The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
service, Olden was recommended by me for the conspicuous gallantry
medal.
The black soldiers, going barefoot, used to come in with their feet
transfixed by long thorns; these I cut out with a horse-lancet fitted
to my knife; and the operation was like cutting leather. I had gained
experience in performing it while getting the boats through at Wady
Halfa. At Ismailia a more delicate operation fell to me. While
fishing, my hook caught in a man's eyelid. The French surgeon who was
summoned went to work with a lancet, and tried to pull the barb through
the wound, causing the patient acute agony. I sent the doctor aside,
and using one of a pair of breeches' bow-ties (for tying bows at the
knees) drew the hook through to the shank, and severed it, much to the
surgeon's indignation.
The expeditions up and down the river in the _Safieh_ were amusing
enough; but we were only making the best of the interval before the
next move. Sir Charles Wilson had left Gubat on 6th February for
Korti, where he arrived on the 9th bearing the news of the fall of
Khartoum, and a full account of the condition of the Desert Column.
Lord Wolseley telegraphed the information to Lord Hartington (Secretary
of State for War), who telegraphed in reply: "Express warm recognition
of Government of brilliant services of Sir C. Wilson and satisfaction
at gallant rescue of his party."
Lord Wolseley, upon receipt of Sir C. Wilson's dispatch containing the
account of the action at Abu Kru, fought on the 19th January, when Sir
Herbert Stewart was wounded, had appointed Major-General Sir Redvers
Buller to take command of the Desert Column, Sir Evelyn Wood being
appointed chief of staff in his place. Buller had left Korti on 29th
January, and had arrived at Jakdul on the 2nd February. Lord Wolseley
had also dispatched the Royal Irish Regiment to reinforce the Desert
Column. The Royal Irish marched on foot the whole way across the {318}
Bayuda Desert, each man carrying 70 rounds of ammunition, filled water
bottles and rolled greatcoats. The first detachment left Korti on the
28th January, the second on the 30th; both arriving at Jakdul on the
4th February. They left Jakdul on the 7th. Buller left on the
following day; and upon arriving at Abu Klea, he left there two
companies of the Royal Irish, the rest of which accompanied him to
Gubat, for which place he started on the 10th. I saw the Royal Irish
march in; a splendid body of fighting men, trained down to the last
ounce, lean as hounds, and spoiling for a fight.
It will be observed that Buller was at Jakdul, half-way across the
Desert, on the 4th February, on which date Lord Wolseley learned from
Sir Charles Wilson of the fall of Khartoum. Lord Wolseley dispatched
three sets of orders to Sir Redvers Buller in quick succession, the
last reaching him at Abu Klea on the 10th, before he had resumed his
march to Gubat.
Lord Wolseley's dispatch instructed Sir Redvers Buller to make every
preparation for the evacuation of Gubat and the withdrawal of the
Column. At the same time, its tenor left a certain discretion to
Buller; who, replying to it in a private letter carried by the
returning messenger to Lord Wolseley, "spoke," says Colonel Colville,
in his official _History of the Sudan Campaign_, "hopefully of the
situation." I think the presence of the Royal Irish, in magnificent
condition, suggested to Buller that he could fight anybody anywhere.
In fact, when Sir Redvers came in to Gubat on 11th February, he wanted
to remain and fight. At his request, I stated to him my view of the
situation; which was, briefly, that unless we departed swiftly, we
should be eaten up by the enemy, who were known to be advancing in
immense force. I also reported officially that until the Nile rose,
the two steamers remaining to us were practically useless: a
consideration which proved conclusive. Sir Redvers Buller's dispatch,
dated at Gubat 12th February, and addressed to {319} the chief of
staff, describes the conclusions to which he came after having
carefully reviewed the situation (_History of the Sudan Campaign_--Part
II. p. 56). The camels were greatly reduced in number and were nearly
worn out; but if the Column were to attempt any further enterprise, the
camels must be sent to Jakdul and back to bring supplies, a journey
which would take at least ten days. This circumstance was virtually
conclusive. Sir Redvers adds: "I regret to have to express now an
opinion different to that which I expressed to Lord Wolseley in a
letter dated the night of the 10th instant; but when I then wrote, I
was not aware of the condition of the steamers and of the fact that the
big one could not pass a sandbank 25 miles below this. Lord C.
Beresford considers it doubtful if the other one can either.... Since
writing this I am confirmed in my opinion by the news that Mohammed
Ahmed (the Mahdi) left Khartoum _en route_ here on the 9th instant."
In the meantime, Lord Wolseley had ordered the River Column to halt on
its way. On the 10th, General Earle, in command of the River Column,
had been killed at the action of Kirbekan. Lord Wolseley, until he
received Sir Redvers Buller's account of the desperate condition of the
River Column--deprived of transport, encumbered with wounded, short of
stores (owing to bad packing), and without boots--retained his
intention of effecting a junction of the two columns at Berber. At the
end of the third week in February that scheme was necessarily
abandoned. The River Column was recalled; and Buller, then on his way
back with the Desert Column, was instructed to return direct to Korti.
On the morning of 13th February the sick and wounded were dispatched
with a convoy under the command of Colonel Talbot. Eight or nine miles
out, the convoy was attacked, surrounded on three sides, and exposed to
fire from the enemy concealed in the bush. Among the wounded were the
scalded engine-room artificers; one of whom, recalling the incident in
conversation with me {320} recently, said: "That was the first time my
heart sank--when the bearers put down my litter, and the firing began."
After about two hours' engagement, when the convoy had lost eight
killed and wounded, the Light Camel Regiment, under the command of
Colonel Clarke, marching from Jakdul, opportunely appeared, and the
enemy drew off.
Colonel Talbot (my cousin) very kindly sent me a copy of his diary,
kept at the time. His account of the affair gives little indication of
what was in fact a passage of very considerable danger. He was
encumbered with a large number of sick and wounded; his force was
small; the force of the enemy, though it was impossible to estimate the
exact numbers, was formidable; and in spite of Talbot's skilful and
prompt dispositions of defence, the issue must have been very doubtful
had not the Light Camel Regiment arrived.
Colonel Talbot's account runs as follows: "_February_ 13_th_.--Received
orders from Sir R. Buller to march for Jakdul at dawn with 75 sick and
wounded, Sir H. Stewart and the worst cases carried in litters borne by
Egyptian soldiers from Khartoum. Escort of 300 men joined from the 3
Camel Regiments and about 200 Gordon's Egyptians from Khartoum.
"_February_ 14.--Marched at dawn 8 miles, and halted for breakfast.
Outposts, just as we were about to resume march, sent in report of
approach of large force of Arabs--mounted men, riflemen, and spearmen.
The Column was formed up, the wounded in the centre surrounded by
camels lying down, and outside them the Egyptian soldiers. The Camel
Corps troops were formed in two squares, one of the Heavy and Guards'
Camel Regiments in front of the Column, and the other of the Mounted
Infantry in rear. Skirmishers were sent into the bush to feel for the
enemy. The enemy opened fire and worked all round our force,
apparently trying to ascertain our weakest point. It was impossible to
estimate the strength of the enemy owing to the thick bush, but a
considerable number of riflemen, supported by a large {321} force of
spearmen, were seen, and about 30 horsemen were counted. After the
affair had lasted about two hours, and we had lost 8 men killed and
wounded, the Light Camel Regiment on the march to Gubat appeared
unexpectedly, and narrowly escaped becoming engaged with us, owing to
both forces being unaware of the proximity of the other, and through
the bush it was difficult to distinguish the Arabs from ourselves. No
doubt the arrival of the Light Camel Regiment accounted for the sudden
disappearance of the enemy."
It was Colonel Brabazon (now Major-General Sir J. P. Brabazon, C.B.,
C.V.O.), second in command of the Light Camel Corps, who, when the
Column had marched nearly half-way from Abu Klea to Metemmeh, went to
his commanding officer, Colonel Stanley Clarke, and suggested that the
Column should be immediately diverted to the scene of action. Colonel
Brabazon led the Column in the direction of the firing, and his two or
three hundred camels made so great a dust that the Arabs thought a
whole army was advancing upon their flank, and instantly fled away.
The result was that, hidden in the bush, the Light Camel Corps occupied
the ground vacated by the enemy, unknown to the convoy, which continued
to fire at the place they supposed the Arabs to be. General Brabazon's
account of the affair, which he very kindly sent to me, is as follows:
"I halted the Column, and the bush being very thick, the trees stopped
most of the bullets; nevertheless, they were knocking up the dust at
the feet of our camels, and a bullet struck my mess-tin. I ordered our
regimental call to be sounded, 'The Camels (Campbells) are coming,'
'Lights Out,' and finally 'Dinners.' But it was not until two or three
of us pushed our way through the bush into the open, whence I saw the
convoy preparing to give us another volley, that they realised we were
friends and not foes, and precious glad they were to see us. They had
only a small escort and were of course hampered with the sick and
wounded, and I think everyone who was there will agree {322} that they
were in a bad way.... I dined at the Guards' mess afterwards, and
Douglas Dawson said that he had just given his men the range
preparatory to their firing another volley, when he put up his glasses
and made out the helmets and red morocco coverings of the camel
saddles, and shouted, 'Come down! They are our fellows.' Then, Dawson
said, his soldier servant, who was standing behind him, remarked: 'Why,
I could have told you they were our fellows ten minutes before!' I
suppose he had recognised the 'Dinners' call."
So ended a comedy which had come very near to being a tragedy.
Gordon's Egyptian soldiers, who were carrying the wounded, put the
litters down when the firing began. Among the wounded were poor Sir
Herbert Stewart, devotedly nursed by Major Frank Rhodes, Major Poe,
Royal Marines, Sub-Lieutenant E. L. Munro and Lieutenant Charles
Crutchley. Poe and Crutchley each had a leg amputated. All the
wounded were lying helpless on the sand, listening to the firing, and
moment by moment expecting the terrible Dervish rush. A violent death
was very close to them, when Brabazon and his men came in the nick of
time. The convoy had one of the narrowest escapes in the history of
the British Army. It remains to add that Colonel Brabazon received no
recognition of his action of any kind from the authorities.
Colonel Talbot had been continuously employed upon the difficult and
arduous convoy duty since the arrival of the Desert Column at Gubat on
the 21st. Two days later Talbot started to return to Jakdul to fetch