the Egyptian Government were taken over; and 380
_voyageurs_ from Canada were engaged. The total force of troops
selected numbered 7000. Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son contracted to
transport the {218} whole expedition to above the Second Cataract.
Lord Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief; General Sir Redvers
Buller was chief of staff; General Earle was given command of a
brigade; special service officers were: Colonels Sir Charles Wilson,
Brackenbury, Harrison, Henderson, Maurice, Lord Anson (Royce, _The
Egyptian Campaigns_). Lord Charles Beresford was attached to Lord
Wolseley's staff.
Even now, the Government failed to recognise the plain facts of the
case. Their instructions to Lord Wolseley were that the main object of
the expedition was to rescue General Gordon. Her Majesty's Ministers
considered that it might be practicable to achieve his release without
going to Khartoum, and that in any case it was desirable to avoid any
fighting so far as possible.
When Lord Wolseley started from Cairo on 27th September, 1884, the
advance was already going rapidly forward. Under the direction of Sir
Evelyn Wood and Commander Hammill, a number of the whaler boats had
been transported to Wady Halfa, which is nearly 900 miles from
Khartoum, the total length of the Nile route being 1650 miles. Along
the river, up to Wady Halfa and a little beyond to Sarras, bases of
supply had been established; an advance guard was already at New
Dongola, about 100 miles above Wady Halfa, under the command of General
Sir Herbert Stewart, he who afterwards led the Desert Column.
Arriving at Wady Halfa on 5th October, Lord Wolseley received news that
Colonel J. S. Stewart, Mr. Power, British Consul at Khartoum and
correspondent of _The Times_, M. Herbin, French Consul, and a party of
Greek and Egyptian refugees, who had left Khartoum in the steamer
Abbas, had all been slain. Stewart had with him Gordon's papers,
which, of course, were taken by the Mahdi's men.
On the 8th October a letter from M. Herbin was received at Cairo. It
was dated from Khartoum, 29th July, 1884, and stated that there were
then provisions for two months in the {219} place. The time had thus
expired--and M. Herbin had been murdered--ere the letter arrived.
A temporary base was formed at Wady Halfa; and bases of supplies were
established along the river up to New Dongola. By means of
extraordinary exertions, boats and steamers were hauled up to Dongola
through the rapids. Lord Wolseley formed a Camel Corps of 1500 men,
consisting of four regiments, Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, Guards, and
Mounted Infantry, with a detachment of Royal Marines. Early in
November, a general advance was made from Wady Halfa. Wolseley arrived
at Dongola on 3rd November. Two days previously, on 1st November, Sir
Evelyn Baring had received a message from Gordon, dated 13th July,
saying that he could hold out for four months. The limit, therefore,
had nearly been reached by the time the expedition was leaving Wady
Halfa, 900 miles from Khartoum.
Lord Wolseley, early in November, considered that it would take to the
end of the year to concentrate his forces at Ambukol, just above Old
Dongola. He returned to Wady Halfa to expedite progress; and by the
middle of December headquarters were established at Korti, and by
Christmas the greater part of the force was concentrated there. During
the whole of this period, Wolseley's army must be figured as a river of
men flowing along the river Nile, the infantry struggling up in boats,
the mounted men toiling along the banks; the stream of men banking up
at headquarters, the military front, which is steadily pushed forward
from Wady Halfa to New Dongola, from New Dongola to Old Dongola 60 to
70 miles farther up, from Old Dongola to Korti.
On 17th November a letter was received from Gordon saying that he could
hold out for forty days from the date of the superscription, 4th
November, 1884, thus leaving Wolseley barely four weeks to accomplish a
task needing as many months. On 28th November another letter from
Gordon, dated 9th September, gave the relief expedition four months,
thus leaving Wolseley five weeks from the {220} date upon which the
letter was received. It was now clear that the expedition could not
reach Khartoum in time.
When Lord Wolseley, towards the end of December, had his forces
concentrated at Korti, he decided to divide them into two columns, the
Desert Column and the Nile Column. The reasons for his scheme can only
be clearly apprehended by a reference to the map. At Korti, the Nile
turns north-east, looping back again, and resuming its southward course
at Metemmeh. A straight line drawn across the Bayuda Desert from Korti
to Metemmeh is the short cut. This was the route given to the Desert
Column. The Nile Column was to proceed up the loop of the river to
Hamdab, there to avenge the murder of Colonel Stewart and his party, to
proceed higher up to Berti, and thence to secure the bend of the river
and to open up the desert route back to Korosko, below Wady Halfa, and
from Korosko it was intended to attack Berber, and thence to join
forces with the Desert Column at Metemmeh.
The Nile Column, numbering about 3000 men, under the command of
Major-General Earle, Brigadier-General Brackenbury being second in
command, left Korti on 28th December, 1884.
The Desert Column was placed under the command of General Sir Herbert
Stewart. With him was Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, who was instructed
to take a body of troops from Metemmeh to Khartoum. The Column
consisted of sections of the Camel Corps, a company of the Royal
Engineers, a detachment of the 19th Hussars, detachments of the
Commissariat and Medical Corps, and the Naval Brigade, which was placed
under the command of Lord Charles Beresford. The total force numbered
73 officers, 1032 non-commissioned officers and men, 2099 camels, and
40 horses. The Desert Column left Korti on 30th December, 1884. It
was, in fact, a forlorn hope.
(The writer desires to acknowledge the use he has made of the excellent
narrative of events contained in _The Egyptian Campaigns_, by the Hon.
Charles Royle.)
{221}
CHAPTER XXIV
THE SOUDAN WAR (_Continued_)
II. HOW WE BROUGHT THE BOATS THROUGH THE GREAT GATE
In January, 1884, General Gordon was entrusted by the British and
Egyptian Governments with the impossible task of evacuating the Soudan
and of organising its future internal administration, in the face of a
vast horde of armed fanatics. In April, the investment of Khartoum, in
which Gordon was shut up, was complete. In May, preparations for war
were begun in England and in Egypt. It was not, however, until 8th
August that Lord Hartington informed General Stephenson, commanding the
British Army of Occupation in Egypt, that measures would be taken to
relieve Gordon. During the same month the whale-boats for the Nile
route were ordered. On 26th August General Stephenson was informed
that Lord Wolseley would command the expedition.
In August, while I was staying with the Duke of Fife at Mar Lodge, I
was appointed to Lord Wolseley's Staff.
I sailed with Lord Wolseley and the rest of his Staff. We arrived at
Alexandria on 9th September, 1884, and went on to Cairo, where we
lodged in the Palace on the Shoobra Road. Here were Lord Wolseley,
General Sir Redvers Buller, Colonel Swaine, Major Wardrop and Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, A.D.C. to Buller. Sir Evelyn Wood and Commander
Hammill were already up the Nile {222} organising transport and supply.
General Sir Herbert Stewart and General Earle were at Wady Halfa.
It is not my intention to relate the history of the war, which has been
admirably recorded in the various works dealing with the subject; but
rather to narrate my personal experiences during the campaign. And the
reader will also be left to his own consideration of the contemporary
affairs of the great world: the marrying and giving in marriage, losses
and gains, desires foiled and ambitions achieved, the shifts and