The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
delighted. He was lowered down, to climb out again faster than he went
in. After a short pause, he had another try. This time, in a frying
heat that only a black skin could bear, he stayed inside, passing the
bolts through, while Mr. Benbow caulked plates and bolts and screwed
them home. The boy was none the worse in body and richer in
possessions than ever in his life. By seven o'clock the job was done.
You can see what it was for yourself; for the plate is now in the
Museum of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. Rear-Admiral Sir Colin
Keppel (sub-lieutenant in 1885), writing to me on the subject, says,
"When in command of the gunboats under Lord Kitchener in 1898, on our
way to Fashoda, about 300 miles above Khartoum on the White Nile, I
again came upon our old _Safieh_, then again in the hands of the
dervishes, with whom we had a short action. The first thing I did
afterwards was to go down below (I knew where to look!) and found the
patch which old Benbow had put on more than 13 years before."
Lord Kitchener afterwards had the plate cut out, and he very kindly
sent it to me.
By ten o'clock that night, the boiler was repaired and the fires were
laid. In the meantime, as soon as the twilight fell that evening, the
fire from the fort slackened. {304} It was my object to delude the
enemy into the belief that we had abandoned the steamer; for, if they
thought she was empty, they would not fire upon her, lest they should
damage an invaluable prize. Moreover, did the enemy suppose that we
were staying by the ship, they would during the night shift a gun from
the fort, dragging it along the bank to a point abreast of the steamer;
whence they could see the vessel looming on the water, whereas we in
the steamer could not see them; whence the range was no more than about
80 yards; and whence a single hit would disable us.
But all depended upon our running the gauntlet in the morning.
Therefore, in the hope of deceiving the enemy, as the darkness
gathered, the four boats brought down to embark Wilson's party were
ostentatiously hauled alongside, as if to take off the ship's company.
Then all firing stopped; and after that thirteen hours' furious
fusillade, the immense and crystal silence of the desert submerged us
like the sea. Talking above a whisper was forbidden; every aperture
was closed below, where the lamps were burning to light Mr. Benbow at
his work, and no spark of light was allowed on deck. The men lit their
pipes at a slow match burning in a bucket, and smoked under cover.
After leaving the _Safieh_ in the afternoon, Captain Gascoigne had more
adventures with his _nuggar_, of which by this time he must have been
weary. It went ashore opposite to the fort, which of course shot at
it, and Gascoigne must embark all except the badly wounded, under fire
as usual. Luckily, the enemy failed to get the range. By sunset, the
united exertions of Sir Charles Wilson's firing party had refloated the
_nuggar_.
Late that night, we saw her drift past us in the darkness.
The fort fired upon her, but apparently without result, for she drifted
on and disappeared. Then the enemy opened fire again upon the steamer.
They had run the guns outside the fort in the interval, and fired a few
rounds at us, accompanied by a heavy rifle fire. But the _Safieh_
remained dumb and motionless. The firing ceased, the {305} enemy
evidently believing that we had abandoned the vessel.
I slept in snatches on deck, waking every now and then to look round.
The officers were sound asleep, lying in a neat row on the deck. It
occurred to me that, taking into consideration the position in which
they lay relative to the gun on the bank, a single shot might kill them
all. So I roused them up very quietly, and bade them dispose
themselves in various places. I remember how they waked with a sleepy
grin, each looking for a separate corner, dropping into it and falling
asleep again.
So far, our ruse had succeeded. At five o'clock the next morning (4th
February) Mr. Benbow lit the fires, using the utmost caution, keeping
the ash-pit draught plates almost shut, in order to prevent sparks,
which would instantly betray us, from flying up the funnel. On deck,
we were in suspense, all staring at the shot-riddled funnel. It kept
its secret for fifty minutes; then suddenly it belched a fountain of
hot ashes. It was then within ten minutes of daylight. Almost at the
same moment a great shouting broke out in the fort, and a convulsive
beating of tom-toms. Then the guns and rifles began to speak again.
What had happened was that when the pressure-gauge indicated 10 lb. of
steam, the Arab captain of the stokers suddenly appeared at the
engine-room hatch, and spoke swiftly in Arabic to his men, who, before
Mr. Benbow could interfere, flung open the draught plates.
It was a close-run business. In the next ten minutes the steam had run
up to 20 lb. pressure. Instantly we weighed anchor. The moment the
steamer began to move, such a yell of rage went up from the Dervishes
in the fort, as I never heard before or since. Leaping and screaming
on the bank, they took up handfuls of sand and flung them towards us.
They had thought us fled, and the steamer theirs. And there we were,
and there was the steamer moving away up river towards Khartoum; and
the men of Wad Habeshi were naturally disappointed.
{306}
I took the _Safieh_ about a quarter of a mile up stream, both to
confuse the enemy and to enable me to turn outside the narrow channel,
and at a comparatively safe distance. Then we went about, and ran down
at full speed, again concentrating our fire upon the embrasures of the
fort. Once more, as we came abreast of Wad Habeshi, we turned both
Gardners and both howitzers upon the embrasures, in one of which we
burst a shell; while the 20 soldiers and the 14 bluejackets maintained
their steady rifle fire.
We were running now with the stream instead of against it, and our
speed was the greater, and we stormed past the fort without a single
casualty; and then, just as we thought we were clear, lo! there was
Gascoigne's hapless _nuggar_, stuck and helpless some 400 yards below
Wad Habeshi, and in full bearing of its side embrasure. As all
depended upon the safe passage of the _Safieh_, I ran on until we were
a mile from the fort and out of its range, and then dropped anchor.
I dispatched Keppel with six bluejackets in a small boat to the
assistance of the _nuggar_. Rear-Admiral Sir Colin Keppel very kindly
sent to me his account of the affair, based upon the notes made in his
diary at the time. "The riflemen, having got rid of the steamer,
concentrated their fire on the _nuggar_. However, the range was long
and their fire was not very accurate. After we had anchored you
dispatched me in a small boat with six bluejackets to the assistance of
the _nuggar_. After attempting to pull up to her, we found that the
stream was too strong, and so I decided, having obtained your approval
by semaphore, to land on the right bank, track the boat up until well
upstream of the _nuggar_, and thus reach her. I found the only thing
to do was to lighten her; and while Gascoigne and I were throwing
overboard sacks of _dhura_ and other things, I was struck in the groin
by a bullet which went through my breeches but did not penetrate the
skin. It only raised a bruise which made me limp for a few days.
There was a considerable number of wounded in the _nuggar_. When {307}
she was afloat again we drifted down. You got under way in the steamer
and picked us up."
Such is Keppel's modest account of what was a very gallant piece of
service on his part and on the part of Captain Gascoigne, who with
their men were working in the _nuggar_ under fire for three hours. Had
they failed where they so brilliantly succeeded, the whole Column, as
we learned afterwards, would have been jeopardised; for the steamer,
returning to their assistance, would again have come within range of
the fort.
The _nuggar_ was taken in tow, and Captain Gascoigne's heroic struggles
with that unlucky craft were thus ended for the time. A mile below us,
Sir Charles Wilson was waiting for us with his whole detachment. They
were all embarked, and by 5.45 p.m. we had safely arrived at Gubat.
That night I slept so profoundly that I do not know when I should have
awakened, had not first one rat, and then another, walked over my face.
Mr. Benbow's skilled and intrepid service had saved the Column with a
piece of boiler plate and a handful of bolts. He received the special
compliments of Lord Wolseley, who presented him with his own silver
cigarette case; and was promoted to the rank of chief inspector of
machinery. He ought to have received the Victoria Cross; but owing to
the fact that I did not then know that the decoration could be granted
for a service of that nature, I did not, to my great regret, recommend
him for the honour. Mr. James Webber was promoted to be chief
boatswain; and in 1887, his services being once more exceptionally
recommended, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.
Surgeon Arthur May's services were inestimable. Always cheery,
indefatigable and zealous, when he was not attending to the wounded
under fire, he was on deck, rifle in hand, among the marksmen. It was
a great pleasure to me to report in the highest terms of the conduct of
the officers and men under my command, and specially to recommend
Lieutenant E. B. van Koughnet, Sub-Lieutenant {308} C. R. Keppel,
Acting-Lieutenant Walter Ingram, Chief Engineer Benbow, Surgeon Arthur
William May and Mr. James Webber, boatswain, and Lieutenant Bower,
commanding the Mounted Infantry.
During the engagement with the fort at Wad Habeshi 5400 rounds were
fired from the Gardner guns, and 2150 from the rifles. The figure for
the brass howitzers is uncertain, the official report giving 126, but
Sub-Lieutenant Keppel, who served one of the guns, mentioned 150 as the
number fired from one gun in one day.
{309}
CHAPTER XXXII
THE SOUDAN WAR (_Continued_)
X. THE EFFECT OF THE ACTION OF WAD HABESHI
The proximate result of the fight of the _Safieh_ was of course the
fulfilment of its immediate object, the rescue of Sir Charles Wilson's
gallant detachment. But, years afterwards, it was made known that the
full effect actually extended so far as to include the salvation of the
whole Desert Column. In _The Royal Navy: A History_, vol. vii., Sir
William Laird Clowes briefly mentions the fact, referring to Sir F. R.
Wingate's letter to Lord Wolseley of 18th March, 1893. The passages in
that letter to which he refers are as follows:
"... It is therefore on these grounds only that I have ventured to
collate evidence on an episode which may be considered to have been
finally dealt with.... Moreover, with the light which this evidence
throws on the situation, the results of Beresford's action cannot but
be enhanced ... that he was the means of saving Sir C. Wilson and his
party is an admitted fact; but when it is realised that added to this,
his action really saved the Column, it is, I consider, my duty to bring
before you this evidence which, had it been known at the time, might
have secured for Beresford and Benbow the greatest reward soldiers and
sailors can hope to obtain. But late as it is, it may not be too late
for the question to be reopened....
"In order to arrive at the actual details of the Dervish movements
subsequent to the fall of Khartoum, a meeting {310} was held at the
Intelligence Department, Egyptian Army, Cairo, on the 23rd February,
1893, at which the following were present, namely, Father Orhwalder,